

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

CONFIDENTIAL

(13025)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MOROCCO

PART 58

JULY TO DECEMBER 1925

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Morocco.

PART 58.

CHAPTER I.—MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MOROCCO.

(a.) Franco-Spanish Agreement and Security of Tangier.

[W 6267/18/28]

No. 1.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, July 1, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 72 to Foreign Office.

Head of Morocco section himself admits that there is at present little smuggling of arms along coast, and alleges that it is the President who insists on establishment of proposed control, which is intended to prevent importation of supplies of all kinds.

Neither does he pretend that arms are being supplied to rebels in any quantity from Tangier, and I understand that it is international supply of provisions which it is desired to control. Under new scheme now being negotiated, it is proposed that whilst French contingent (and also British contingent, if one is sent) [? groups omitted], Spanish force would form cordon round the town of Tangier in order to prevent passage of supplies intended for rebels and also ingress of undesirables, without, however, interfering with legitimate commerce.

Another proposal is to obtain power for Mendoub instead of merely to expel undesirable natives, to arrest them and hand them over to authorities of zone to which they belong.

(Addressed to Tangier, No. 9.)

[W 6220/18/28]

No. 2.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Madrid, July 1, 1925.

SPANISH Government inform me that they have received information to the effect that Captain Sarell, apparently British subject, who has lately returned from the Riff where he assisted rebels by recruiting foreign wireless and telephone experts and artillery instructors, proposes to embark at Tilbury on steamship "Orama," of Orient Line, for Gibraltar, whence he will return to the Riff via Tangier.

They communicate this information, accuracy of which they cannot guarantee, for such action as is considered desirable.

(Sent to Tangier and Gibraltar.)

[W 5351/186/28]

No. 3.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris), No. 2244,
and Mr. Gurney (Madrid), No. 351.

My Lord (Sir),

Foreign Office, July 1, 1925.

I TRANSMIT herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier, in which he reports a tentative suggestion by Marshal Lyautey that His Majesty's Government should use their good offices to put an end to the war in Morocco.

2. It is manifestly to the interests of this country that peace should be restored to Morocco as soon as possible, and His Majesty's Government do not desire for this reason to exclude altogether the possibility of British mediation. For the present their policy will be to watch the situation and to reserve their good offices for the moment, which has not yet arrived, when, in their own opinion, they are likely to be of real value. An essential condition of intervention would, of course, be a formal invitation from all three parties.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6252/39/28]

No. 4.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 1460.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 30th June, 1925 (with enclosures), respecting the agreement between French and Spanish Governments regarding the surveillance of the Moroccan coast.

Paris, July 1, 1925.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Ambassador.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 30 juin 1925.

J'AI l'honneur de faire parvenir, ci-joint, à votre Excellence, en la priant de vouloir bien en donner connaissance au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, deux avis relatifs aux dispositions prises, conjointement, par la France et l'Espagne pour l'exercice de la surveillance maritime des côtes du Maroc.

Ces deux documents doivent être communiqués, demain, 1^{er} juillet, aux représentants, à Paris, des Puissances intéressées, comme ils l'ont été, à Madrid, par les soins du Directoire.

Vous trouverez également sous ce pli, le texte de l'accord conclu, le 22 de ce mois, entre la France et l'Espagne, au sujet de la surveillance maritime des côtes de l'Empire chérifien.

Bien que l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Madrid ait été mis, au jour le jour, au courant de l'état de la négociation relative à cet objet et en ait certainement informé le Foreign Office, le Gouvernement de la République tient, de son côté, à lui donner connaissance, à titre confidentiel, du texte même des mesures arrêtées, de concert entre les Gouvernements français et espagnol.

Veuillez, &c.

(Pour le Ministre des Affaires étrangères),
[Illisible.]

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy.

APRÈS entente avec le Gouvernement espagnol, le Gouvernement français a l'honneur d'adresser à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique à Paris l'information suivante :

Au large du littoral des territoires français et espagnols, tant de souveraineté que de protectorat, situés au nord et à l'ouest de l'Afrique et compris entre le 2^e degré de longitude ouest de Greenwich et le 27^e degré de latitude nord, les bâtiments de guerre français et espagnols assureront conjointement la stricte observation des dispositions internationales et des règlements interdisant, d'une part, tout accès des côtes marocaines en dehors des ports ouverts, et, d'autre part, toute importation d'armes et de matériel de guerre au Maroc. A cet effet, lesdits bâtiments surveilleront et visiteront, s'il y a lieu, conformément aux usages internationaux en pareille matière, tous les navires qui seraient soupçonnés, pour des motifs raisonnables, de contrevenir aux prescriptions visées.

Cette surveillance portera aussi bien sur les armes, les munitions et le matériel de guerre que sur les marchandises suspectes d'être dirigées sur des ports ou des mouillages naturels, non ouverts au commerce.

Paris, le 30 juin 1925.

Enclosure 3 in No. 4.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy.

APRÈS entente avec le Gouvernement espagnol, le Gouvernement français a l'honneur d'adresser à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique à Paris l'information suivante :

Dans l'ensemble des côtes soumises à la surveillance conjointe des bâtiments de guerre espagnols et français, conformément à l'avis donné à la date de ce jour aux représentants des Puissances intéressées à Paris, les Gouvernements français et espagnol distinguent, pour les limites et modalités de surveillance, deux catégories de secteurs.

Dans les secteurs comprenant des ports ouverts au commerce ou traversés par des routes commerciales, la surveillance est limitée aux 6 milles des eaux territoriales, avec droit de suite, en dehors de cette limite.

Dans les autres secteurs, la surveillance s'étend jusqu'aux limites particulières définies ci-dessous :

1. Atlantique : Secteur compris entre le cap Ghir et le cap Noun. La surveillance s'exerce dans l'est de la ligne joignant les points situés à 6 milles à l'ouest de ces deux caps.
2. Méditerranée : Secteur compris entre le cap des Trois Fourches et le cap Negro (nord de Tétouan). La surveillance s'exerce dans le sud de la ligne joignant ces deux caps.

En outre, la présence et les organisations des dissidents sur la côte rendant difficiles et même dangereuses aussi bien la navigation commerciale que les opérations de contrôle des bâtiments de guerre aux abords du littoral, les eaux territoriales de ce secteur, limitées à 6 milles, sont interdites à la navigation entre le cap Mazari (sud de Tétouan) et la pointe Abdun ou Afraout (est d'Alhucemas). En conséquence, tout navire de commerce rencontré par des bâtiments de guerre dans la zone prohibée sans pouvoir y justifier sa présence sera déféré à l'autorité compétente.

La surveillance maritime dans les eaux territoriales de la zone de Tanger s'exercera conformément aux stipulations de l'article 4 de la convention du 18 décembre 1923.

Les bâtiments et embarcations qui seront reconnus par les navires de surveillance comme se livrant au trafic des armes, munitions, matériel de guerre et marchandises suspectées d'être dirigées sur des ports ou mouillages naturels non ouverts au commerce, seront déferés à la juridiction locale compétente.

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Les dispositions qui précèdent étant motivées par les événements actuels n'ont, de ce fait, qu'un caractère provisoire et les hautes parties contractantes se réservent le droit de les modifier après entente préalable.

Paris, le 30 juin 1925.

Enclosure 4 in No. 4.

Accord entre la France et l'Espagne pour la Surveillance maritime des Côtes du Maroc.

LES représentants de la France et de l'Espagne à la commission réunie à Madrid en vertu de l'accord franco-espagnol du 4 juin 1925, dûment autorisés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, ont conclu l'accord suivant, qui a reçu l'approbation du Gouvernement de la République française et du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté catholique et qui entrera en vigueur immédiatement :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes consentent mutuellement à ce que, au large du littoral des territoires espagnols et français, tant de souveraineté que de protectorat, situés au nord et à l'ouest de l'Afrique et compris entre le 2^e ouest de Greenwich et le 27^e de latitude nord, leurs bâtiments de guerre respectifs assurent conjointement la stricte observation des dispositions internationales et règlements interdisant, d'une part, tout accès des côtes marocaines en dehors des ports ouverts et, d'autre part, toutes importations d'armes et de matériel de guerre au Maroc.

ARTICLE 2.

A cet effet, lesdits bâtiments surveilleront et visiteront, s'il y a lieu, conformément aux usages internationaux en pareille matière, tous les navires qui seraient soupçonnés, pour des motifs raisonnables, de contrevenir aux prescriptions visées.

Cette surveillance portera aussi bien sur les armes, les munitions et le matériel de guerre que sur les marchandises suspectes d'être dirigées sur des ports ou des mouillages naturels non ouverts au commerce.

ARTICLE 3.

Les bâtiments et embarcations qui seront reconnus par les navires de surveillance comme se livrant aux opérations illicites visées aux articles ci-dessus seront déferés à la juridiction locale compétente.

ARTICLE 4.

Dans toute l'étendue de la zone de surveillance définie à l'article 1^{er}, les bâtiments de guerre des deux nations auront les mêmes droits et les mêmes pouvoirs. Les commandements des forces navales resteront nettement distincts; ils régleront en toute indépendance l'emploi et la répartition de leurs unités respectives, tout en maintenant entre eux une liaison étroite par la communication constante et réciproque de tous les renseignements utiles à l'accomplissement de leur mission.

ARTICLE 5.

Les forces navales affectées à la surveillance pourront utiliser normalement pour les besoins de leur croisière tous les ports de la côte marocaine ouverts au commerce. En outre, les bâtiments espagnols pourront relâcher à Oran, Nemours, de même que les bâtiments français à Algésiras, Malaga et Almería.

ARTICLE 6.

Les bâtiments de guerre de l'une des nations ne pourront débarquer aucune force armée sur un territoire placé sous la souveraineté ou dans la zone d'influence de l'autre nation.

Dans le cas où une action militaire serait entreprise par l'une des Puissances dans un secteur ou sur un point du littoral placé dans sa zone d'influence, le chef de la force navale de l'autre Puissance s'abstiendrait pendant la durée de l'opération de faire participer ses bâtiments à la surveillance de ce secteur ou de ce point.

Par application de ce principe, les bâtiments de guerre français s'abstiendront dès maintenant de pénétrer dans l'intérieur de la baie d'Alhucemas.

ARTICLE 7.

Les modalités d'exécution et les dispositions techniques de détail que nécessitera la mise en application de la présente convention feront l'objet d'instructions concertées entre les autorités navales espagnoles et françaises et qui seront soumises à l'approbation de la commission.

ARTICLE 8.

Les dispositions de la présente convention ne s'appliquent pas à la partie du littoral qui a déjà fait l'objet des stipulations de l'article 4 de la convention du 18 décembre 1923, relatives à la surveillance maritime dans les eaux territoriales de la zone de Tanger.

ARTICLE 9.

Les dispositions qui précèdent étant motivées par les événements actuels n'ont, de ce fait, qu'un caractère provisoire et les hautes parties contractantes se réservent le droit de les modifier après entente préalable, ou de dénoncer le présent engagement soit d'un commun accord, soit à la diligence de l'une des deux parties moyennant un préavis de quinze jours.

E. DE PERETTI DE LA ROCCA.
SORBIER DE POUGNADORESSE.
G. JORDAN.
M. AGUIRRE DE GARCER.

Madrid, le 22 juin 1925.

[W 6399/39/28]

No. 5.

Marquis Merry del Val to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Spanish Embassy, London, July 2, 1925.

I HAVE been charged by the Government of His Majesty the King my August Sovereign to inform your Excellency that as a result of an agreement between the Government of His Catholic Majesty and of the French Republic, Spanish and French warships will jointly watch the coast of Spanish territory of the international Tangier zone and of the Spanish and French protectorates, that is to say, the coasts of North and West Africa, between the second degree longitude west of Greenwich and 27th degree north latitude, in order to enforce the strict observance of the international rules and regulations forbidding on the one hand all access to the coasts of Morocco with the exception of the open ports, and on the other the importation into that country of arms and munitions of war of every kind. To this end the above-mentioned naval units will watch and visit, if necessary, in conformity with international usage in the matter, all ships which afford ground for suspicion as infringing the said rules and regulations. These operations will apply both to arms, munitions and material of warlike character, as also to those goods which it is suspected are going to ports or natural anchorages not open to commerce.

While thus carrying out the instructions received, I avail, &c.

ALFONSO MERRY DEL VAL.

[W 6303/39/28]

No. 6.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 2, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 34.

I submit following observations on three proposals:—

1. Apart from 6,000 refugees, of whom 2,000 men, there are several hundred natives from Spanish zone residing in Tangier. To round up and hand over these natives to Spanish authorities would, apart from other considerations, be physical impossibility for Tangier Administration. Yet Spanish Government may claim that all these men are potential enemies. But to do so would destroy in the eyes

of Abd-el-Krim and all so-called rebels any respect now and in the future for neutrality of Tangier. Effect would be the same if proposal only applies to future entrants into this zone, if in these are included unarmed men and women coming to market. Judging by his letters Abd-el-Krim perfectly understands meaning of neutrality. To jeopardise his respect for neutrality of Tangier would be worst dis-service one could render to future prosperity of Tangier. On the other hand, should Spaniards be able to indicate that certain individual natives are actively intriguing against them in Tangier, then it is quite reasonable that Mendoub be requested to expel them.

2. There are in Tangier zone sixty-five villages besides town of Tangier. Captain Pannibières estimates that they could furnish 1,500 fighting men with rifles. In Tangier most of the native families are said to possess fire-arms.

Physical difficulties of disarmament apply as above mentioned. But to a native his rifle is his greatest treasure, and rather than be disarmed natives would cross the frontier to join enemies of Spain.

At a time when statute is unpopular and cost of living greater, no more unpopular measure could be devised than wholesale disarming of natives.

On the other hand, in Tangier itself I strongly favour idea that when administration is more firmly established there should be gradual disarmament, especially in town, which would probably have to be maintained by purchase as has been done in the two French zones.

3. I record my considered opinion, which is shared by experienced people, that, that Abd-el-Krim will not attack Tangier zone provided neutrality of Tangier is strictly maintained. I would point out, moreover, that section of Tangier zone occupied by Spanish part of international contingent would, for the time being, become to all intention a section of Spanish zone.

4. Finally, I do not consider supplies obtainable by rebels from Tangier have any material effect on struggle.

(a.) As regards food-stuffs, natives have just gathered harvest; they have summer fruits and honey. They lack sugar and tea and are short of flour, but amount received from Tangier under existing conditions (Spanish blockade has admittedly been successful) is not sufficient to affect campaign;

(b.) As regards war material (see my telegram No. 72), Captain Pannibières to-day told me that he had just bought 200 Spanish cartridges in market. I am convinced that Spanish authorities, by strict supervision of all Spanish soldiers entering zone, would stop traffic in cartridges.

Moreover, Captain Pannibières considers it feasible to have natives leaving Tangier for Spanish zone searched for contraband. I recommend both these measures. I do not believe altogether that absolute closing of frontier, which is 28 miles long and which would require, I am informed, force of 5,000 men, would compel surrounding tribes to come to terms so long as Abd-el-Krim forced them to go on fighting.

[W 6318/39/28]

No. 7.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, July 2, 1925.

PRESIDENT of Directorate, who has just returned from Morocco, gave me his views on the situation yesterday.

In his opinion, a permanent settlement is not possible until Abd-el-Krim has received severe punishment. If peace were made with him now Riff would very soon become centre for undesirables from all parts of the world and would constitute a serious danger for Europe. Once, however, a defeat were inflicted on him tribes which now follow him under compulsion would abandon his standard and be only too ready to submit to Spain. In President's opinion, therefore, which was, he said, shared by Marshal Lyautey, is that operations should be begun at once against Abd-el-Krim.

He had spoken in this sense to M. Malvy, who arrived yesterday from Paris, but latter felt that public opinion, both in France and elsewhere, demanded that all attempts should be made in the first instance to negotiate with Abd-el-Krim.

Matter would now be discussed by Franco-Spanish Commission, and if it were decided to offer terms they would be formulated and submitted by France and Spain jointly with least possible delay, and an immediate answer would be demanded, so that if they were rejected operations could be begun whilst the season was still favourable.

All preparations had been made for a landing at Alhucemas, and he was convinced that operations could be successfully concluded within a month.
(Sent to Tangier.)

[W 6319/39/28]

No. 8.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Madrid, July 2, 1925.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

As regards Tangier, President said he was apprehensive of trouble from native inhabitants of zone. They had hitherto kept quiet as they had been well disposed towards French, but they now held them in equal aversion to Spaniards and rising was quite possible.

Proposal was being made in one of the arrangements now under discussion by Commission for Disarmament of Natives.

This he thinks would be effected within a fortnight if proposal to send forces to Tangier is adopted—of course he said as a purely provisional measure and with concurrence of Committee of Control.

He dwelt on necessity for constitution of cordon round Tangier for prevention of passage of supplies to rebels, and explained how persons passing between Tangier and villages in Fahs would not be interfered with.

In reply to question from me, he said it was not suggested arms were coming from Tangier, though ammunition was.

On this I alluded to report that Spanish soldiers were in the habit of supplying ammunition to natives. He admitted frankly that some barter of cartridges did go on, but my suggestion that measures might be taken to put a stop to practice met with no response.

He did not mention question of British co-operation.
(Sent to Tangier.)

[W 6270/18/28]

No. 9.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 2269.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 2, 1925.

I ASKED the French Ambassador to call this morning in order that I might make to him two communications. The first dealt with the proposals made to me by the Spanish Ambassador for dealing with the Moroccan situation. I told his Excellency that, pending a communication from him as to the views of the French Government, I had made no reply to the Spanish Ambassador, but that His Majesty's Government had given most careful consideration to the Spanish proposals, and I was anxious that the French Government should know our views upon them before their promised communication was made to us.

In the first place, I desired to state that His Majesty's Government felt the greatest interest in the international character and the neutrality of the Tangier zone, and if the zone were seriously menaced, His Majesty's Government would do their part in its defence. His Majesty's Government recognised their obligations under article 4 of the Tangier Convention, and, subject to being satisfied as to the international position and to the rights of the three Governments to act as suggested, they were prepared to co-operate in the prevention of contraband traffic within the territorial waters of the Tangier zone. They did not, however, think that it was expedient or desirable that British action should extend to the territorial waters of the French or Spanish protectorates.

His Excellency interrupted me at this point to say that the proposal agreed at Madrid, and which he understood he would be instructed to support, was for this naval surveillance to be exercised within a 6-mile limit, which I understood him to consider was justified by something which had passed at Washington. I said that this was a wholly different proposition, to which I could certainly give no assent without further enquiry and consultation. In order to examine it I must wait for the promised communication from the French Government, which will no doubt fully explain the grounds upon which it is made and justified.

M. de Fleuriau here observed that there had been some disorder in the communications, and the instructions of himself and the Spanish Ambassador had not kept pace. The Spanish Ambassador had been directed to make a communication before M. de Fleuriau had received any instructions, and M. de Fleuriau had now received instructions to make another communication, whilst the Spanish Ambassador was still without any corresponding advice. These instructions related to some communication that it was proposed by the two Governments to address to other Powers. His Excellency told me that a telegram giving the views of the French Government on the Madrid proposals was being decyphered at the moment when he left the Embassy, and that in the course of the day he expected to be in a position to make a full communication to me, which he hoped would include the actual texts of the two agreements made at Madrid, one of which dealt with general arrangements for surveillance by land and for co-ordinated action between the French and Spanish authorities, and the other, which was supplementary, with the proposals in regard to the Tangier zone.

I told his Excellency that, as I had not yet received any communication of the views of the French Government, I had hoped that my communication would be in time to enable the French Government to consider our views before definitely deciding on their own course. The Ambassador replied that he would, of course, transmit these views to his Government, but that he might be obliged to act on the instructions which he had already received, and he trusted that I should not object to his taking this course if necessary.

I, of course, said that there could be no idea of my objecting to any communication of the views of the French Government, though I should wish them to have the earliest possible information as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I had spoken of the proposed naval surveillance: I now came to the proposal to send a joint Franco-Spanish-British force to the Tangier zone. To this proposal His Majesty's Government remained strongly opposed. They held now, as when I last discussed the question with him, that, according to our information, the Tangier zone was in no immediate danger from Abd-el-Krim, who would be very unwilling to attack it, provided its neutrality were properly safeguarded, but that to send such a force at the present time might probably be regarded by Abd-el-Krim as a direct provocation, and might precipitate the very attack which we were anxious to avoid. Further, I could not help feeling that such action on our part would certainly raise that "Mediterranean question" of the existence of which I for my part had no knowledge, but of which Italian statesmen and publicists were always talking. His Majesty's Government therefore regarded this proposal as bringing danger nearer to the protectorate and as almost certain to raise further international complications.

M. de Fleuriau confined himself to observing that he understood that this proposal had been made by the Spanish negotiators a condition *sine qua non* of co-operation between the French and Spanish authorities. The conversations in Madrid had proceeded most satisfactorily and the relations between the Governments and the military authorities of the two countries were more satisfactory than they had been.

I shall make a similar communication to the Spanish Ambassador this afternoon.

I then passed to a different subject, namely, the proposed pact of security. I told his Excellency that I hoped to be in a position to send him to-morrow the draft which His Majesty's Government would suggest as carrying out the objects of the note sent to Germany by the French Government with our previous agreement. M. de Fleuriau told me that he had in his pocket a French draft which had been prepared by M. Fromageot, but had not yet been examined by M. Briand. In these circumstances he did not wish to leave me a copy of it, but he would read it to me. I cannot, of course, pretend to have formed a considered

judgment on a document of this importance, which has only been read to me in course of conversation, but, as far as I could judge, the text of the draft conformed closely to the policy upon which His Majesty's Government have agreed, and gave promise of an early and even an easy agreement between the two Governments upon the text to be submitted to the Germans.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6302/39/28]

No. 10.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Gurney (Madrid).

(No. 361.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 2, 1925.

I HAVE just seen the Spanish Ambassador, whom I asked to call in order that I might make to him a declaration as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Morocco similar to that which I had made this morning to M. de Fleuriau. I told his Excellency that after his interview with me on Monday I had naturally expected an almost immediate communication on the same subject from the French Ambassador, but that, for reasons of which he was doubtless aware, M. de Fleuriau, as he had explained to me, had not yet received his instructions. In these circumstances, having regard to the importance of his communication and the great interest of the Spanish Government in it, I had thought it right to examine it without waiting for the French conclusions, and, as His Majesty's Government had come to certain decisions, I had explained their character to M. de Fleuriau this morning, in the hope that they would be in time for consideration by the French Government before M. de Fleuriau's instructions were finally issued.

I said that His Majesty's Government took great interest in the international character and the neutrality of the Tangier zone, and that if they thought it was in danger they would be prepared to take their part in its defence. As regards the proposals specifically laid before me by the Ambassador, His Majesty's Government, subject to an examination of the international position and to being satisfied that the three Powers concerned had the right to take the contemplated action, were prepared to co-operate in the naval surveillance of the territorial waters of the Tangier zone; but that they thought it undesirable and inexpedient that they should participate in the policing of the territorial waters of the French and Spanish Protectorates. I added that, when I had informed M. de Fleuriau of this decision, he had explained to me that the surveillance was intended to extend to 6 miles—a proposal which had appeared to the French Government to be justified by something that had passed at Washington.

The Spanish Ambassador explained that the allusion was to our agreement with the United States for the search beyond the limit of territorial waters of suspected rum-runners. I replied that this, in any case, raised a quite different question, and obviously required a wider international agreement before it could be enforced; but I would reserve any expression of opinion upon it until the exact proposal and the grounds on which it was justified had been communicated to me.

I then turned to the proposal to land a composite French-Spanish-British force in the Tangier zone, and to this proposal I said His Majesty's Government felt the strongest objection. They did not think an attack by Abd-el-Krim on the zone probable at the present moment, but they thought that such action by the three Powers within the zone might very likely provoke an attack, and create the very incident which we were anxious to avoid. Further, they were of opinion that it would almost certainly evoke an Italian claim to intervention, and lead to international complications which were certainly not in the interest of either France or Spain or of anyone interested in Tangier.

As regards the minor proposals, such as the action to be taken by the Mendoub, or the suggested disarmament of the inhabitants of the Fahs district, I would express no definite opinion. They seemed to me matters which primarily concerned the Tangier Administration, and on which His Majesty's Government would be largely guided by local opinion as to their necessity and effect.

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His Excellency replied that his Government would regret our decision in so far as it concerned participation in the policing of the waters of the two Protectorates. This had been an invitation rather than a request, dictated by the feeling that the presence of a third party like ourselves would facilitate harmonious relations between the two Powers immediately concerned, and would mark the international character of the Tangier question.

As to the proposed landing of the composite force, he must say that his Government attached the greatest importance to this proposal, for the reasons which he had explained to me the other day. They would view our decision with sincere regret, and they would be obliged to consider whether it was not necessary for them, or for them and the French, to take some action of the kind even without our participation. He had, he reminded me, read to me the other day a passage in the conclusions of the Madrid Conference in which France and Spain, in contemplation of the possibility of our refusal, had decided to confer as to what, in that eventuality, it might be proper for them to do.

I told his Excellency that I remembered his reference to the subject, but, as he had only alluded to it in passing, I had not felt called upon to take the matter up with him then or to make any observations upon it; but, since he laid greater stress upon it to-day, I must say at once that, whilst I could have no objection to France and Spain taking counsel together upon learning of our refusal, I assumed that they would come to no decisions, or at least take no action, without first informing His Majesty's Government of their intentions, and taking into their friendly and serious consideration the views which His Majesty's Government might express. Meanwhile, I must say to him frankly that it seemed to me that, if there were objections to the sending of a joint force by the three Powers into the Tangier zone at this moment, those objections would be infinitely stronger to any action by one or by two of the Powers without the participation of the third. I conceived, indeed, that it might have very grave consequences and produce very serious international complications of which I was most unwilling even to contemplate the possibility.

The Ambassador thanked me for the frankness and precision with which I had defined the position of His Majesty's Government. He repeated that that decision would certainly cause great regret and disappointment to the Spanish Government, whose proposals had been inspired by the desire to maintain the international character and neutrality of the Tangier zone in which I had declared so strong a British interest, and by the inability, as he had already indicated to me, of Spain to continue to make the sacrifices which she had borne now for many years in protecting the zone from outside.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6315/39/28]

No. 11.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 74.

Madrid, July 2, 1925.

Head of Morocco Section tells me that at yesterday's meeting of commission, which M. Malvy attended as principal French delegate, latter stated that French Government concurred in proposal for despatch of forces to Tangier zone, but he was not yet in a position to sign agreement in regard thereto. I am sending by bag proposed text of agreement. I do not telegraph it, as I understand Spanish Ambassador has given you full information.

(Sent to Tangier.)

[W 6324/39/28]

No. 12.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, July 2, 1925.

FOLLOWING is continuation of my immediately preceding telegram:—

My telegram No. 74.

Commission then discussed terms of peace which it has agreed in principle to submit to Abd-el-Krim. Terms proposed by Spaniards comprise offer of large measure of administrative independence with high-sounding title and subvention.

They should be definitely formulated within a week and will then be submitted at once to Abd-el-Krim in form of ultimatum so that if he rejects them operations can be begun against him in the course of the present month.

All necessary preparations have been made, he says, for landing at Alhucemas, but scheme for co-operation with French has not yet been elaborated. This could be done, however, very quickly, as French technical experts are here.

(Sent to Tangier.)

[W 6339/39/28]

No. 13.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 2285.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 3, 1925.

THE French Ambassador called this morning in pursuance of an appointment made at his request.

He informed me that he had sought the appointment in order to present a reply to the note which I had addressed to him on the subject of inter-Allied debts, but that at the last moment he had received instructions to delay the presentation of the note in order that some verbal alterations might be made in it. He took the opportunity, however, to read to me a note from the French Government upon the situation in Morocco, of which he left me the original, as well as a copy of the notification to foreign Governments of the agreement arrived at between the Governments of France and Spain in regard to the surveillance of contraband traffic on the coast of Morocco. This document was dated Paris, 30th June, and extended to six paragraphs.

His Excellency explained that, had it not been for the statement which I made to him yesterday of the attitude of His Majesty's Government, it was probable that he would have had to support the Spanish proposals with greater insistence; but he dwelt upon the great desire of the French Government to act in agreement with His Majesty's Government as well as with the Directory in all measures relating to the Tangier zone. His Excellency said that he was quite prepared to continue diplomatic negotiations with me, but the question was in so large a measure one of military defence that he believed that conversations between the military authorities of the three countries would be more appropriate.

I said that upon this point I should desire to consult my colleagues, and in particular the Secretary of State for War, and would take the earliest opportunity of doing so. Meanwhile I could only repeat what I had said to his Excellency yesterday, as recorded in my despatch No. 2269 of yesterday's date, and added that, unless His Majesty's Government became convinced that there was a real menace to the neutrality and the safety of Tangier, I thought it in the highest degree unlikely that their opinion upon the proposed international force would change. I thought it necessary to tell the Ambassador of the insistence with which the Marquis Merry del Val had yesterday referred to the clause in the Madrid agreement which provided for France and Spain taking the situation into their consideration in the event of Great Britain declining to participate in sending an international force. The Marquis Merry del Val had even suggested that Spain might act alone. I told M. de Fleury that I had listened to this suggestion with some anxiety, and had at once pointed out to the Spanish

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Ambassador that whatever the objections to the landing of a three-Power force they must be greater in the case of a force drawn from two Powers only, and still greater if the forces were drawn from Spain alone. Any such action would, in my opinion, give rise to the gravest international complications and must be avoided. In any case I assumed that the French and Spanish Governments would take no action without first communicating their intentions to us and giving their friendly and serious attention to whatever observations we might think it right to make.

I then referred to the contemplated joint action in the surveillance of the Moroccan waters. I said that I did not believe that there was in fact any illicit importation of arms and certainly not any important importation. At the same time I was anxious to give satisfaction to Spanish anxieties and Spanish wishes on this point, especially when they were supported by the French Government, and that, as he was aware, His Majesty's Government were quite ready to co-operate in the territorial waters of the Tangier zone (subject only to our being satisfied that the three Powers were in a sound position in point of law), but that the proposal now made to extend the supervision beyond the 3-mile limit raised questions of principle on which he knew how strong were the views not only of the British Admiralty but of all British Governments.

Upon this his Excellency first read and then handed to me a separate sheet which contains paragraphs 7 and 8 of the memorandum, dated Paris, the 30th June. I told his Excellency that I could say nothing upon the subject without consultation, but he would readily anticipate the probable attitude of His Majesty's Government from his knowledge of the British views on this question.

As regards the minor but still important proposals sketched to me by the Spanish Ambassador, such as the instructions to be given to the Moudoub to hand over fugitives from the Spanish zone to the Spanish authorities and for the disarmament of the inhabitants of Fahs, I observed that suggestions of this kind ought, perhaps, to proceed from the Tangier administration, and that in any case I should be largely guided by advice from those upon the spot, but as a general principle of conduct I would observe that we ought to take all necessary steps to prevent the neutrality of the Tangier zone from being infringed by the use of that zone as a basis of supply for the tribes that were in revolt. I was, however, a little doubtful whether the suggested measures were necessary or wise, and above all I could not help a certain anxiety lest the effect and even the intention of the Spanish proposal should be to transfer the defence of the Spanish protectorate from the protectorate itself to the territory of the Tangier zone. I should view with great distrust any proposal which seemed likely to make, or to have the appearance of making, the Tangier zone itself the base of operations against the rebellious tribes.

I gathered from his Excellency's general attitude and from some of the observations which he made in the course of our conversation that the French Government finds itself considerably embarrassed by the Spanish proposals. At the same time they feel it of great consequence to secure a friendly agreement with Spain and to cultivate the improved relations which have arisen out of the Madrid conversations. I am almost inclined to infer that our resistance is not unwelcome to the French Government, but that events in the French protectorate and their relations with the Spanish Government prevent them from doing more than insisting upon the necessity of acting in agreement with the British Government, and that the onus of rejecting the Spanish proposals will be left entirely to us. My language will have shown M. de Fleuriau that we shall, if necessary, take this responsibility.

In order that M. de Fleuriau might be fully informed of all that passed between M. Briand and myself, I read to him, before he left, my personal letter to M. Briand, of which I sent your Lordship a copy by last night's bag.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6340/39/28]

No. 14.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Madrid, July 3, 1925.

MY telegram No. 77.

Second French delegate tells me that refusal to sign agreement was due to fact that French Government wished first to obtain concurrence of His Majesty's Government in proposal, and they desired in any case certain modifications on points detailed.

(Sent to Tangier.)

[W 6361/39/28]

No. 15.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tangier, July 3, 1925.

MY telegram No. 74.

My French colleague tells me that personally he shares my views.

I venture to submit that His Majesty's Government are justified in refusing compliance with demand for military occupation of Tangier zone failing overwhelming evidence to support it.

No one can pretend that there is any danger from natives of zone, and there is every reason to believe that Abd-el-Krim will continue to respect neutrality under present conditions unless Spaniards deliberately provoke trouble. Spaniards themselves admit that contraband smuggling is insignificant. There remains as sole justification for international occupation demand of Spaniards for blockade to prevent food-stuffs from Tangier reaching Spanish zone.

If Spaniards attach so much importance to this, it should be easy for their agents to notify their consul-general in time to warn Spanish camp at Rgaia by telephone or wireless so as to [group omitted] for any convoy to be cut off on entering Spanish zone.

I cannot avoid impression that Spanish demand for military occupation, removal of Spanish consul-general, who has done his best to help forward statute, and persistent demands of Spanish press in Morocco for a new conference, should be considered together, and that whole question is bound up with political status of Tangier, which again enters the melting-pot as soon as neutrality is compromised.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[W 6359/39/28]

No. 16.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, July 4, 1925.

MY telegram No. 79.

Head of Morocco Department tells me that negotiations have come to a standstill as Spanish delegation declines to continue discussion of peace terms and other questions pending conclusion of definite agreement in regard to Tangier.

Reasons why Spanish Government attach importance to agreement have, I understand, been fully explained by Spanish Ambassador in London.

French delegation seem equally in favour of proposed measures, but they cannot sign agreement pending expression of opinion from His Majesty's Government, and they are annoyed at insolence of Spaniards on the subject.

There is a further point of disagreement in connection with delimitation of frontier between the two. French ask for cession of Beni Zerual district which is, they say, of no value to Spaniards and resent refusal of latter to agree to it, whilst Spaniards say that though they may ultimately consent to cession they do not see why they should give way to French in this matter when latter offer nothing in return.

(Sent to Tangier.)

[W 6378/39/28]

No. 17.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul-General Clive (Tangier).

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 5, 1925.

FRENCH Ambassador informs me that on the night of 29th June 300 armed Jebala and 100 Anjera escorted a tribal convoy into the Tangier zone and remained to ensure its safe return. French Government state that this is the first occasion on which tribesmen have made an armed incursion into the zone, and that both Marshal Lyautey and French consul-general take a serious view of the situation. The Ambassador adds that, in his opinion, incident constitutes violation by the tribesmen of the neutrality of Tangier.

I presume from your reports that French account of incident, if it really occurred, is much exaggerated, but I should be glad to have confirmation by telegraph.

[W 6377/39/28]

No. 18.

M. de Fleuriau to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 6.)

*Ambassade de France,
Londres, le 3 juillet 1925.*

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

VOTRE Excellence a bien voulu m'indiquer oralement hier l'opinion du Gouvernement britannique quant à deux démarches relatives aux affaires du Maroc que mon collègue et ami l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne avait fait auprès d'elle lundi dernier 29 juin. Elle m'avait prié en même temps de lui faire connaître le sentiment de mon Gouvernement au sujet de ces deux démarches, qui avaient été effectuées à la suite des pourparlers engagés à Madrid entre représentants français et espagnols chargés de conclure les accords les plus appropriés à mettre fin à l'état présent d'hostilités dans le nord du Maroc.

Je suis aujourd'hui autorisé à m'associer à la démarche de M. Merry del Val touchant la surveillance maritime dans les eaux marocaines, et à exprimer l'espoir que le Gouvernement britannique consentira à y participer, dans les eaux territoriales de la zone internationale de Tanger et même dans les eaux territoriales des zones française et espagnole du Maroc. Votre Excellence a déjà eu connaissance par l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Paris de l'accord franco-espagnol concernant la surveillance maritime, et je lui transmets, ci-joint, le texte d'une notification que je suis chargé de lui remettre à ce sujet.

Quant à la démarche de mon collègue espagnol relative aux mesures à prendre sur le territoire de la zone internationale de Tanger, ces mesures ont été examinées par les représentants à Madrid de la France et de l'Espagne, qui ont rédigé deux textes d'accords relatifs à la surveillance à exercer sur le territoire du Maroc, soit dans les deux zones française et espagnole, soit dans la zone internationale de Tanger. J'ai communiqué au Foreign Office le texte de ces deux documents. L'un qui concerne les deux zones française et espagnole du Maroc va probablement être ratifié par le Gouvernement français, sauf quelques modifications à l'article 4. L'accord relatif à la zone internationale de Tanger intéresse le Gouvernement britannique. La démarche de M. le Marquis Merry del Val du 29 juin portait sur certaines parties de cet accord, et votre Excellence m'a déjà fait connaître l'avis du Gouvernement britannique au sujet de l'exécution immédiate des propositions du Gouvernement espagnol. Je me contenterai aujourd'hui de lui marquer que le Gouvernement français tient essentiellement à s'entendre avec le Gouvernement britannique et le Gouvernement espagnol au sujet des mesures à prendre pour assurer la sécurité de la zone internationale de Tanger; la situation dans cette région est si grave que les trois Gouvernements intéressés doivent rechercher les moyens de parer aux dangers qui menacent la zone internationale. Le projet d'accord franco-espagnol offre une base à des études communes qu'il sera peut-être utile de faire suivre aussi par des officiers de nos trois pays.

Veuillez, &c.

A. DE FLEURIAU.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

Notification from the French Government.

LES Gouvernements français et espagnol ont conclu, le 22 juin, un accord provisoire pour la surveillance des côtes du Maroc.

2. En exécution de cet accord, le Gouvernement français avisera, le 1^{er} juillet (le Gouvernement espagnol le faisant de son côté), toutes les Puissances représentées à Paris de la mise en vigueur de la surveillance conjointe par les deux marines de la côte du nord du Maroc et côtes avoisinantes jusqu'au 2^e degré ouest de Greenwich, et de la côte ouest du Maroc et côte avoisinante jusqu'au 27^e degré de latitude nord.

3. Cette surveillance sera exercée normalement à l'intérieur des eaux territoriales, qui sont de 6 milles.

4. Elle sera toutefois étendue : (1) en Méditerranée, au large de la côte du Riff jusqu'à la ligne qui joint le cap des Trois Fourches au cap Négro; (2) dans l'Atlantique, au large de la côte d'Agadir et d'Ifni jusqu'à la ligne joignant les points situés à 6 milles à l'ouest du cap Ghir et du cap Noun.

5. La navigation commerciale demeure interdite dans les eaux territoriales de la côte (dissidente) du Riff.

6. La surveillance visée ci-dessus portera aussi bien sur les armes, munitions, matériel de guerre dont l'importation est interdite au Maroc, que sur les marchandises suspectes d'être dirigées sur des ports ou mouillages non ouverts au commerce.

7. Si l'extension de la surveillance au delà des eaux territoriales donnait lieu à des observations de la part du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, vous vous inspireriez dans votre réponse verbale des observations suivantes dont le texte a été arrêté d'accord entre les Gouvernements français et espagnol.

8. *Commentaires verbaux* : "En portant dans certains secteurs les limites de la surveillance en dehors des eaux territoriales, les hautes parties contractantes s'inspirent des considérations prises par le (Gouvernement américain) pour la répression de la contrebande de l'alcool et des dispositions prévues par les accords de Genève pour empêcher l'importation d'armes dans les pays non civilisés; toutefois, cette extension de la zone de surveillance est seulement appliquée dans deux secteurs du littoral étroitement définis et en des limites telles qu'elles ne puissent être une gêne pour la navigation commerciale."

Paris, le 30 juin 1925.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

*Projet d'Accord : Surveillance terrestre.*ARTICLE 1^{er}.

LES hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à interdire et réprimer tout trafic d'armes, de munitions, de matériel de guerre et de denrées de ravitaillement effectué par voie de terre avec les tribus des régions riffaines et djebalas, rebelles au Maghzen et poursuivant des hostilités contre les forces militaires de chacune des deux zones d'influence.

ARTICLE 2.

Le choix des moyens de surveillance et de répression est laissé à la décision respective des hautes autorités des deux zones, qui, dès la mise en vigueur du présent accord, devront se concerter pour arrêter des mesures communes et pour, autant que possible, mettre en harmonie, sur ce point, les lois et règlements des deux zones respectives.

ARTICLE 3.

Toute tentative de trafic interdit ou toute infraction à cette interdiction seront réprimées selon les lois et règlements en vigueur, ou qui viendraient à être promulgués d'accord entre les hautes autorités des deux zones, et suivant les usages locaux.

ARTICLE 4.

Les autorités locales poursuivront, conformément aux lois, règlements et usages locaux, les menées des indésirables et des suspects de tous lieux favorisant la rébellion au Maroc.

Elles se communiqueront les sanctions prises, le cas échéant, à leur rencontre.

L'accès du territoire de l'une des deux zones d'influence française ou espagnole demeurera interdit aux insoumis de l'autre zone. Il en sera de même de l'accès des territoires de l'une des deux hautes parties contractantes.

Tout sujet marocain de l'une des deux zones qui se rendrait dans la zone voisine sans autorisation des autorités de la zone dont il est le ressortissant pourra être réclamé par ces dernières, auxquelles il devra être remis par les autorités de l'autre zone.

ARTICLE 5.

La circulation des personnes de toute nationalité est interdite entre les zones occupées française et espagnole et les zones insoumises limitrophes.

Il en est de même de toute correspondance et de toute publication jugée contraire aux buts de pacification poursuivis par les deux Gouvernements.

ARTICLE 6

Les hautes autorités locales maintiendront entre elles une collaboration et une liaison étroite par la communication constante et réciproque de tous renseignements utiles concernant la situation politique et économique des zones rebelles, les trafics interdits, la surveillance des indésirables et des suspects et les mesures adoptées dans chacune des deux zones pour l'organisation de cette surveillance et la répression des menées poursuivies.

Cette collaboration sera assurée par les agents d'information et de liaison que les hautes autorités locales de chacune des deux zones seront invitées à désigner dès la mise en vigueur du présent accord.

ARTICLE 7.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour considérer qu'il convient, en vue du maintien et de l'observation de la stricte neutralité de la zone de Tanger, que cette ville et sa banlieue ne puissent être utilisées ni pour des menées tendant à favoriser ou à provoquer la rébellion au Maroc, ni pour les trafics interdits à l'article 1^{er}.

En conséquence, les hautes parties contractantes, désireuses de contribuer dans la mesure de leurs moyens, à ce que l'article 10 de la Convention de Paris du 18 décembre 1923 soit scrupuleusement observé, s'engagent dès maintenant à faire conjointement toutes les démarches qui seront jugées utiles, pour y réussir auprès des organismes et des autorités qualifiés à cet effet.

ARTICLE 8.

Les dispositions qui précèdent étant motivées par les événements actuels n'ont, de ce fait, qu'un caractère provisoire, et les hautes parties contractantes se réservent le droit de les modifier après entente préalable, ou de dénoncer le présent engagement, soit d'un commun accord, soit à la diligence de l'une des deux parties moyennant un préavis de 15 jours.

Enclosure 3 in No. 18.

Projet d'Accord relatif à la Surveillance terrestre en Zone de Tanger.

LES Gouvernements français et espagnol, se référant à l'article 7 de l'accord de ce jour, relatif à la collaboration et à la liaison des autorités de leurs zones respectives d'influence pour la surveillance du trafic interdit, des indésirables et des menées suspectes dans la partie de leurs zones d'influence limitrophes des régions riffaines et djebalas, conviennent de ce qui suit :

1. Le Gouvernement français s'engage à employer son influence auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan pour que le Mendoub de Tanger reçoive des instructions à l'effet d'interdire l'accès du territoire de Tanger aux insoumis des zones d'influence française et espagnole et de remettre, à charge de réciprocité, aux

autorités de ces zones et sur leur demande, tout sujet marocain leur ressortissant, qui se serait rendu, sans leur autorisation dans la zone de Tanger.

2. Les deux Gouvernements sont d'accord pour estimer pour la durée de l'état actuel d'hostilité dans les régions limitrophes de la zone de Tanger, qu'il conviendrait d'assurer, à titre provisoire, à ladite zone les moyens indispensables à la surveillance et à la répression des trafics interdits par l'article 1^{er} de l'accord de ce jour visé ci-dessus. A cet effet, les deux Gouvernements demanderont au Gouvernement britannique de se joindre à eux pour l'envoi, à titre provisoire, dans la banlieue de Tanger, de détachements de 500 hommes de troupe de chacun des trois nationalités.

Si le Gouvernement britannique préférerait s'abstenir, les deux Gouvernements lui proposeraient de pourvoir par leurs seuls moyens à l'organisation desdites forces de surveillance.

3. Les forces en question auront pour mission exclusive d'empêcher tout trafic illicite entre la ville de Tanger et la zone espagnole en empêchant la formation et le passage de convois de ravitaillement destinés aux rebelles de ladite zone.

A cet effet, une ligne de surveillance sera organisée à l'extérieur et aux abords immédiats du périmètre municipal de Tanger. Les consuls généraux d'Espagne et de France et le Mendoub du Sultan à Tanger se concerteront avec les chefs des détachements pour confier l'organisation de cette ligne de surveillance au chef du détachement espagnol. Le Gouvernement britannique sera sollicité, par les deux Gouvernements de Paris et de Madrid, d'autoriser son consul général à Tanger à se joindre, pour la solution de cette question, à ses collègues français et espagnol.

4. Les deux Gouvernements sont d'accord pour considérer comme désirable au maintien de la neutralité de Tanger que les tribus de la banlieue ne conservent pas leurs armements.

Ils s'engagent à inviter leurs consuls généraux à Tanger à se concerter avec leur collègue britannique et le Mendoub du Sultan pour que ce dernier recherche les voies et moyens de procéder à ce désarmement en mettant à profit l'opportunité qui découlera de la présence des détachements de surveillance.

[W 6378/39/28]

No. 19.

M. de Fleuriau to Sir W. Tyrrell. — (Received July 6.)

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 4 juillet 1925.*

Mon cher Ami,

M. BRIAND vient de recevoir la nouvelle d'une violation de la zone internationale de Tanger par des tribus révoltées et en armes : pendant la nuit du 29 au 30 septembre, 300 Djebala et 100 Andjera ont pénétré sur le territoire de la zone pour escorter leurs convois de ravitaillement. Ils en sont sortis après leur opération terminée. C'est la première fois que ces Djebala et Andjera font une irruption en armes dans la zone, et le consul général de France, comme le Maréchal Lyautey, considère la situation comme très sérieuse.

Toutes les forces disponibles à Tanger sont occupées en ce moment au maintien de l'ordre dans la ville, le reste de la zone est dégarni et le moment paraît venu d'en assurer la défense au moyen de contingents pris au dehors. Le cas prévu par Mr. Chamberlain me paraît déjà s'être présenté. Je vous prie, cher ami, de communiquer ce qui précède au Secrétaire d'Etat. Je pense que déjà vous aurez reçu la nouvelle par Mr. Clive.

Votre très sincèrement dévoué,
A. DE FLEURIAU.

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[W 6379/39/28]

No. 20.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 83. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 5, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 36.

Commandant of French tabors informs me that facts are as stated. Matter had been kept dark and was unknown to Spaniards as it was to me. Action of tribesmen was their reply to some twenty incursions into zone by Spanish armed forces since January. Captain Pannibières immediately informed heads of tribes that if similar incursions again occurred no further convoys would be allowed to leave Tangier with food-stuffs. Tribesmen have sent satisfactory assurances. Captain Pannibières tells me he entirely shares my view that:—

1. Food supplies: Maintain suggestion received from Tangier cannot affect result of campaign.
2. If supplies are cut off neutrality of Tangier zone becomes a dead letter.
3. Contraband smuggling from zone is insignificant.
4. Spanish forces, if efficiently commanded, ought to be able to intercept convoys at the frontier.

[W 6436/39/28]

No. 21.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 320.)

Sir,

Madrid, July 4, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Franco-Spanish Commission, which has been sitting in Madrid since the 17th ultimo, has so far only concluded one agreement, namely, that in regard to the policing of the waters round the coast of Morocco, the text of which was enclosed in Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 300 of the 23rd June.

2. The main subjects of discussion have been (1) an agreement in regard to the policing of the land frontiers of the two zones; (2) an agreement, arising out of the former, in regard to measures to be taken at Tangier; (3) the delimitation of those portions of the frontier between the two zones which have hitherto been in doubt; and (4) the terms of peace to be offered to Abd-el-Krim.

3. As regards the first point, a draft agreement has been prepared and accepted in substance by the two delegations. I have received the text of this agreement both from the French and the Spanish delegates, but I am not forwarding it to you as I am informed that it has been communicated to you by the French Ambassador in London. The only point still outstanding is the precise wording of paragraph 2 of article 4, and the approval of the French delegation has been given subject to the stipulation that it is without prejudice to the special agreement in regard to Tangier provided for in article 7.

4. The text of the draft agreement in regard to Tangier has, I understand, also been communicated to you by M. de Fleuriau, and I see by your despatch No. 346 that the Spanish Ambassador informed you of its substance on the 29th June. As regards this agreement, the French delegation have stated that, although the French Government accepted in principle the proposal for the despatch of forces to the zone, they were unable to adhere to the agreement pending the receipt by the French Government of an intimation of the views of His Majesty's Government. There were also some points in the agreement which they desired to discuss further with the Spanish delegation.

5. As the Spanish Government insisted very strongly that the agreement should be signed without delay, the French delegation made at the sitting held on the 2nd instant the declaration, of which I enclose a copy herein, defining their attitude as explained above.

6. As regards the frontier between the two zones, I understand that there are two sectors in dispute. One of these, towards the western end of the line, involves the tribe of Beni Zeruel. This district the French are very anxious to include in their zone, and M. Sorbier tells me that the refusal of the Spanish Government to agree to its transfer has caused the French delegation much dissatisfaction. The district in question is, he says, of no possible value to the Spaniards, who would never effectively occupy it, whilst it would be of considerable utility to France.

7. The terms of peace to be offered to Abd-el-Krim now form the principal subject of discussion. It seems to be agreed that, even if it is thought that lasting peace with Abd-el-Krim is not possible, an opinion which is widely held here, generous terms must be offered in order to satisfy public opinion, particularly in France. Both delegations are, I understand, prepared to concede to him almost anything short of absolute independence, but they both assure me that the rights of the Sultan must be respected, as well as international treaty stipulations. The impression, however, seems to prevail that Abd-el-Krim is so confident of his own power that he will refuse to accept any conditions involving the recognition by him of the suzerainty of the Sultan.

8. It is expected that these discussions will be concluded within the next few days, when the peace offer will be transmitted to Abd-el-Krim without delay. It will not go in the form of an absolute ultimatum, but a definite limit of time will be indicated within which his reply must be given, since it is anticipated that he will endeavour to procrastinate and it is essential that the matter should be dealt with without delay, for, if it is decided to undertake active military operations, they should take place during the present month. This is the most suitable season of the year, and, as General Primo de Rivera told me, if operations were postponed until September, it would be too late to carry them out effectively.

9. If the peace terms are rejected, the military measures to be taken against Abd-el-Krim will have to be considered, and as the French appear to have little confidence in the value of Spanish co-operation it may be found very difficult to arrive at a plan of combined operations.

10. M. Malvy arrived in Madrid on the 1st instant and at once took his place as principal French delegate.

11. Both the delegations, with which I have kept in close touch, have represented to me the importance which they attach to the co-operation of His Majesty's Government in the action which it is proposed to take at Tangier and they are anxiously awaiting the decision of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

I have, &c.

HUGH GURNEY.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Declaration.

LE Gouvernement français, sous réserve d'une précision portant sur le paragraphe 2 de l'article 4 du projet d'accord relatif à la surveillance terrestre dans les deux zones et d'une modification de forme portant sur le paragraphe 1^{er} du même article, donne son adhésion de principe à ce projet d'accord. Mais l'approbation qu'il donne, ainsi, à l'article 7 de ce projet relatif à Tanger ne préjuge pas de l'accord spécial et détaillé qui doit encore intervenir au sujet de la surveillance terrestre en zone de Tanger.

Le projet concernant ce dernier accord a été communiqué par le Gouvernement français au Foreign Office, dont l'attention a été attirée sur le fait que le Gouvernement français a réservé son adhésion jusqu'à ce qu'il ait pu s'assurer des vues du Gouvernement britannique touchant cette question.

Le projet d'accord relatif à Tanger appellera encore, de la part du Gouvernement français, certaines observations qui seront examinées avec le Gouvernement espagnol avant l'approbation définitive du projet et la signature de l'accord, laquelle interviendra en même temps que la signature des autres accords en préparation.

[W 6505/39/28]

No. 22.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Madrid, July 7, 1925.

MY telegram No. 80.

Meetings of Franco-Spanish Commission were resumed yesterday when agreement in regard to surveillance of land frontier was approved, and some discussion took place in regard to peace terms but not much further progress can be made pending the receipt of views of His Majesty's Government on proposal to despatch forces to Tangier zone.

[13955]

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In support of this proposal French delegation tells me that large armed mule convoy has just entered zone to fetch supplies, and asks me to represent to you that in addition to protection of zone from attack and stopping passage of supplies and undesirables, presence of forces would greatly facilitate establishment of new régime.

Spanish delegation, who are equally insistent, state that 300 rebels have succeeded in passing through Spanish lines, and senior delegate says that if His Majesty's Government object to proposal Spanish Government would agree to increase either of tabors or gendarmerie.

(Sent to Tangier.)

[W 6506/39/28]

No. 23.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 2331.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 7, 1925.

M. DE FLEURIAU called upon me this afternoon with a sheaf of papers referring to several different questions upon which he wished to speak to me.

The first—and the most urgent—was the position in Morocco. His Excellency said that the opinion of his Government and of Marshal Lyautey had somewhat changed in consequence of recent events. There was the frontier incident which he had communicated on Saturday. More important was the situation in Tangier itself. The Government and Marshal Lyautey had come to the conclusion that it was necessary at once to send the proposed international force to the Tangier zone.

I replied to his Excellency that I had had before me the draft of a note giving the views of His Majesty's Government at the moment when his message about the frontier incident had reached me late on Saturday night; that in consequence of that message I had delayed sending him the note pending confirmation of the report of what had occurred and the receipt of Consul-General Clive's observations upon it. When these were received I had consulted my colleagues, for in an affair of this consequence I could not take the responsibility of a decision without laying the matter before them, but having obtained the directions of His Majesty's servants I had this morning given instructions for the preparation of a reply. This was on the lines of the statement which I had previously made to him, but on examining the papers which he had left with me, and which recorded the Franco-Spanish Agreement, I found that it was proposed to extend the naval surveillance in which we were asked to co-operate to a distance of 6 miles from the shore with the right of pursuit still further out to sea, and with an extension of even the 6 miles in certain cases by drawing an arbitrary line from cape to cape. It was impossible that His Majesty's Government should concur in this proposal, nor, as I was now advised, was it possible for the three Powers to apply the surveillance even in the territorial waters of the Tangier zone to nations which had possessed extra-territorial rights and had not adhered to the convention. I did not doubt that, when their attention was drawn to the matter, the French Government would receive the same advice on the legal position as had been given to His Majesty's Government, and they would see that it would be impossible under these circumstances to search either United States or Italian ships unless their Governments agreed to our so doing.

As to the frontier incident, it appeared, according to my information, to have been of little consequence and in the nature rather of a reprisal for or a protection against recurrence of previous violations of the zone by Spanish forces. His Majesty's Government were advised by their representatives in Tangier and were themselves of opinion that no real danger to Tangier would arise unless its neutrality were first infringed from within, and that to send the proposed force at the present time would be to provoke the attack which we were anxious to avoid.

M. de Fleuriau repeated more than once that the French Government and Marshal Lyautey had changed their view; that he was now obliged to press these proposals upon me, and that he trusted His Majesty's Government would consider his new representations before finally deciding on their answer. I said that I would certainly delay sending my note until I had again consulted my colleagues, but that I could not pretend to think that what he had said would alter the opinion which they had formed on careful consideration of the information at their disposal. His Majesty's Government were anxious to act with due consideration for the difficulties and for the wishes of two friendly nations, but they held a very strong view upon the inexpediency of the course proposed to them.

Some further conversation led me to summarise the position as follows: It appeared to me that the French Government, confronted by serious difficulties and attaching great importance to co-operation between the Spanish and the French authorities, was met by the Spanish negotiators with the statement that nothing could be done unless these proposals in regard to the Tangier zone were accepted, and that the French Government, in these circumstances, felt that it had no choice but to accept them. I must, however, observe that His Majesty's Government also had serious interests in the Tangier zone and had a right to their own point of view. To this claim on behalf of the British Government M. de Fleuriau at once agreed. He did not dispute the correctness of my summary of the situation as far as it went, but he again repeated that, in addition to the considerations enumerated by me, there was the changed condition of affairs in Tangier within the last week or two. The police force in Tangier was insufficient to preserve order in Tangier itself, and the force in the zone was certainly insufficient to carry out the measures of disarmament which the Spanish Government had proposed and which the French Government also thought desirable. I told his Excellency that we were advised by our consul-general and we ourselves held that to attempt to disarm the inhabitants of Fahs at this moment would be an act of madness provocative of the gravest trouble. In this connection I observed that it was remarkable that none of these proposals had emanated from or had hitherto been supported by the local administration. The natural inference was that the local authorities did not share the apprehensions of the two Governments as to the safety of Tangier, and I should be greatly surprised if they, in fact, approved such proposals.

Something that the Ambassador had said was understood by me as implying that France and Spain had agreed to send their contingents without us, and I expressed a very serious view of that proposal. I was reassured, however, by the Ambassador, who at once said that certainly France had no intention of acting without Great Britain.

Finally (as far as this subject was concerned), M. de Fleuriau drew my attention to articles in the Spanish press advocating a revision of the Statute of Tangier. He could not say that this had been encouraged by the Directory, but some indications had reached the French Government that there was influential Spanish opinion behind them. On this point, the French negotiators had said that they could not agree to change a comma of the statute. I informed his Excellency that I had noticed the press articles, but had no information that they represented the policy of the Spanish Government. In any case, I could not conceive a worse moment for Spain to raise the question than the present.

The Ambassador left with me an *aide-mémoire*, of which I enclose a copy.

M. de Fleuriau then passed to the question of inter-Allied debts. He was instructed to tell me that the French Government had informed the United States on the 3rd July that they proposed to send a delegation to Washington to discuss the settlement of their debt, and had asked what date would be convenient to the American negotiators. M. Briand had further instructed him to recall to me our conversation on this subject at Geneva, and to inform me that *the French Government would carefully abstain from any settlement that would place the United States of America in a position of advantage over His Majesty's Government*. He went on to expatiate on the difficulties of the situation in France, where M. Caillaux had been unable to carry his whole budget and where he was attempting something entirely novel, the results of which could not be exactly foretold. It was an additional difficulty that France had to carry out two separate but simultaneous negotiations with the United States and ourselves. The French Government were, however, anxious to reach a settlement, and contemplated sending negotiators to London.

As regards details, I told his Excellency that the Chancellor had informed me that he would be happy to receive him and to explain the position to him. Meanwhile, I had noted with great satisfaction the assurance which he had given me by direction of M. Briand that there was no idea of prejudicing our position in the negotiations with the United States, and I said that what His Majesty's Government would wish to receive from the French Government were definite and official proposals for a settlement under two heads:—

1. Substantial payments on account of their debt, independent of reparation receipts, which should begin immediately, though the scale of payments might be graduated for a few years before reaching a normal figure; and
2. Further payments, which might be contingent on the Dawes annuities.

I suggested that the best course would be that the French Government should put forward in writing the proposals which they could make, and thus afford a definite basis for conversation. But I repeated that I thought that he should first take advantage of the Chancellor's invitation to discuss the matter with him.

I then introduced the question of the evacuation of the three towns of Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf. I told M. de Fleuriau that before going to Geneva, and while at Geneva, I had considered whether I should say anything to M. Briand about the evacuation of the Ruhr. I had refrained from doing so for two reasons. In the first place, because I hoped, as later proved to be the case, that the French Government might themselves take a decision to hasten evacuation and I wished to be in a position to say, if this did happen, that it was not the result of any request or any suggestion from Great Britain, but was the sole act of the French Government, done to show their goodwill and thus promote the success of the proposals for a mutual pact. My second reason had been that, at the moment when M. Briand and I, on behalf of our two Governments, had come to an agreement about the conditions of such a pact, I did not wish to appear to ask or to expect from him something in the nature of a concession in return for the support which we had been willing to promise to France. But just before M. de Fleuriau called Herr Sthamer had been to the Office about the three towns. I must remind M. de Fleuriau that, whilst we had no part or lot in the occupation of the Ruhr, we had a certain responsibility for the three towns, which had been occupied by the French and Belgians with the assent of the Allies in consequence of the very unsatisfactory statement of policy made by Herr von Simon at the conference in St. James's Palace in 1921. I now understood that the Germans had a copy of a protocol said to have been initialled by the French and Belgians in London at the time of the Dawes negotiations, providing for this evacuation simultaneously with that of the Ruhr, but that no copy of this protocol could be found in Paris or Brussels. Further, Herr Sthamer had informed Sir William Tyrrell that, in course of conversation in Berlin, M. de Margerie had stated that the French Government had received representations from us upon the subject. Sir William Tyrrell had at once replied that this was a complete misunderstanding, but since we had thus been introduced into the discussion I desired to say that I thought it would be a great misfortune, after the French Government had gone so far, to "spoil the ship for a ha'p'orth of tar," and that I did hope that they would see their way to evacuate these three towns. Compared with the success of our pact negotiations, the occupation of these towns was of no consequence, and I hoped that no difficulty would arise on account of them. The Ambassador said that he would report my observations.

He then began to speak of the personal comments which he had already made in the Department on the subject of the earlier clauses of our draft of the pact. The pressure of other appointments made it impossible that I should go into this question with him, which, I said, I must defer to some later occasion, but I called his attention to the important and very satisfactory support for the policy of the Government which had been given by Lord Oxford, Lord Haldane and Lord Grey in the House of Lords yesterday, and said that he would have noticed without doubt that the unanimity which now prevailed in support of the policy of the guarantee turned upon the acceptance of arbitration before any recourse to war. I was glad to know from a letter which I had received from you that M. Briand apparently fully appreciated this fact and himself stood firmly by this principle. I therefore anticipated no difficulty between us on a matter which was of cardinal importance from the British point of view.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Aide-mémoire.

LE Maréchal Lyautey, en présence de l'incursion signalée le 4 juillet et des troubles du 2 juillet à Tanger, estime que l'envoi de détachements anglo-franco-espagnols ne peut pas être différé. Le Gouvernement français se rallie à l'avis du Maréchal Lyautey; il est, d'ailleurs, pressé par le Gouvernement espagnol, qui refuse de continuer les négociations de Madrid sans la signature de l'accord relative à la surveillance terrestre à Tanger dont le texte a été communiqué au Foreign Office.

Le Gouvernement français demande au Gouvernement britannique d'accepter l'envoi immédiat de contingents des trois Puissances afin d'assurer la neutralité et la sécurité de Tanger.

Il paraîtrait expédient dès cette décision prise, d'inviter les trois consuls généraux à Tanger de faire appel à la compétence technique des attachés militaires dénommés dans le statut et à celle des trois commandants des détachements d'arrêter sur les lieux, d'accord avec le Mendoub, les mesures nécessaires à la neutralité et à la sécurité de Tanger. La force supplémentaire sera ainsi utilisée au mieux des intérêts à sauvegarder. On pourrait placer le contingent espagnol près de la ville, les contingents français et anglais près de la frontière, ce qui éviterait des incidents, produirait un effet moral très utile à Tanger et préviendrait une attaque des Riffains contre la zone internationale.

L'adhésion du Gouvernement français à l'accord de la surveillance terrestre à Tanger a été donnée après étude des diverses questions: surveillance des indigènes à remettre individuellement et non en masse; conservation des ouvriers riffains en Algérie et au Maroc; désarmement des tribus de la banlieue de Tanger, qui facilitera d'action de la future gendarmerie.

Attitude des Espagnols vis-à-vis du statut de Tanger, tant à Tanger même qu'à Madrid, où les délégués français ont dû déclarer que "pas même une virgule ne pouvait être modifiée de la convention de 1923." Mais on sent à Madrid une arrière-pensée au sujet du statut, et l'envoi des trois contingents surtout en les disposant de manière à interposer les Français et les Anglais entre Tanger et la frontière de la zone, serait de nature à maintenir le statut.

[W 6458/39/28]

No. 24.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 315.)

Sir,

Madrid, July 2, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 71 of the 30th June and to my despatch No. 308 of the 29th June, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of a communication from the Spanish Government giving further details of the manner in which it is proposed to carry out the policing of Moroccan waters.

2. I am not telegraphing the substance of this note, as I am informed by the head of the Moroccan section of the Presidency that the Spanish Ambassador in London was instructed by telegraph yesterday to make a full communication to you on the subject.

3. Señor Aguirre further informed me that the necessary notice to mariners would be issued without delay.

I have, &c.

HUGH GURNEY.

Enclosure in No. 24.

Note verbale.

(Translation.)

IN continuation of the *note verbale* of the 26th June last, and in amplification of the information contained therein, the Presidency of the Military Directorate has the honour to inform the Embassy of Great Britain that, as regards the whole of the coast subjected to the combined supervision of the Spanish and French men-of-war, in accordance with the notification already sent to the Powers, the two Governments make a distinction of two different categories of sectors, in as far as the limits and methods of surveillance are concerned.

In the sectors comprising harbours open to trade or crossed by trade routes, the surveillance is limited to the 6 miles of territorial waters, with the right of pursuit outside this limit.

In the other sectors, the surveillance extends to the particular limits laid down as follows:—

1. *Atlantic sector* comprised between Cape Ghir and Cape Noun.

The surveillance is exercised to the east of the line which joins the points situated 6 miles to the west of the two capes in question.

2. *Mediterranean sector* comprised between Cape Tres Forcas and Cape Negro (to the north of Tetuan).

The surveillance is exercised to the south of a line drawn from one of these capes to the other. Further, as the presence of rebel centres on the coast makes commercial navigation and the surveillance by warships in the proximity of the shore difficult and even dangerous, the territorial waters of this sector, extending to a distance of 6 miles, are closed to navigation between Cape Mazari (south of Tetuan) and the point Abdón o Afrau (to the east of Alhucemas).

Consequently, any merchant-vessel found by the warships in the prohibited zone, which is unable to justify its presence there, will be handed over to the competent authority.

In conformity with the stipulations of article 4 of the convention of the 18th December, 1923, the surveillance of the territorial waters of the Tangier zone is the duty of the Spanish, British and French naval forces.

Ships and vessels reported by the warships exercising surveillance as having devoted themselves to illicit traffic in arms, munitions, war material and merchandise suspected of being directed to harbours or natural anchorages not open to commerce, shall be handed over to the competent jurisdiction.

The foregoing dispositions which have their origin in present events are for that reason only of a temporary character and the high contracting parties—Spain and France—reserve to themselves the right to modify them by common agreement.

*Presidency of the Military Directorate,
Moroccan Section, Madrid, July 2, 1925.*

[W 6530/39/28]

No. 25.

Texte du Projet d'Avis complémentaire à adresser aux Puissances.—(Communicated by the French Ambassador, July 8.)

D'ACCORD avec le Gouvernement espagnol, le Gouvernement français, se référant aux informations adressées le 2 juillet 1925 à , croit devoir en compléter les dispositions par les précisions suivantes, qu'il a l'honneur de lui faire parvenir :

1. Dans les secteurs comprenant des ports ouverts ou traversés par des routes commerciales, la surveillance conjointe des bâtiments de guerre espagnols et français sera exercée au large de la zone de Tanger jusqu'à une distance de 3 milles marins de la côte, et au large des zones espagnoles et françaises jusqu'à une distance de 6 milles marins, . . . avec droit de suite en dehors de cette limite.

2. Dans le secteur méditerranéen (cap des Trois Fourches, cap Negro) la navigation entre le cap Mazari (sud de Tétouan) et la pointe Abdun ou Afraout (est d'Alhucemas) est interdite dans un rayon de 6 milles marins au large de la côte.

[W 6377/39/28]

No. 26.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 8, 1925.

I HAVE laid before His Majesty's Government the papers and observations which were communicated to me by your Excellency and the Spanish Ambassador on the subject of the resolutions adopted by the Franco-Spanish Conference at Madrid. His Majesty's Government have given their most serious consideration to the suggestion of the French and Spanish Governments, both on account of their close friendship with the Governments from which these proposals emanate and of the high importance which His Majesty's Government attach to the safety and integrity of the international zone. The two Governments have proposed that—

- (1.) British naval forces should co-operate in the suppression of contraband traffic in arms and ammunition in Moorish waters.
- (2.) Contingents of British, French and Spanish troops should be despatched to the Tangier zone to prevent supplies of all kinds reaching the rebels and, if necessary, to protect the town itself.

- (3.) The Mendoub at Tangier should be instructed to hand over to the Spanish authorities any natives of the Spanish zone who may escape into the international zone.
- (4.) The natives in the Fahs should be disarmed.

2. His Majesty's Government, in fulfilment of their obligations under article 4 of the Tangier Convention, are prepared to co-operate in the surveillance and prevention of contraband traffic within the territorial waters of Tangier. It must, however, be remembered that as neither the Italian, United States or Portuguese Governments have acceded to the Tangier Convention, and as those Powers enjoy extra-territorial rights in the international zone, it will be impossible to detain or search vessels flying the flags of those countries. It is for consideration whether in these conditions the surveillance can be made sufficiently effective to be of use.

3. His Majesty's Government consider it inexpedient that they should participate in any action in the territorial waters of the French and Spanish zones. They observe that in the Franco-Spanish explanatory memorandum of the 30th June it is stated that surveillance will be carried out normally "à l'intérieur des eaux territoriales qui sont de 6 milles"; and further, that surveillance will be carried out within lines drawn from Cap des Trois Fourches to Cap Negro and from points 6 miles to the west of Cap Ghir and Cap Noun respectively. His Majesty's Government must place on record at once their inability to accept the above statement of the extent of territorial waters, or to admit the claim to exercise surveillance beyond a 3-mile limit from low-water mark. The principle of the 3-mile limit is expressly recognised in the Anglo-American Liquor Traffic Convention to which your Excellency has referred, and His Majesty's Government feel unable to sanction tacitly or by implication any infringement of a principle which they have consistently maintained.

4. His Majesty's Government are convinced that the despatch of contingents of troops to Tangier at the present moment would be fraught with grave danger. In their considered opinion, which is entirely supported by His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier in a report received by me within the last few days, such action, far from averting an attack on the zone by the rebels, would probably provoke it. Further, it would almost certainly lead to international complications such as must increase difficulties of a situation which is already sufficiently embarrassing. It is hardly necessary to add that His Majesty's Government would entertain even stronger objections to the despatch of French and Spanish contingents only or of a Spanish contingent alone without the presence of a British contingent, and that the danger to Tangier from such action would be indefinitely increased. They are happy to be assured that such isolated action is not contemplated by the French or Spanish Governments.

5. So far as His Majesty's Government are aware, there are no substantial grounds for believing that Abd-el-Krim contemplates an attack on the international zone provided that its neutrality be strictly observed; and His Majesty's Government do not anticipate that he will deliberately embroil himself with all the Powers who have acceded to the Tangier Convention and who are in the last resort jointly responsible for the safety of the zone. Once only have rebel forces crossed the frontier in order to protect unarmed tribesmen from ambush within the Tangier zone, and it is to be observed that no hostile acts were committed by them on that occasion. The heads of the tribes were at once warned of the consequences of any repetition of the incident, and they sent satisfactory assurances, which have since been scrupulously respected.

6. The establishment of a cordon within the limits of the zone, and indeed any attempt to close the frontier on the Tangier side, would almost inevitably be considered by Abd-el-Krim as involving Tangier in the struggle now in progress outside the international zone, and His Majesty's Government cannot but fear that it would draw upon the Tangier zone the very attack which it is the object of all Powers concerned to avert. It is, moreover, difficult to see what real advantage would be gained even if the frontier were successfully closed and all ingress and egress rendered impossible. Tangier depends on the Jebala tribes for provisions, especially chickens, eggs and vegetables, and I understand that Tetuan is to a large extent provisioned from Tangier. The loss of these supplies would inevitably increase still further the high cost of living at Tangier and inflame the discontent which unfortunately prevails there. The tribesmen would be unable to obtain the small quantities of sugar and tea which they now receive in exchange for their produce; but, as they have gathered their harvest and have summer fruits and honey, they would suffer less than the inhabitants of the zone. Certainly it would not be sufficient to force the tribesmen to surrender. As

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regards war material, it appears, according to the information which has reached His Majesty's Government, that no supplies of this kind are reaching Abd-el-Krim through the port of Tangier; but the Administration would no doubt be ready to arrange that all natives leaving Tangier for the Spanish zone should be searched for contraband. The conclusion to which His Majesty's Government are forced is that any attempt to close the frontier from the Tangier side will have a negligible effect on the rebels and cannot hasten the restoration of peace, while, by provoking an attack on Tangier, it might have the gravest consequences and produce a situation the result of which cannot be foreseen.

7. His Majesty's Government agree that Tangier cannot be allowed to become a centre and focus of intrigue and rebellion against the authorities of the French and Spanish zones. They have no evidence that this is the case. Should it be so, however, the necessary powers are in the hands of the Administration under article 29 of the convention, which provides for the expulsion of both foreigners and natives by the Mendoub. His Majesty's consul-general will support his colleagues in setting the appropriate machinery in force in all cases where the offence is proved. On the other hand, apart from 6,000 refugees, there are several hundred natives from the Spanish zone residing in Tangier. To round up and hand over these natives to the Spanish authorities would be a physical impossibility for the Tangier Administration. Nor can His Majesty's Government perceive what advantage would be gained by so doing. It would not seriously hamper Abd-el-Krim, and it would certainly exasperate a great many people.

8. The disarmament of the natives in the Fahs, that is to say, throughout the international zone except the town of Tangier itself, also presents great physical difficulties. There are in the zone some sixty-five villages. To a native his rifle is his greatest treasure. Sooner than surrender it, he would cross the frontier and join the rebels. No more unpopular measure could be devised, and the present crisis is not the moment for unpopular measures. Later on, when the Administration is more firmly established, gradual disarmament of the natives may be possible, but it seems quite impracticable now.

9. It is a noteworthy fact that the international Administration of Tangier have made no appeal to the Powers for the despatch of troops or for the other suggested measures of protection. The inference would seem to be that the local authorities do not consider such action advisable. His Majesty's Government desire to suggest that at the present juncture it would be wise to be guided largely by the views and wishes of the international Administration, and that any interference with their discretion should be reduced to a minimum.

10. His Majesty's Government recognise, however, that it is necessary to be prepared for the possibility that a situation might arise calling for joint action on the part of the three Powers in defence of the integrity of Tangier. They understand that there has already been some informal interchange of opinion in London upon this subject between the military representatives of the three Powers, and they have given directions to the War Office to continue these conversations.

11. I am addressing a similar note to the Spanish Ambassador.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6565/39/28]

No. 27.

Marquis Merry del Val to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 10.)

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Spanish Embassy, London, July 9, 1925.

I HAVE had the honour and the pleasure to receive your Excellency's communication under the date of the 8th instant.

While reserving my intention of giving a more ample reply to the said note in general, and to certain of the points therein contained in particular, it is my duty, as a result of instructions received from the Government of His Majesty the King, my august Sovereign, to dwell upon one of those points, in view of the capital importance and urgency of the same in the judgment of His Majesty's Government.

I allude to the absolute necessity of rendering effective the neutrality of the international Tangier zone guaranteed in its statute and convention, by the adoption of measures which may put an end to the ever-increasing violation of that territory

and its use by the partisans of the rebel chief, Abd-el-Krim, now for agitation among the natives of the zone or those residents in the same, now for incursions and acts of violence.

In support of this assertion, I wish to submit the following facts to your Excellency:—

1. The Spanish consul-general in Tangier has been obliged to present to the Mendub on the 6th instant an energetic protest, inspired by the fact of a vigorous attack in the night of the 28th June last by groups of natives ensconced within the international zone on the river constituting the limit of the same, against forces of the Mehalla under the orders of Captain Castellon, commanded at that moment by Señor Moreno Navarro. These troops, when endeavouring to cut the passage to the Spanish zone of the protectorate of an enemy convoy, were caught between two fires, on one side from the international zone, and on the other from natives posted in the Spanish zone of the protectorate, and suffered casualties.

2. The Spanish consul-general in Tangier telegraphed yesterday to His Majesty's Government in Madrid that seventy natives of the tribe of Beni Messuar entered the international zone in arms during the night of the 7th instant. This official has also been notified that at a certain point of the Fahs Province, near the sanctuary of Santi Tass, a group of 200 natives of the tribes of Djebel Kebir, Beni Messuar and Wad Ras have taken up positions.

3. News transmitted by the Intelligence Department of the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco are to the effect that in the village near the well-known place named Ain Dalia and that of Seguedla, both situated in the international zone, a meeting took place a few days ago attended by natives of the Fahs Province and some 150 armed mountaineers. Forces of the Police Tabor No. 1 attempted to disarm the invaders, but were obliged to desist in view of their attitude.

4. Communications and correspondence are openly and continually sustained with impunity between Abd-el-Krim and his agents in Tangier. This is proved by the example given by the recent discovery of letters from that chieftain addressed to the native named Ajamlx, containing threats against France and Spain and announcing reprisals against the international zone. One of these missives has been sent in copy to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid, and I await another copy in London at any moment.

The specific facts just quoted are a proof not only of the increasing want of security within the territory of the international zone; they also show a discrepancy between the news received from the British agent in Tangier alluded to by your Excellency in your above-mentioned note and the no less authentic information received in Madrid.

Your Excellency has been good enough to express me, both verbally and in writing, the sympathy of His Britannic Majesty's Government for the endeavours of His Catholic Majesty's Government to prevent communication between Tangier and the rebels. I feel myself supported by this assurance when I invoke a tangible manifestation of these dispositions, as the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain will not adopt any measure of the kind mentioned above on their own account in conjunction with the Government of the French Republic without the consent of the British Government.

The remedy which my Government proposes for the time being consists in the despatch to the international zone of a contingent of troops by each of the three Powers principally interested, or a reinforcement of the existing native police force with similar elements organised and commanded by European officers, so as to increase its number in the proportion necessary to assure order within the town and zone of Tangier and the respect of their frontiers by putting an end to the communications of every sort between the rebels and the former with the efficiency which will arise from the form of such measures which may hereafter be proposed and established with the necessary supplementary steps to be taken in consequence.

By this proposal the Government of His Majesty the King, my august Sovereign, do not infringe the stipulations of the Convention of Paris of the 18th December, 1923. On the contrary, they endeavour to assure the observance of articles 3 and 10 of the said pact, which carries Great Britain's signature. For this reason, and also because it is necessary to maintain not only the material neutrality of the Tangier zone, but also its honour, and to make possible the application of the precautions adopted by the Spanish high command on the exterior limit of the zone in order to assure the termination of hostile communications between the rebels and

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their friends and agents in that territory, I make no doubt but that your Excellency and His Britannic Majesty's Government, recognising the good reason which militates in favour of His Catholic Majesty's Government, supported in this respect by the Government of the French Republic, will accept the proposal which I have the honour to renew, in view of the fact of the continual violation of the territory of the international zone by armed rebels and by certain natives of the province of the Fahs itself, as a result of an inadequacy easy to understand on the part of the tabors of the shereefian police, now reduced in numbers, and evidenced by the case quoted in the third place among those mentioned above.

I avail, &c.

ALFONSO MERRY DEL VAL.

[C 9223/459/18]

No. 28.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 2362.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 10, 1925.

THE French Ambassador brought me this morning a communication from M. Briand on our draft of a pact of guarantee.

The Ambassador said that he would be happy to discuss these matters with me or with any of the officials of this Office whom I might designate for the purpose as soon as we both were in a position to do so. At present he had not himself been able to study M. Briand's observations, and in the course of our interview he read to me only the paragraph marked No. 1, indicating very briefly some of the other points raised in the message.

I told his Excellency that I would at once begin the study of this document. I entirely agreed with him that it required careful examination before I made any comment upon matters of such high importance. I would only observe for the moment, and with reference to the criticism, that the earlier clauses as drawn added nothing to the Covenant, that this description did not at all correspond with my conception of the draft.

The Ambassador repeated that they had reason to expect that the German answer would be delivered about the 14th, and the matter was therefore of great urgency. I assured him that there should be no delay on our side.

I then took the opportunity of referring to the memorandum which he had left with Sir William Tyrrell, in which some anxiety was expressed lest Lord D'Abernon should offer in Berlin explanations of the French note. I said that I had no reason to think that Lord D'Abernon was doing anything of the kind, but that his Excellency must recognise that Lord D'Abernon could not avoid conversations with the German Ministers or refuse explanations on any questions arising out of my own speech in the House of Commons. I added that I mentioned the matter because Sir William Tyrrell had not known and could not have told him of what had passed between me and M. Briand at Geneva on this subject. As soon as we had reached our agreement, I had told M. Briand that I should instruct Lord D'Abernon to use his whole influence with the German Government to induce them to send a reply of an equally conciliatory character, to refrain from offering meticulous criticisms and to get to practical negotiations as early as possible. M. Briand had replied: "Yes, please do so; that is very important." I then told the Ambassador what had passed between me and Herr Sthamer when Herr Sthamer came to enquire whether I agreed with some reported observation of M. de Margerie (see my despatch No. 1175 to Berlin of the 23rd June).

Before entering on this subject, the Ambassador informed me that he had received instructions this morning to press upon me the great importance which M. Briand attached to the proposal for our co-operation in the surveillance of the Tangier territorial waters, but that at the time these instructions were given M. Briand had not been in possession of the reply of the British Government, and he would therefore await further instructions before saying more upon the subject.

In connection both with the answer we had returned about this naval surveillance and with what he said about the pact of guarantee, the Ambassador suggested that there might be useful conversation between our legal advisers. I replied that I should warmly welcome a visit from M. Fromageot to Sir Cecil

Hurst, which I thought might be very useful. They had been accustomed to work together with great harmony in many difficult matters, and the explanations which they might interchange might greatly facilitate an agreement.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6634/39/28]

No. 29.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 10, 1925.

RIFFS arriving in Tangier state that Abd-el-Krim has for the present forbidden tribes under serious penalties to come into this zone. None have done so for several days, but reasons for Abd-el-Krim's order are not clear.

Same Riffs report growing desire for peace.

Harris tells me that head of French intelligence at Fez who returned there yesterday from Tangier spoke very pessimistically of position on French front, expected little from Madrid Conference, and said Abd-el-Krim's demand for independence was greatest stumbling block to peace.

Settlement of frontier would not be difficult. To meet difficulty French contemplated trying to obtain his consent to issue of two dahirs, one delimitating Riff frontier, the other secretly recording his allegiance to Sultan in some form, but only to be published later if he broke his word.

[W 6633/39/28]

No. 30.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 86. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Madrid, July 11, 1925.

MY telegram No. 82.

Commission have completed agreement in regard to peace offer to Krim which now only awaits approval of French Government.

Head of Morocco section has shown me text in confidence. Provisions are:—

1. Neither party will enter into peace negotiation independently of the other.
2. They will offer Riff and Jeb . . . tribes fullest measure of autonomy compatible with treaty stipulations under ruler of their own choice.
3. Delimitation of boundaries of territories concerned.
4. Respect for territory remaining in Spanish occupation.
5. Terms offered will include—
 - (a.) Exchange of prisoners.
 - (b.) Full amnesty.
 - (c.) Establishment of police force.
 - (d.) Freedom of commerce.

6. Pending the receipt of reply, military operations will continue.

7. If terms are refused they will be published and Abd-el-Krim will be held responsible for possible consequences.

8. The two Governments will concert as to publication of agreement.

No arrangements have yet been made for military co-operation in the event of refusal of offer, which is anticipated. Plan for landing at Alhucemas seems to have been abandoned, at any rate, for the present, but a communiqué issued to-day fore-shadows Spanish land operations elsewhere.

Commission have not yet discussed your note in regard to Tangier pending the receipt of full text and instructions from French Government.

(Sent to Tangier.)

[W 6664/39/28]

No. 31.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 88.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 12, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 40.

Only incident known to have occurred in Tangier zone this month according to Captain Panabieres is that on night of 6th July thirty armed men of Benimesowar tribe crossed frontier between Segue [group omitted] and international bridge to attend annual Moslem religious festivals at Sidikasim.

On arrival there they were told to return at once by cavalry patrol of tabor sent to keep order at festival and left without incident.

My French colleague, who has received similar enquiry from Paris, is replying in the same sense.

Harris received further confirmation to-day of report given in my telegram No. 86 that Abd-el-Krim has ordered tribesmen not to enter zone. Reasons are twofold:—

1. Losses suffered in entering and leaving zone are not justified by results
2. Abd-el-Krim does not want status of Tangier altered.

[W 6665/39/28]

No. 32.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 13, 1925.

THE Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will be aware from paragraph 2 of the Foreign Office note of the 8th instant to the French and Spanish Ambassadors in London that His Majesty's Government have agreed, in accordance with article 4 of the Tangier Convention, to participate with French and Spanish naval forces in the surveillance of contraband traffic in arms and munitions of war in the territorial waters of the Tangier zone.

2. The French Ambassador in London has suggested that the steps to put the surveillance into active operation might be discussed between the French Ministry of Marine and the naval attaché to His Majesty's Embassy in Paris. Mr. Secretary Chamberlain is disposed to agree to this suggestion, and if the Lords Commissioners see no objection His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris will be requested to instruct the naval attaché accordingly.

I am, &c.

G. H. VILLIERS.

[W 6688/39/28]

No. 33.

*M. de Fleuriau to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 14.)**Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 12 juillet 1925.*

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

PAR le paragraphe 2 de la lettre qu'elle m'a adressée le 8 de ce mois, au sujet de la zone de Tanger, votre Excellence a bien voulu me rappeler que le Gouvernement britannique avait formellement accepté de coopérer à la surveillance maritime de la contrebande des armes dans les eaux territoriales de Tanger.

M. Briand est heureux de prendre acte de la déclaration du Gouvernement britannique touchant sa coopération à la surveillance maritime, à propos de laquelle le Gouvernement français m'a fait parvenir les observations suivantes:

La difficulté de soumettre certains éléments à cette surveillance n'en laisse pas moins subsister l'article 4 du statut, qui oblige: les signataires de la Convention de Paris (18 décembre 1923), les ressortissants des Puissances qui ont adhéré au statut, les ressortissants des Puissances qui ne jouissent pas au Maroc de droits spéciaux en vertu des traités.

En ce qui concerne les ressortissants américains, italiens et portugais, ils doivent, en vertu de l'Acte d'Algésiras, respecter la prohibition d'importation des armes de

guerre au Maroc. L'article 25 de cet acte prévoit qu'en cas de violation de ces prohibitions, les navires de ces Puissances peuvent être saisis. Ils doivent, toutefois, être différés à leurs consuls et non au Tribunal mixte de Tanger.

Aux conditions indiquées ci-dessus, la surveillance maritime peut, dès à présent, être exercée dans les eaux de la zone internationale de Tanger.

Dans le paragraphe 3 de la note de votre Excellence du 8 de ce mois, votre Excellence m'a indiqué les objections du Gouvernement britannique à l'extension à 6 milles des eaux territoriales du Maroc. Il est entendu que la surveillance dans les eaux de Tanger s'exercera dans la limite des 3 milles.

Mais M. Briand estime qu'une action limitée à 3 milles au large de la côte du Rif serait sans action utile. Cette zone se trouve actuellement pratiquement interdite à la navigation par les Riffains eux-mêmes. Ils tirent sur les navires qu'ils considèrent comme suspects. Le 17 juin, deux torpilleurs français, le "Bouclier" et le "Tonkinois," ont été canonnés à leur passage devant la baie d'Alhucemas et le tir des Riffains était bien réglé jusqu'au delà de 10,000 mètres. Or, les eaux voisines du Rif sont en dehors des grandes routes maritimes et aucun intérêt essentiel ne saurait être invoqué contre l'exercice nécessaire de la surveillance maritime dans les conditions prévues en ce qui concerne cette région.

Le Gouvernement français est, d'ailleurs, tout disposé à déclarer que les mesures de surveillance envisagées dans les circonstances exceptionnelles actuelles se sauraient être considérées comme impliquant une fixation de la limite des eaux territoriales.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

A. DE FLEURIAU.

[W 6678/39/28]

No. 34.

Marquis Merry del Val to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 14.)

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Spanish Embassy, London, July 13, 1925.

IN addition to my note of the 9th instant and in compliance with instructions received from the Government of His Majesty the King, my august Sovereign, I have the honour to submit to your Excellency two fresh cases of violation of the neutrality of the Tangier international zone by native armed forces and its use for smuggling purposes.

These two cases are the following:—

1. The infiltration of armed natives for purposes of aggression has begun by the high road from Tangier to the Spanish zone of the protectorate. They are concentrating preferably in the places known as Sidi Hassan Sai and Ain Zeitun. Two days ago numerous groups of armed Moors, among them some known as deserters from the Spanish auxiliary forces belonging to the Dar Xauien troops, entered the international zone, busying themselves with the survey of the surrounding country, evidently intending to prepare attacks and ambushes. These movements, according to information received from the Spanish High Commissioner of Tetuan, are the result of instructions from Abd-el-Krim ordering the rebels to exercise pressure on the international zone.
2. According to news received by His Majesty's Government, a convoy of pack animals, returning during the night of the 8th instant from the rebel tribes to Tangier, came across a lighter used for the transport of cattle to the international zone at the place named Handak-es-Zahara and used it to cross over to the latter territory, landing at the spot known as Casa del Frances and Punta Blanquilla, situated, as your Excellency knows, within the Bay of Tangier itself.

This fact constitutes another proof of the existence of contraband trade and relations between the inhabitants of the international zone and the rebels.

I avail, &c.

ALFONSO MERRY DEL VAL.

[W 6731/39/28]

No. 35.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Madrid, July 14, 1925.

SPANISH Government inform me with all reserve that High Commission in Spanish zone reports enemy group of Beni Messanar tribe propose attack Spanish position at Rgaia and also Tangier zone.

(Sent to Tangier.)

[W 6665/39/28]

No. 36.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 15, 1925.

ON the 11th instant the counsellor to your Excellency's Embassy was good enough to communicate to the Foreign Office the proposal of the French Government that the strength of the French and Spanish tabors at Tangier should be raised to 1,000 men and 500 men respectively, making a total of 1,500 men in all.

2. His Majesty's Government are ready to agree to an increase of the tabors on condition that the expense involved thereby is borne by the French and Spanish Governments and does not fall upon the budget of the Tangier zone. They regard it as essential that no additional burden should be placed upon the resources of the zone, which are already heavily strained, and they desire to suggest that for any purpose for which the tabors can be legitimately used, a less increase than that suggested by the French Government would suffice.

3. His Majesty's Government assume, of course, that the tabors will continue to be employed as at present, and that no attempt will be made either to establish a cordon on the frontier of the zone or to disarm the natives of the Fahs.

4. The Spanish Government having made a similar proposal, I am informing the Spanish Ambassador in London to the above effect.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6779/39/28]

No. 37.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 1584.)

Sir,

Paris, July 15, 1925.

WITH reference to the Marquess of Crewe's despatch No. 1563 of the 13th July regarding the situation in Morocco, I have the honour to inform you that the news that an agreement between the French and Spanish Governments had been initialled at Madrid on the 12th July has been received with general satisfaction in Paris, somewhat tempered, however, by the fact that no precise information is obtainable regarding the exact scope of the accord. Beyond the arrangements for the policing of the Moroccan coasts and of the land frontiers of the French and Spanish zones, the existence of which was already known, the Franco-Spanish agreement is understood generally to have been limited to the drawing up of the conditions of peace which might be offered to or accepted from Abd-el-Krim. In this latter connection, an interview with M. Malvy, published in the "Petit Parisien" of the 13th July, a copy of which is enclosed herein,* has given rise to considerable discussion. Whereas it was generally inferred, both from the recent utterances of the President of the Council in the Chamber of Deputies and from the general attitude of the French Government, that any such terms of peace would be presented to Abd-el-Krim more or less in the form of an ultimatum which he would have to accept or decline without discussion, it would appear, to judge from M. Malvy's remarks, that it is intended to open regular negotiations with the Riffian leader, and that the latter will be at liberty to discuss, with a view to their modification, the conditions of peace. M. Malvy goes as far as to say that if Abd-el-Krim is prepared to enter into negotiations it will be necessary to convene a regular conference made up

* Not printed.

of representatives, not only of the French and Spanish Governments, but also of the Riffians themselves. Further, M. Malvy seems to have declared that there was no question of insisting upon the Riffians evacuating French protected territory before negotiations were entered upon. In an interview published in another newspaper, M. Malvy added that he thought it was probable that Abd-el-Krim would be informed of the conditions formulated in Madrid through the intermediary of Señor Echevarrieta.

2. It appears to be generally realised now in Paris that there is little hope of obtaining any immediate military support from the Spanish Government, and in this connection an interesting article appeared recently in the "Journal des Débats" expressing regret that the French Government had not shown more sympathy for and readiness to collaborate with the Spaniards in the years immediately following the disaster of Annual. The Spanish Ambassador, I am informed, is himself openly expressing this opinion. There is, however, a growing anxiety, emphasised in the "Europe nouvelle" and the "Journal des Débats," lest the negotiations with the Spanish Government should lead to international difficulties and the military problems be complicated by diplomatic questions. It is hinted that the Spaniards in return for their military support are endeavouring to obtain a revision of the status of Tangier, and the dangerous repercussions which such a demand might have upon the general diplomatic situation are not overlooked.

3. The decision of His Majesty's Government not to comply with the request to send a body of troops to Tangier has met with little attention in the press, and has raised no hostile comment.

4. It remains to be seen whether the Government, now that it is free (owing to the rising of the Chambers) from the openly hostile attacks of the Communists and the half-veiled opposition of the Socialists, will take any extraordinary measures in Morocco. It is, however, to be doubted whether any such measures would have any great effect, since it is now generally recognised that the French have little hope of regaining the offensive and driving back the invaders before the winter season sets in. This, however, has not prevented Marshal Lyautey from announcing on the occasion of the celebrations on the 14th July at Rabat that the "worst phase of the situation is over."

5. I have the honour to add that General Naulin will leave for Morocco on about the 17th instant.

I have, &c.

ERIC PHIPPS.

[W 6802/39/28]

No. 38.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 90.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 15, 1925.

MADRID telegram No. 87.

According to my information facts are as follows:—

1. About 1,200 men of Benimesower have recently collected in neighbourhood of Rlatia with possible intention of attacking it but with no intention of attacking Tangier zone.
2. Letters received yesterday from Abd-el-Krim for communication to Captain Pannibières stated that no attack on Tangier zone would be allowed except in the event of landing of Spanish troops.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[W 6688/39/28]

No. 39.

Foreign Office to Admiralty, and to Board of Trade, mutatis mutandis.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 16, 1925.

THE Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will be aware that in the Foreign Office note to the French and Spanish Ambassadors of the 8th instant, His Majesty's Government not only refused to participate in the surveillance and prevention of contraband traffic in arms off the coasts of the French and Spanish zones in Morocco,

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but also placed on record their inability to admit any claim to exercise surveillance in those waters beyond a 3-mile limit.

2. I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to enclose a copy of a note from the French Ambassador, in the two concluding paragraphs of which his Excellency explains the reasons for which the French Government desire to exercise naval surveillance beyond the 3-mile limit. The French Government are ready to declare that in the exceptional circumstances the surveillance shall not be considered as implying any definition of the limit of territorial waters.

3. The Secretary of State will be glad to learn whether the Admiralty see any objection to the conclusion of an arrangement with the French and Spanish Governments whereby ships flying the British flag may be searched within the limits defined, viz., within a 6-mile limit off the coast of the French and Spanish zones of Morocco, and further, within lines drawn from Cap des Trois Fouches to Cap Negro and from points 6 miles to the west of Cap Ghir and Cap Noun respectively, provided that the French and Spanish Governments formally declare that the arrangement does not prejudice the principle of the 3-mile limit or constitute any implied definition of the extent of territorial waters.

I am, &c.
G. H. VILLIERS.

[W 6835/39/28]

No. 40.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Gurney (Madrid).

(No. 591.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, July 16, 1925.

THE Spanish Ambassador brought me a note to-day, which, he explained, was framed in no critical or contentious spirit, but solely for the purpose of clearing up misapprehensions, and defining exactly the attitude of the Spanish Government on two points on which I had apparently misconceived it. I attach a copy of this note to the present despatch. I need not deal further with these particular matters.

The Ambassador added that he would have further communications to make to me, but his instructions were not complete. He spoke appreciatively of the consent given by His Majesty's Government to participate in the surveillance of the territorial waters of the Tangier zone, and of their agreement to an increase in the strength of the tabors. His Excellency said that he had at once telegraphed to his Government upon this subject, and he believed that the Spanish Government would see no difficulty in undertaking their share of the expense. He had also telegraphed the substance of the reply which I gave yesterday to a parliamentary question. I observed that this reply was intended to summarise, within the limits imposed upon me by the occasion, the notes which I had sent to himself and M. de Fleuriau. If there appeared to be any discrepancy between the summary and the notes, I would beg him to treat the notes as the authoritative documents.

His Excellency then referred, always in a most friendly spirit and without hinting at any complaint, to the incidents infringing the neutrality of the zone which had already been the subject of correspondence between us, and added that he had been supplied by his Government with other cases which it would be his duty to communicate. Upon this I said that I felt that both Governments were placed in a difficult position, not because they were not animated by perfectly friendly feelings to one another, but by the fact that there was no basis for agreement, since the facts were differently reported to each of us. I suggested that it would be much better if, when a report of any incident arising in or directly affecting the Tangier zone reached one of our consuls-general, the three consuls-general should meet and investigate the facts, and, if possible, send a simultaneous and agreed report to their Governments. It was only upon the spot that the real truth could be ascertained, and this seemed to me to be the natural and practical course. I hope that the Spanish consul-general at Tangier will receive instructions to this effect, and, in that case, Mr. Clive will be instructed to co-operate with him.

Finally, I referred to the note sent me by the Ambassador, in which he drew attention to the doings, or alleged doings, of an individual named Saril. I had looked into this matter, but I found that his action did not amount to a breach of the Foreign Enlistment Act or bring him within the reach of our laws. His Excellency replied that he was well aware of this fact, that he had not asked for any action, but that he thought it just as well that the police of this country should have a

record of the operations of such individuals. He knew that we could not take action, and he repeated that he had not asked that we should do so.

His Excellency then made a few general comments upon the attitude of the Spanish Government towards Abd-el-Krim. They felt that the success of Abd-el-Krim constituted a menace to all Powers with Mahometan subjects. They themselves had reluctantly agreed to the terms of peace proposed by the French negotiators, but they could not really wish for their success, since they felt that Abd-el-Krim, undefeated, would be a constant menace in the future. It was not true, as suggested in certain papers, that they were refusing to the French permission to cross into the Spanish zone for the purpose of defeating Abd-el-Krim. On the contrary, they thought that there would be no settled peace until he had been defeated. The Spanish Government, on their side, were ready to enter upon combined operations, though they might be of a disagreeable kind, and Spain's part the most disagreeable part, and they believed that, in spite of the difficulties if joint operations were undertaken, the campaign would not be long, and Abd-el-Krim's powers of resistance would be quickly broken. I made no comment upon these observations.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure in No. 40.

Spanish Ambassador to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Spanish Embassy, London, July 16, 1925.

WITH the purpose of preserving proper order in the negotiation which I have the honour to follow with your Excellency in such friendly terms respecting the precautionary measures which the Government of His Majesty the King my august sovereign, conjointly and in agreement with the Government of the French Republic, consider necessary on the coasts of the International Tangier Zone and in the territory of this region, as also on the coasts of the Spanish and French zones of the Morocco protectorate, I take the liberty of calling your Excellency's attention, in the same cordial manner, towards certain inaccuracies which, no doubt as a result of so many misunderstandings easy to explain, have crept into our correspondence and certain public references to the proposal I have submitted to your Excellency in virtue of instructions received.

In the first place, I notice that in your Excellency's note to myself of the 8th instant there is an allusion to an explanatory Franco-Spanish memorandum of the 30th June last. Solely for the purpose above mentioned, I take the liberty to recall to your Excellency that I have not written nor delivered to your Excellency the document in question, and have limited myself in my notes Nos. 123 and 127 of the 27th June last and the 2nd July to invoke by the former communication the participation of Great Britain in the surveillance of the international coast, inviting Great Britain at the same time to extend that measure to the coasts of the Spanish and French zones of the Morocco protectorate, while by the second I informed your Excellency in general terms of the agreement between the Governments of His Catholic Majesty and the French Republic as to the maritime surveillance of the coast of Morocco. In neither of these two communications did I refer to the extension of the waters in which this operation is to be carried out.

On the other hand, according to the official report of the Parliamentary Debates in the House of Commons yesterday, your Excellency appears to have declared that the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain wishes instructions to be given to the Shereefian Mendub in Tangier for the delivery to the Spanish authorities of any natives of the Spanish zone of the protectorate who may have taken refuge in the international zone, and to have referred later to the proposal of the delivery of all the natives of the Spanish zone and protectorate to the Spanish authorities. I would wish to say here that if on my part in my interviews with your Excellency I have never proposed the delivery of all the natives of the Spanish zone, but only those of the undesirables, the text of article 4 of the agreement on the surveillance of the territory of the international zone between the Spanish and French Governments cannot either be interpreted in the sense of a delivery *en masse* of those natives, as is plain from the text itself, as it specially mentions the undesirable and suspected persons, and adds that "any Moorish subject proceeding from either of the two zones (Spanish and French) who enters the neighbouring one without permission

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from the authorities of the zone from which he depends may be claimed," &c. According to the letter of this clause, reference is evidently and expressly intended to the rebels, and not to a delivery *en masse*, but of individuals after a demand on the Mendub. Without attributing too much importance to these divergencies, I consider it useful to make these precisions for the above-mentioned purpose.

I avail, &c.

ALFONSO MERRY DEL VAL.

[W 6664/39/28]

No. 41.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Marquis Merry del Val.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 16, 1925.

ON receipt of your Excellency's note of the 9th instant I instructed His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier by telegram to report on the cases mentioned by you of violation of the Tangier frontier by the Riffian forces.

2. Mr. Clive has now reported that there have been only two cases in which armed tribesmen have crossed the frontier, notwithstanding the fact that Spanish forces have repeatedly done so during the present year. The first of these cases was on the night of the 29th June. The heads of the tribes were at once warned against similar incursions in future, and sent assurances of good behaviour. The second case was on the night of the 6th July, when thirty armed tribesmen crossed the frontier to attend the annual religious festival at Sidikasin. On arrival there they were told to return at once by the cavalry patrol of the tabor sent to keep order at the festival, and they left without incident. On neither occasion was a shot fired or any damage done.

3. Since the 6th July no incident of the kind has taken place, and Mr. Clive learns on good authority that Abd-el-Krim has forbidden the tribesmen under heavy penalties to enter the zone. The reason given for this order is that Abd-el-Krim is anxious that there should be no alteration in the status of the international zone.

4. His Majesty's Government note with much satisfaction the assurance given in your note that the Spanish Government will not adopt any measure in the international zone, on their own account or in conjunction with the French Government, without the consent of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6883/39/28]

No. 42.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 2458.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 17, 1925.

M. DE FLEURIAU left with me this morning a note stating that the consul-general of France at Tangier had received a somewhat enigmatic and threatening communication from a Riffian chief in the neighbouring region, which might be considered as a preparation for some act of violence, and M. Briand accordingly desired to recall my statement that His Majesty's Government were willing that the military attachés of France and Spain should examine the problem of the defence of the Tangier zone with the War Office, and expressed the wish that those conversations might take place.

I told M. de Fleuriau that all my information, from whatever source it was derived, led me to think that Abd-el-Krim had no intention of making or allowing any attack on the Tangier zone, provided that we on our side did not allow the Spanish operations of war to be transferred from the Spanish protectorate to the Tangier zone, but I agreed as to the conversations, and the War Office had already received instructions in accordance with the decision which I had communicated to him.

I took the opportunity of mentioning to M. de Fleuriau the proposal which I had made yesterday to the Spanish Ambassador that, when an incident was alleged to have occurred in the Tangier zone, our three consuls-general should meet and establish the facts, and make simultaneous and, as I hoped, agreed reports to our Governments. It appeared to me that there was a certain danger of irritation arising in the mind of the Spanish Government which apparently

constantly received reports of incidents of which we and probably the French received quite different accounts, or indeed in some cases, according to our information, had no basis at all. I asked M. de Fleuriau to mention the matter to M. Briand and tell him that I was sending instructions to Consul-General Clive to co-operate with his colleagues in this way if they were similarly instructed.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6873/39/28]

No. 43.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tangier, July 17, 1925.

SPANISH consul-general has been told by his Government to stay another month in Tangier in order, as he told me privately, to try to convince me of necessity for making some concession to Spanish *amour-propre*. Question was really more one of *amour-propre* than of practical necessity. Spanish Government, he said, were inclined to think note from His Majesty's Government a little unsympathetic. What he proposed is given in my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[W 6874/39/28]

No. 44.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 93.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 17, 1925.

SPANISH consul-general suggests that now that municipal police is working there is really no need for Spanish tabor within the town. Could it not, therefore, be agreed that the two tabors should jointly police zone, the French round the frontier, the Spanish round the town?

Every assurance would be given that villagers of Fahs should not suffer. Moreover, he would strongly recommend to his Government that present officers of Spanish tabor should be changed. Fact that Spanish officer would be in a position to send daily assurance to Spanish Government that nothing was leaving Tangier for the rebels would have great moral effect on Spanish Government and public.

I said that any change in sphere of action of tabors must, in the first instance, receive assent of French. I was, however, prepared to recommend to my Government greatest possible concession to Spanish view compatible with maintenance of neutrality of zone. I feared, however, that proposal to give Spanish tabor absolute control over all exits from Tangier was going too far and would be considered by Abd-el-Krim as handing over to Spaniards of military control of the town.

I have since spoken to my French colleague, who agrees. We are all three to discuss matter to-morrow, together with Captain Pannibières, and try to find some solution. Meanwhile, Captain Pannibières tells me he would be prepared to recommend that sphere of Spanish tabor be extended to Cape Spartel on west, and about half way along the shore of Tangier Bay to the east.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[W 6890/39/28]

No. 45.

Marquis Merry del Val to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 20.)

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Spanish Embassy, London, July 17, 1925.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's note of the 16th instant. In this communication your Excellency is good enough to reply to mine of the 9th instant informing me that, having given instructions to His Britannic Majesty's consul-general in Tangier to report as to cases of violation of the frontier of the Tangier international zone by Riffian forces, Mr. Clive has replied that only on two occasions has the boundary been crossed by armed natives, although the Spanish

troops have repeatedly passed it in the course of the current year. He adds that the first of these cases occurred on the 29th June and that a warning was immediately sent to the headmen of the tribes in order that they might abstain for the future from such incursions, assurances of proper behaviour being received from them. The second case took place in the night of the 6th instant when thirty armed tribesmen crossed the frontier of the international zone for the purpose of being present at the yearly festival at Sidi Kasem. On their arrival at that place the cavalry patrol of the tabor, sent to maintain order at the festival, intimated to them that they must return immediately, on which they retired without incident of any sort. In neither of the two above-mentioned cases was a shot fired nor any harm done. Since the date of the 6th July, no incident has occurred, and Mr. Clive has since received authentic information to the effect that Abd-el-Krim has forbidden the natives under the threat of heavy fines to enter the international zone, an order explained by his anxiety to avoid any alteration in the status of Tangier.

I may be allowed, in my turn, to remark that the information contained in my notes of the 9th and 13th instant, has as authentic an origin at least as any other. The cases quoted by me in both communications have been made known by the Spanish consul-general in Tangier or the High Commissioner at Tetuan, who has at his disposal specially efficient means of information both within the Spanish zone of the protectorate and in the international zone. I was, moreover, careful to be precise in describing the different incidents and circumstances of the five cases quoted by me. On the other hand, if the agent of His Britannic Majesty in Tangier considers it necessary in attenuation of the violation of the neutrality of the international zone by the natives to quote similar acts by Spanish forces or forces in the service of Spain, certainly not intended by the Spanish authorities, it is my duty to call your Excellency's attention to the fact that, if such acts have really taken place, they have been provoked by the use of the international zone by the rebels as a base for supplies and contraband of war breaking the blockade established by Spain on the outer limit of her own zone of the protectorate, thus originating within the international zone a truly intolerable situation to the remedy of which are directed the measures proposed to your Excellency on different occasions by the Government of His Majesty my august Sovereign, among others, by my above-mentioned note of the 9th instant. In this connection, I am filled with gratification by the assurances of sympathy with Spain, in her endeavour to prevent abuses of the kind before alluded to in the international zone by the natives, which your Excellency offered on the 26th June last and again confirmed on the 15th instant by declarations in the British Parliament, assurances and declarations which contain the implicit recognition of the existence of that deplorable situation.

In view of the precision of the information I have had the honour to transmit to your Excellency, its absolutely trustworthy origin, in a word its authenticity, I see no reason whatever even now to doubt its accuracy, nor do I consider that it is in any way minimised by the news which your Excellency has been good enough to quote in your note of yesterday's date.

I shall recall here that the Government of His Majesty the King my august Sovereign by calling the attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government towards the situation in the international Tangier zone has in view, not only the maintenance of the material neutrality of that territory, *i.e.*, the acts of violence committed within its limits and the passage of arms, munitions of war, and food to a district in rebellion and submitted to the blockade of Spanish forces acting in the name of the Shereefian Khalifa, but also the moral abuse of that neutrality which consists in agitation by agents of the rebels sowing the seed of probable future grave complications.

In this respect, I am carrying out instructions freshly received by denouncing the two following facts to your Excellency. According to information received by the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain, twenty-five armed Moors from the international zone itself appeared in the night of the 11th instant in the village of Sania, situated within the zone, and sacked the house of a Moor named Abd-el-Krim Belhedia Val-Hel, wounding one of his relations. There are besides reasons for believing that the Fahs tribesmen have received letters from the rebels in the Spanish zone of the protectorate exhorting them to join them and threatening if not to abandon them to their fate as they intend to invade their territory. Finally the enclosed English translations of letters addressed by Abd-el-Krim to a native named Ajamlux, his agent in the international zone, constitute an undeniable proof of agitation on his part within that district.

I make no doubt but that your Excellency, in view of so many specific examples, will recognise the necessity of efficient means to put an end to such a state of things and avoid future inevitable complications harmful to the interests of the three Powers interested in the international Tangier zone, and that none will deplore more deeply than the nation which I have the honour to represent in London.

I avail, &c.

ALFONSO MERRY DEL VAL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 45.

(Translation.)

Letter from Mohamed Abd-el-Krim to Muley Ali Ajamlux, his Agent in the Tangier International Zone.

(Praise to the one and only God)

To the person of my dear Muley Ali Ajamlux, Greetings,

I PRAY you to send me immediately the Caid Mohamed Ben Mennux with or without a reply, because we have decided to close the road to Tangier and forbid our brethren to pass into it because the Spanish are free to murder and imprison men, women and children. Here is another misfortune greater than the former. They have killed a woman of the village of Dar Ben Sadok, a beautiful woman worth hundredweights of gold, at Sidi-el-Arbi, taking with them many sheep and cattle and other things. This is the limit of abuse and we reserve our responsibility as to what may occur in the Tangier zone and the shedding of blood on its soil and in Tangier itself if the nations do not take measures and stop the hand which commits these savage actions. I pray you inform of all this the English, American, Italian and French nations, &c., and inform me immediately by Mohamed Ben Mennux. May God help and preserve you. Peace to you.

Your dear

ABD-EL-KRIM BEN-EL-HADJ ALI.

Kaada 25, 1343 (June 17, 1925).

Enclosure 2 in No. 45.

(Translation.)

Letter from Mohamed Abd-el-Krim to Muley Ali Ajamlux, his Agent in the Tangier International Zone.

(Praise to the one and only God.)

To the person of the Shereef Sidi Ali Ajamlux, Greetings,

YOUR letter of the 15th Sheual last of this same year has arrived in which you treat of the following subjects:—

1. You have written to us by request of the French colonial party.
2. They tell us that we have repeatedly violated the French zone and cut the telegraph wires and that our army has entered the zone of colonisation and lastly you ask for the evacuation by our army of the present rear-guard positions as preliminary measure for an agreement which will be concluded at Wezzan if we so wish.

In answer to this I say to you that there has been no violence on our side, but that violence has come many times from the French colonial party against all which we have protested at a proper time being requited only with mockery and lack of good faith in every case which might have served to establish a good understanding between both parties. We do not find this strange because we consider that we belong to the innumerable group of the weak and because such is the custom of those men. In their abuse and contempt they have gone so far as to declare, whenever they commit a crime or rob us of our territory, that they have not ordered it and that it is the act of some chiefs acting without orders. And they sometimes say that the land is theirs and that they have the right to continue to live where they choose. Last year Weld-el-Medboh appeared with a troop and occupied Mernisa and attempted to remain there, alleging that he had been sent by the Shereefian Maghzen and the protecting nation. This act was followed by the occupation of Sanhaya, El Yaia,

Metiua and Beni Zerual on the grounds that these tribes had requested the Maghzen to do so. Before and afterwards they stopped the merchants forbidding them to bring the goods that they considered forbidden although we pay for those goods at a very high price. All this we bore in patience and close our eyes thereto sending only protests to the chiefs at Rabat, who received them without a reply. But now we have lost patience because the measure is running over and we have done the same to them; that is to say that they have made war upon us for several years and we have suffered with displeasure, but the moment has come for us to rise before them as one who defends his right and we have done what we have done without fearing them nor their threats. It is true that we have opposed the colonial party and that we will show them the limit of our territory until they be convinced that we have no fear of them nor of death to oblige them to respect our down-trodden rights. If they return to their senses and wish to treat with us on reasonable principles we will discuss as reasonable men. We are prepared for this because we do not wish to wage war nor to colonise as they do. And if they persist in their colonising ideas and in using treacherous means, the situation will remain as it is. And inform them in our name and that of all the Mussulmans, who live under our authority, that we are prepared to do one of two things, as the colonial party may prefer, because victory comes from God, who gives it to whom he wishes. And so for what you say of wishing for peace and quiet in the Rif, if they wish for it it will be a peace which means the obedience of the Riffis to the French, which would be for them a sweet morsel in their mouth. Therefore warn them that the peace and quiet they wish for is neither peace nor quiet. Peace to you.

MOHAMED-EL-HATABI.

Kaada 8, 1343.

[W 6910/39/28]

No. 46.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 20.)

Sir,

Admiralty, July 18, 1925.

WITH reference to your letter of the 16th July, 1925, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that they have had under their consideration the conditions under which His Majesty's Government might agree to policing of the French and Spanish navies in waters off the Moroccan coast outside the 3-mile limit.

My Lords are prepared to concur in the suggestion of the Secretary of State that such policing might be allowed provided that the French and Spanish Governments formally declare that the arrangement does not prejudice the principle of the 3-mile limit nor constitute any implied definition of the extent of territorial waters.

In the United States Liquor Convention it was laid down that His Majesty's Government would raise no objection to the boarding of private vessels for the purpose of making enquiries and examining ships' papers, and that when a reasonable ground was found for suspicion a search of the vessel might then be instituted. My Lords would suggest that the agreement with the French and Spanish Governments should be similarly worded.

In the case of the United States Liquor Convention the mention of any particular distance from the coast in which vessels might be boarded was avoided in order that the convention might not be taken as instituting any extended area in any way analogous to territorial waters. For this reason my Lords would prefer that no reference should be made to an actual distance of 6 miles from the coast. In any case, it should be made clear that ships on the normal trade routes should not be interfered with.

I am to point out that the French proposals include an article forbidding navigation within a certain area (outside the 3-mile limit) off the coast of Morocco. My Lords are strongly of the opinion that His Majesty's Government should refuse to recognise any such right to prohibit navigation outside the Moroccan 3-mile limit. It would, of course, however, be possible to agree that the fact of the vessel being found within this area may, under certain circumstances, be regarded as a ground for suspicion which would justify her being searched.

I am to forward herewith copy of a French notice to mariners on the subject which has been supplied to the Admiralty. It will be observed that in this notice to mariners it is laid down that the vessels which will be searched will be only those which are open

to suspicion. Reference is, however, still made to the limit of territorial waters as being 6 miles, and it is laid down that any vessel found in the prohibited zone without being able to justify its presence will be sent in for adjudication. It would be desirable that the British mercantile marine should be informed, as early as possible, of the measures which are being taken. My Lords would therefore be glad to be informed, as early as possible, of the views of the Secretary of State as to the desirability of promulgating this order by a British notice to mariners. It might be desirable simply to issue a translation of the French notice eliminating the words "territorial waters," and stating that His Majesty's Government is in communication with the French Government as regards the terms of the order, and particularly as regards the paragraph prohibiting shipping from navigating in certain areas.

I am, &c.

CHARLES WALKER.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Avis aux Navigateurs, publiés par le Service hydrographique de la Marine.

Maroc (Côte nord).

Côte de Tétouan et côte du Riff. Zones de surveillance et de visite des bâtiments de commerce. Zones interdites à la navigation. (État Major-Général 3, No. 811 du 4 juillet 1925.)

Zones de surveillance et de visite des bâtiments de commerce. Zones interdites à la navigation. En vue d'interdire tout commerce illicite sur les côtes du Maroc, les Gouvernements espagnol et français ont décidé de faire surveiller conjointement par leurs bâtiments de guerre le littoral des territoires situés au nord et à l'ouest de l'Afrique et compris entre le 2° de longitude ouest de Greenwich et le 27° de latitude nord.

Les limites à l'intérieur desquelles peuvent être surveillés et visités les bâtiments de commerce soupçonnés de transporter au Maroc des armes, des munitions et du matériel de guerre ou de se diriger vers des ports ou mouillages naturels de la côte non ouverts au commerce, sont les suivantes :

Dans les secteurs comprenant des ports ouverts au commerce ou traversés par des routes commerciales, la surveillance est limitée aux 6 milles des eaux territoriales, avec droit de suite en dehors de cette limite.

Dans les autres secteurs la surveillance s'étend jusqu'aux limites particulières définies ci-dessous :

Méditerranée.—Secteurs compris entre le cap des Trois Fourches et le cap Negro (nord de Tétouan).

La surveillance s'exerce dans le sud de la ligne joignant ces deux caps. En outre, la présence et les organisations des dissidents sur la côte rendant difficile et même dangereuse aussi bien la navigation commerciale que les opérations de contrôle des bâtiments de guerre aux abords du littoral, les eaux territoriales de ce secteur, limitées à 6 milles, sont interdites à la navigation entre le cap Mazari (sud de Tétouan) et la pointe Abdun ou Afraout est de Alhucemas. En conséquence, tout navire de commerce rencontré par des bâtiments de guerre dans la zone prohibée sans pouvoir y justifier sa présence sera déferé à l'autorité compétente.

Pos. app. du cap Negro : 35° 41' 0" N.—5° 16' 3" W. Gr.

Pos. app. du cap Mazari : 35° 33' 1" N.—5° 13' 7" W. Gr.

Pos. app. de la pointe d'Abdun : 35° 12' 0" N.—3° 29' 0" W. Gr.

Pos. app. du cap des Trois Fourches : 35° 27' 0" N.—2° 59' 1" W. Gr.

Maroc (Côte ouest).

Zones de surveillance et de visite des bâtiments de commerce. (État Major-Général 3, No. 811 du 4 juillet 1925.)

Zones de surveillance et de visite des bâtiments de commerce. En vue d'interdire tout commerce illicite sur les côtes du Maroc, les Gouvernements espagnol et français ont décidé de faire surveiller conjointement par leurs bâtiments de guerre le littoral des territoires situés au nord et à l'ouest de l'Afrique et compris entre la 2° de longitude ouest de Greenwich et le 27° de latitude nord.

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Les limites à l'intérieur desquelles peuvent être surveillés et visités les bâtiments de commerce soupçonnés de transporter au Maroc des armes, des munitions et du matériel de guerre ou de se diriger vers des ports ou mouillages naturels de la côte non ouverts au commerce, sont les suivantes :

Dans les secteurs comprenant des ports ouverts au commerce ou traversés par des routes commerciales, la surveillance est limitée aux 6 milles des eaux territoriales, avec droit de suite en dehors de cette limite.

Dans les autres secteurs la surveillance s'étend jusqu'aux limites particulières définies inclusivement, pour l'Atlantique, comme suit :

Secteur compris entre le cap Ghir et le cap Noun.

La surveillance s'exerce dans l'est de la ligne joignant les points situés à 6 milles à l'ouest de ces deux caps.

L'Ingénieur-hydrographe général, Chef du Service
hydrographique de la Marine,
FICHOT.

[W 6897/39/28]

No. 47.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 19, 1925.

MY telegram No. 93.

Meeting was held yesterday between French consul-general, Spanish consul-general, Captain Pannibières and myself to discuss question of tabors.

After a long discussion I made a note under a series of headings of points on which we were generally agreed. This is, of course, only résumé of our discussion, but, subject to approval of our respective Governments, may form basis of a detailed agreement. Text of my note, of which my French colleague and my Spanish colleague have copy, and which latter has already telegraphed to Madrid, is given in my immediately following telegram.

My French colleague has informed Rabat.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[W 6896/39/28]

No. 48.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 19, 1925.

FOLLOWING is note referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

1. Abolition of limitation of sphere of action of the two tabors, which, however, continue under authority of Mendoub for protection of zone. This implies closer co-operation.

2. It is understood that tabors have no police functions in town, but are solely gendarmerie.

3. Tabor No. 2 to guard coastline from Villa Harris to Cape Spartel.

4. Tabor No. 2 to extend their sphere to limits of town and to replace posts now held by tabor No. 1, where, however, customs officials will do such searching as is required for contraband.

5. Entrance into and departure from town forbidden between hours of 8 P.M. and 5 A.M.

6. Complete freedom of circulation for all villagers of Fahs between 5 A.M. and 8 P.M.

7. Tabor No. 1 will keep enlarged posts on all roads leaving zone opposite Spanish frontier posts.

8. No Spanish or native Spanish soldiers to be allowed into zone with their arms except as allowed under article 3 of convention.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[W 6911/39/28]

No. 49.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tangier, July 20, 1925.

PLEASE read my immediately preceding telegrams in the light of following observations:—

1. Assurance given by Spanish consul-general at meeting of 18th July that present commandant of Spanish tabor, who is little more than an *agent provocateur*, will be removed.

2. Necessity, in my humble opinion, which is shared by French consul-general, of making some concession to Spanish *amour-propre*.

3. Concessions suggested will not in opinion of experienced people here risk hostility of Abd-el-Krim, who has much more interest in seeing international status of Tangier maintained rather than a Spanish Tangier, which general rumour pretends has been mooted to French at Madrid.

4. Extension of sphere of Spanish tabor to present urban limits does not conflict with Act of Algeciras.

Moreover, formation of municipal police leaves absolutely nothing for Spanish tabor to do within former restricted area, especially if it is true, as stated in the press, that His Majesty's Government have agreed to increase of tabors as [*sic*: ?at] expense of France and Spain.

5. Customs officers are stationed at exits from the town for collection of new consumption duties. I strongly insist that any search for contraband should be done by them.

6. I have told both my French and Spanish colleagues that you may think it advisable that a British officer be sent to Tangier for the present to mark international character of proposed arrangements and to keep in close touch with both tabors.

[W 6947/39/28]

No. 50.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 343.)

Sir,

Madrid, July 18, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 320 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that though, as stated in my telegram No. 80, the work of the Franco-Spanish Commission in regard to Morocco seemed to have come to a standstill on that date, the difficulty was quickly overcome and the negotiations, which were resumed on the 6th, have been continued without interruption ever since.

2. As reported in my telegram No. 82, the agreement in regard to the policing of the land frontiers of the zones was approved on the 7th. M. Malvy returned to Paris on the 9th in order to attend the sittings of the Chamber, but before he left the terms of the agreement in regard to the peace offer to be made to Abd-el-Krim had been practically settled and the agreement itself was signed on the 11th instant. I regret that I have not been able to obtain a copy of it, but I have seen it and I think that the summary given in my telegram No. 86, though reproduced from memory, is substantially correct.

3. As will be seen from that telegram, the agreement contains only an outline of the terms. It had at first been intended to lay down more precisely that the measure of independence offered would be based on the maintenance of the suzerainty of the Sultan and submission to the Khalif of the Spanish zone, but ultimately it was decided, at the instance of the French, to omit all reference to the Sultan, as being unpalatable to Abd-el-Krim, and to speak merely of respect for existing treaty stipulations, which implies, of course, the recognition of the rights of the Sultan and the Khalif.

4. The boundaries of the zone to be allotted to Abd-el-Krim have similarly not yet been defined and will, like other details, be left for subsequent negotiation. As regards the initiation of negotiations, it was proposed first of all to convey an intimation to Abd-el-Krim that the two Governments are prepared to treat with him if he so desired. This intimation has probably already been conveyed to him through the commandant of the Spanish post at the Peñon in Alhucemas Bay, who is in communication with the

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Riffians in connection with the supply of provisions for the Spanish prisoners in their hands, and I understand that a reply is expected within the next few days. If Abd-el-Krim shows a disposition to negotiate, French and Spanish emissaries will be sent to discuss matters with his representatives. They will not be in the nature of plenipotentiaries, but persons in a subordinate position who enjoy the confidence of the parties concerned, and they will merely talk over the general outlines of an arrangement. The more detailed terms to be presented later are, I am informed, now being elaborated by the Franco-Spanish Commission.

5. It is, however, considered very doubtful whether Abd-el-Krim will be disposed to enter into negotiations on the terms now offered, and the question of military action in the event of his refusal is, therefore, under consideration.

6. Another question which the commission have been discussing is that of Tangier, as it has been necessary to revise the original agreement in view of the refusal of His Majesty's Government to accept the proposals contained therein. The agreement, as now drafted, provides for an increase in the tabors, with a proviso that the cordon to be drawn round Tangier shall be furnished by the Spanish tabor. Both General Jordana, the first Spanish delegate, and Señor Aguirre, the second delegate, express the earnest hope that His Majesty's Government may agree to this proposal and they have intimated that the Spanish Government would be prepared to defray a part at least of the additional expenditure involved. I understand that the preliminary draft agreement is now being considered by the French Government, who will no doubt consult His Majesty's Government before agreeing to it.

7. As regards the question of the handing over of undesirables to the authorities of the Spanish and French zones, the Spanish delegates tell me that they regret to see from your note that the impression had been produced that they contemplated the handing over of large numbers of natives *en bloc*. This was not their intention, and all they desired was that the *mendoub* should be given the power of arresting and handing over individual natives who might be specially indicated to him as working in the interests of those in rebellion against the Sultan. As for the question of disarmament, it was, they say, merely proposed that the matter should be discussed by the consuls-general, and that action should only be taken if and when the occasion seemed propitious.

8. The French have again brought up for discussion the question of the frontier between the two zones, and are once more pressing for the inclusion in their zone of the area occupied by the Beni Zerual tribe. They attach a good deal of importance to the question, as they say that it is most unsatisfactory that the boundary should remain indeterminate, as difficulties might at any moment arise in regard to it. Señor Aguirre points out, on the other hand, that the question is outside the original scope of the conference, that it is of a somewhat academic nature as there is no immediate prospect of the occupation of the district by either Power, and that, although it is of little use, either actual or potential, to Spain, it would be difficult to reconcile the Spanish public to the cession to France of so large and fertile a tract unless some compensating advantage could be announced at the same time. The French delegation tell me that they think the matter can be arranged without any great difficulty, but unless they can offer some adequate compensation—and it is not easy to see what form such compensation can take—it does not seem likely that the Spaniards will be in any hurry to give way to them, even though they may yield in the end. Señor Aguirre, indeed, told me last night that the negotiations were going badly in this respect. He mentioned, incidentally, that the Spanish delegation had suggested that compensation might be found in the neighbourhood of the Rio de Oro Colony, but that the French had declined to discuss such a suggestion.

I have, &c.
HUGH GURNEY.

[W 6965/39/28]

No. 51.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 21.)

Sir,

Admiralty, July 20, 1925.

WITH reference to your letter of the 13th instant regarding the steps to be taken to put the surveillance of contraband traffic in arms and munitions of war in the territorial waters of the Tangier zone, in accordance with article 4 of the convention, into active operation, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty

to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that they concur in the proposal that the arrangements should be discussed with the French Ministry of Marine by the naval attaché, Paris.

My Lords presume that the French Government have arranged for the participation of the Spanish Government.

I am, &c.
CHARLES WALKER.

[W 6932/39/28]

No. 52.

Marquis Merry del Val to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 21.)

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Spanish Embassy, London, July 20, 1925.

WITH reference to my notes dated the 9th, 13th and 17th instant, it is my duty, in view of instructions received, to call your Excellency's attention towards a new case of abuse of the neutral territory of the international Tangier zone as a base of supplies for the rebels of the Spanish zone of the Morocco Protectorate, taking the form of contraband of war. The Government of His Majesty the King my august Sovereign has ascertained that a great quantity of telephone wire, of rubber tyres for motor-cars and other apparatus acquired by a Riffi agent resident in the Tangier zone has left Tangier for the rebel chief Abd-el-Krim Ued Hadj Ali-el-Loh, whose headquarters are at Bugabexa. The telephone wire in question is no doubt the same that has been used to lay a line which already goes from the town of Xauen to Souk-el-Telata, in the tribal territory of Beni Ider, in which village it is asserted there are six Europeans occupied in that operation. The purchase of the above-mentioned material was carried out under the management and intermediary of Mrs. Arnall, a British subject. This woman is the widow of the notorious international Communistic agitator, of British nationality, John Arnall, whose record is known to the competent authorities in London, and whose name appears in the note of your Excellency's Department of the 5th September, 1922, and it would appear that she has established her residence in Tangier and continues the collaboration with the Riff rebels begun by her late husband.

I avail, &c.

ALFONSO MERRY DEL VAL.

[W 6910/39/28]

No. 53.

Foreign Office to Admiralty, and to Board of Trade (mutatis mutandis).

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 22, 1925.

WITH reference to your letter of the 18th instant, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to transmit, for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a draft of a note which it is proposed to address to the French and Spanish Ambassadors regarding the policing by French and Spanish naval forces of the waters off the coast of the French and Spanish zones of Morocco.

2. The Secretary of State will be glad to learn as soon as possible whether the Lords Commissioners concur in the terms of the draft note.

I am, &c.

G. H. VILLIERS.

[W 7089/39/28]

No. 54.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 23, 1925.

HARRIS has had conversations yesterday and to-day with messenger from Abd-el-Krim. Discussion elucidated following points:—

1. Abd-el-Krim is very anxious for peace, but lacking disinterested advisers is at a loss to know what he could properly demand or accept.

2. He will almost certainly turn down any proposals for peace from France and Spain because he professes to have no confidence in either party.

3. Reference was again made to intervention of His Majesty's Government, which alone, so messenger stated, would give necessary confidence in *bona fides* of His Majesty's Government [group omitted] Spain. Abd-el-Krim realises that there can be no question of guarantee of peace terms by any Power that might lend good offices. Such Power could, however, help in bringing the three parties together.

4. Abd-el-Krim would like Harris to visit him. Latter, while anxious to go, fears his visit might be liable to misinterpretation by Spaniards.

5. Messenger was satisfied with explanation that increase of tabors was based on Act of Algeciras and existing situation to avoid landing of troops, of which Abd-el-Krim had heard rumour.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[W 6965/39/28]

No. 55.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1925.

ON the 11th instant the counsellor of your Embassy suggested that in order to put the proposed surveillance of Tangier territorial waters by British, French and Spanish naval forces into practical operation, the British naval attaché at Paris should be instructed to discuss the matter with the French Ministry of Marine.

2. I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government are ready to fall in with the suggestion, and they are instructing His Majesty's Minister at Paris accordingly. They presume that the French Government will make arrangements for the participation of a Spanish representative in the proposed conversations.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6910/39/28]

No. 56.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1925.

IN the first part of your note of the 12th instant you informed me of the views of the French Government in regard to the proposed surveillance by British, French and Spanish naval forces of the territorial waters of Tangier. You stated that no difficulty would arise in the application of article 4 of the Tangier Convention in the case of the signatories of the convention, or of Powers who have acceded thereto, or of Powers enjoying no special treaty rights in Morocco. As regards United States, Italian and Portuguese nationals, you pointed out that they must, in virtue of the Act of Algeciras, observe the regulations prohibiting the importation of munitions of war into Morocco. Article 25 of that Act provided that, in the event of the infraction of the regulations, vessels of the three Powers in question may be seized, but the offenders must be brought before their respective consuls, and not before the Mixed Tribunal at Tangier.

2. I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government agree with the observations of the French Government, except as regards the application of the proposed joint measures of surveillance to United States, Italian and Portuguese nationals. Article 25 of the Act of Algeciras provides that—

"In case of the importation, or attempted importation, of prohibited goods by sea, at a place other than a port open to commerce, the Moorish customs authorities may take the vessel to the nearest port, to be there handed over to the consular authority, who shall have the right to seize and retain it until payment of the prescribed fines."

His Majesty's Government do not consider that they are justified in claiming that British warships are entitled to exercise in Moorish waters the rights and duties conferred on the Moorish Customs under article 25 of the Act of Algeciras. The right to do so in the territorial waters of Tangier can only be claimed by British warships in virtue of article 4 of the Tangier Convention. Since the United States, Italy and

Portugal have not acceded to the latter instrument, His Majesty's Government cannot properly invoke it in justification for searching ships flying the flags of those Powers.

3. His Majesty's Government recognise that France and Spain, in virtue of the treaties of 1911-12, occupy a different position, and it is for those two Governments to decide whether the French and Spanish naval or other authorities can properly be regarded as substituted for the Moorish Customs, and would therefore be justified in interference with vessels flying the flags of Powers which have not acceded to the Tangier Convention. His Majesty's Government do not desire to express any opinion on this point, and they can only declare their views in so far as British naval or other authorities are concerned.

4. I am addressing a further note in reply to the last two paragraphs of your communication, which dealt with surveillance of contraband by sea outside the territorial waters of Tangier.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[W 6910/39/28]

No. 57.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau, and to M. Merry del Val
(*mutatis mutandis*).

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1925.

IN the concluding paragraphs of your Excellency's note of the 12th instant you explained the reasons for which the French Government desire to exercise naval surveillance beyond a 3-mile limit off the coast of the French and Spanish zones of Morocco. You stated that the French Government were ready to declare that the measures of surveillance contemplated in the exceptional circumstances should not be considered as implying any definition of the extent of territorial waters.

2. His Majesty's Government have had under consideration the conditions subject to which they might consent to the policing by the French and Spanish navies in waters off the Moroccan coast outside the 3-mile limit, and they are prepared to come to a special and temporary agreement on the subject. This arrangement might take the following form:—

His Majesty's Government, whilst maintaining the principle that 3 marine miles extending from the coast line outwards and measured from low-water mark constitute the proper limits of territorial waters, will raise no objection to the boarding of private British vessels outside the 3-mile limit for the purpose of making enquiries and examining ships' papers and to the search of the vessel when a reasonable ground is found for suspicion, provided that—

- (a.) The French and Spanish Governments shall formally declare that the consent of His Majesty's Government to the above does not prejudice the principle of the 3-mile limit or constitute any implied definition of the extent of territorial waters.
- (b.) On the lines of the Liquor Convention between Great Britain and the United States, no mention shall be made of any particular distance from the coast in which vessels may be boarded.
- (c.) Ships on the normal trade routes shall not be interfered with.
- (d.) The prohibition of navigation within an area outside the 3-mile limit off the coast shall be withdrawn on the understanding that the fact of a vessel being found within this area may in certain circumstances be regarded as a ground for suspicion which will justify her being searched.

3. His Majesty's Government trust that the French Government will appreciate the goodwill with which the proposals of the Madrid Conference have been considered and that they will concur in the above conditions. In that event, I have the honour to propose that the agreement shall be concluded by means of an exchange of notes.

4. A similar note is being addressed to the Spanish Ambassador.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6932/39/28]

No. 58.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Marquis Merry del Val.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1925.

IN reply to your Excellency's notes of the 17th and 20th instant, I have the honour to state that I am consulting His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier in regard to the incidents mentioned therein.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 6932/39/28]

No. 59.

Foreign Office to Mr. Clive (Tangier).

(No. 326.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1925.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 88 of the 12th instant, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to transmit herewith copies of correspondence with the Spanish Ambassador relative to alleged violations of the frontier of the international zone by rebel forces. Mr. Chamberlain will be glad to receive any observations which you may desire to offer in regard to the incidents mentioned by the Ambassador. No reply has been returned to the notes from his Excellency of the 13th, 17th and 20th instant beyond the mere statement that you were being consulted.

I am, &c.

G. H. VILLIERS.

[W 6965/39/28]

No. 60.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 2496.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2479 of the 22nd instant, I transmit a copy of a letter from the Admiralty* and of a note to the French Ambassador† on the subject of the proposed surveillance of Tangier territorial waters by British, French and Spanish naval forces.

2. I request that you will authorise the naval attaché to His Majesty's Embassy to discuss the arrangements for the naval surveillance with the French Ministry of Marine.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 7116/39/28]

No. 61.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 351.)

Sir,

Madrid, July 21, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 343 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that the new agreement in regard to Tangier drawn up by the Franco-Spanish Commission was initialled yesterday, and it is hoped to sign it to-day. I understand that a copy of this agreement either already has been or shortly will be communicated to you by the French Ambassador in London, but it may perhaps be useful if I enclose a copy herein.

2. It will be seen that it provides in article 2 for an increase in the tabors.

3. In communicating the agreement to me, M. Aguirre particularly requested me to invite the attention of His Majesty's Government to the provisions contained in article 3. This article provides, amongst other things, for the handing over by the Mendoub to the authorities of the French and Spanish zones of individual natives of those zones who may have entered the Tangier zone without permission of the authorities and can be shown to have been guilty of a breach of the provisions of article 10 of the convention, which prohibits any agitation, propaganda or conspiracy in

* No. 46.

† No. 56.

the zone against the established order in the French and Spanish zones. The commission hope that the formula here employed will overcome the objections raised in your note of the 8th July to the provisions of the original agreement in this respect.

4. Similarly as regards the question of disarmament, M. Aguirre begged me to point out that it is made clear in the last paragraph of the article above mentioned that it is merely desired to explore the possibility of a gradual disarmament of the natives.

5. M. Aguirre further informed me that the President of the Directorate had authorised the removal of the present commander of the Spanish tabor and the appointment in his place of Captain de Miguel, who is at present attached to the Spanish consulate-general at Tangier and who is, he says, a very competent officer.

6. I understand that the work of the commission is nearly completed. The details of the arrangement for military co-operation have been practically settled, and the only question now outstanding is in regard to the delimitation of the frontier. A proposal on this subject, put forward by the Spanish Government, has been submitted to the French Government for consideration.

7. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier.

I have, &c.

HUGH GURNEY.

Enclosure in No. 61.

Accord relatif à la Protection de Tanger.

LES Gouvernements espagnol et français, se référant à l'article 7 de l'accord du 8 de ce mois, en vue d'assurer la protection de la zone de Tanger, conviennent ce qui suit :

1. Les Gouvernements espagnol et français associeront leurs efforts auprès des autorités locales compétentes de la zone de Tanger pour assurer, par les moyens légaux en leur pouvoir aussi bien que par leur action diplomatique, la stricte observation des dispositions consacrées par le Statut de Tanger de 1923 et les actes internationaux antérieurs.

2. A cet effet et en attendant l'organisation de la gendarmerie prévue à l'article 47 du Statut, les deux Gouvernements sont d'accord sur la nécessité de renforcer sans délai les effectifs des tabors de police Nos. 1 et 2.

3. Les instructions spéciales que les autorités compétentes auraient à donner auxdits tabors seront établies avec l'agrément des représentants des Puissances signataires du Statut, notamment en ce qui concerne la stricte observation des dispositions ayant pour objet le maintien de la neutralité et de la sécurité de la zone de Tanger ainsi que le respect de l'ordre établi dans les zones voisines.

A cette fin les deux Gouvernements considèrent que ces instructions spéciales devront porter :

- (a.) Sur l'interdiction de la zone de Tanger aux insoumis des autres zones ;
- (b.) Sur la remise individuelle, à charge de réciprocité, aux autorités desdites zones, sur leur demande formulée pour chaque cas d'espèce et fondée sur une infraction aux stipulations de l'article 10 de la convention du 18 décembre 1923, de tout sujet marocain, leur ressortissant, qui se serait rendu, sans leur autorisation, dans la zone de Tanger ;
- (c.) Sur l'organisation, par le chef du tabor urbain No. 2, et aux abords immédiats du périmètre municipal de Tanger, d'un service de surveillance qui s'exercera de manière à ne pas entraver le commerce licite et les échanges normaux de Tanger avec l'extérieur, et dont il sera rendu compte aux autorités compétentes.

Les deux Gouvernements considèrent, également, que l'armement des indigènes nécessite une surveillance particulière. Ils s'engagent à concourir, avec toute la diligence possible, à la recherche des moyens propres à réduire, au fur et à mesure que les circonstances le permettront, un armement qui constituerait un danger pour la tranquillité publique.

4. Le présent accord sera communiqué au Gouvernement britannique, signataire du Statut de Tanger de 1923, qui sera prié d'y donner son adhésion.

[13955]

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[W 7160/39/28]

No. 62.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 26.)(No. 100. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tangier, July 26, 1925.

MY telegram No. 98.

Harris learns that Marshal Lyautey a few days ago sent French official to Abd-el-Krim to inform him that Franco-Spanish peace terms were at his disposal. At the same time, official secretary informed Abd-el-Krim of terms at an interview in which latter was accompanied by Azergan, his Minister for Foreign Affairs. Abd-el-Krim promised to communicate his reply on his return to Ajdir. Instead, he communicated with Tangier to Captain Panabieres and to Harris stating that he did not intend to apply for Franco-Spanish peace terms, but was ready to send his Minister for Foreign Affairs with a Riff delegation to Tangier to negotiate peace, but negotiations must be public. To Harris only, he added, he would reserve the right to keep His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier informed of details of proceedings.

Harris tells me last week he again by telephone from a place a few miles across the frontier advised Abd-el-Krim not to count on British mediation. Latest proposal, however, still shows latter's inherent suspicion of his enemies. Marshal Lyautey is apparently annoyed at Abd-el-Krim's insistence on Tangier as place of negotiations, but Spanish authorities at Tetuan have invited Abd-el-Krim's messenger to go to Tetuan to see General Primo.

In the event of peace negotiations taking place at Tangier and Abd-el-Krim insisting on wishing to keep me informed of proceedings, I should be grateful for your instructions.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[W 7156/39/28]

No. 63.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 27.)(No. 223.)
Sir,

Tangier, July 21, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 93 and succeeding telegrams, I have the honour to enclose copy of a note in French for submission to our respective Governments, in the form in which it was approved at a meeting this afternoon between M. Feit, M. Buigas and myself, in regard to the measures proposed for the distribution of the increased tabors. Captain Panabieres was present at the meeting.

2. In explanation of the various points of this note I would submit the following observations:—

Paragraph 2.—By proposing to give to Tabor No. 2 surveillance of the coast from Cape Spartel to Villa Harris, an additional sphere of action is given to the Spanish tabor which was not contemplated in the arrangements made after the Act of Algeciras, although the extension of the urban limits as proposed in paragraph 5 does not conflict with the limitations of an urban tabor, as the town of Tangier has greatly increased since 1907. It was decided, therefore, that as the two tabors are to remain under Shereefian authority it was within the competence of the Mendoub to define the limitations of each tabor.

Paragraph 7.—It will be observed that it is proposed to increase Tabor No. 1 to an effective of 600 men and Tabor No. 2 to 300. In reply to my observation that this appeared to go beyond the limits of size originally laid down, Captain Panabieres assured me that throughout the war Tabor No. 1 had an effective force of 600 men, and it was only within the last two or three years that it had been reduced to its present size of 250. If the French and Spaniards are to pay the bill, I do not see that it makes very much difference whether the tabors have an effective force of 500 and 250 men or of 600 and 300.

Paragraph 9.—The Spanish Government appear to continue to insist on the question of the disarmament of the Fahs. My French colleague, however, entirely agrees with me in thinking that this disarmament, however desirable in principle, can only be effected very gradually, and that so long as

individuals of the Fahs who have arms continue to behave themselves it would be merely provocative at the present moment to try and take their arms away. The knowledge, however, that if they caused trouble in any way they would risk having their arms confiscated would, in our opinion, act as a deterrent. In the form, therefore, in which this paragraph is drafted, and to which my Spanish colleague finally agreed, I see no reason to fear any trouble on account of the gradual disarmament proposed.

Paragraph 10.—As this paragraph only applies to natives, it is within the competence of the Mendoub to take the necessary steps to prevent the ingress and egress of natives between sunset and sunrise.

Paragraph 11.—This article if properly enforced should do more than anything else to stop contraband traffic within the zone.

3. If you see no objection in principle to the arrangements proposed, which my Spanish colleague seems to think would be sufficient to satisfy Spanish *amour-propre*, you may perhaps, as I had the honour to suggest by telegraph, consider it advisable that a British military officer should be posted in Tangier for the time being, with the double object of marking the international character of the arrangements and in order to keep in close touch with the two tabors; by the latter I mean that he should be free to ride round the zone and visit the various posts held by either of the tabors; that, in case the Spanish tabor should attempt to abuse their position at the posts they held on the outskirts of the town, the British officer should be free to visit such posts and satisfy himself that the Spanish tabor are acting up to the spirit of the proposed arrangements. Without saying that any British officer would be sent, I was careful to tell both my colleagues individually that His Majesty's Government might think fit to send one for the reasons I have mentioned.

4. In conclusion, I would add that I attach great importance to the assurance given me by my Spanish colleague that, in the event of an agreement on the lines of the enclosed note being come to by the three Governments, Captain Cazes, the present commandant of the Spanish tabor, together with the officers serving under him, will all be removed. If Captain Cazes had been going to remain I should have hesitated to recommend any extension of the sphere of the Spanish tabor. The officer whom M. Buigas expects his Government will appoint to command No. 2 Tabor is Captain Miguel, who has been here for some months as the Spanish military officer provided for under article 3 of the statute. I have been careful to sound experienced opinion on these proposals, and I do not believe, from the information in my possession, that they will be interpreted by Abd-el-Krim as conflicting with the international and neutral status of the Tangier zone.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Note sommaire.

A LA suite d'un entretien auquel ont pris part, le 18 juillet, sur la question des tabors de Tanger, les consuls généraux d'Angleterre, d'Espagne et de France, les points ci-dessous ont été fixés sur lesquels un accord paraît possible et qui seraient proposés aux Gouvernements respectifs:

1. Bien que le statut soit en vigueur depuis le 1^{er} juin, les Tabors Nos. 1 et 2 sont maintenus provisoirement, tant que la situation ne sera pas redevenue normale. Ils sont placés sous l'autorité du Mendoub, puisqu'ils constituent des unités chérifiennes, et non pas sous l'autorité de l'administrateur de la zone. Leur but est la protection de la zone de Tanger.

2. La répartition des secteurs prévue à la suite de l'Acte d'Algésiras (secteur urbain pour le Tabor No. 2, secteur extra-urbain pour le Tabor No. 1) est supprimée. La nouvelle mission des tabors serait définie par le Mendoub à chaque instructeur en chef.

3. La police urbaine du statut récemment créée et en service normal actuellement sera chargée de la police de la ville et des opérations qui se rapportent à ce service. Les tabors n'auraient donc plus à faire la police en ville et resteraient une force armée à la disposition du Mendoub.

[13955]

H 2

4. Le Tabor No. 2 aurait la surveillance (service à créer que les trois consuls généraux proposeraient) du littoral depuis le cap Spartel jusqu'à l'ancienne villa Harris, près de Tangia Balia, pour la répression de la contrebande de toute nature par les barques de pêche en majorité espagnole.

5. Le Tabor No. 2 surveillerait également, dans l'intérieur, un secteur ainsi défini :

- (a.) Partant de l'embouchure de l'Oued-el-Youd, suivre le cours de cet oued jusqu'au pont qui coupe la route circulaire; suivre cette même route jusqu'au marché aux bœufs. La propriété de Mme. Bruzeau serait comprise dans ce secteur.
- (b.) La route de la T.S.F. jusqu'au pont de Fez.
- (c.) La route de France-Maroc.
- (d.) Boulevard circulaire.
- (e.) Route du Monopole des Tabacs se prolongeant jusqu'à la mer.

Le cordon de surveillance douanière actuellement établi par le Tabor No. 1 aux routes et chemins donnant accès à la ville serait désormais fourni par le Tabor No. 2 et les agents des douanes de Tanger opéreraient, tout comme cela se fait actuellement, sous la protection de ces postes ainsi transformés.

6. Le secteur du Tabor No. 1 partirait de la nouvelle ligne de postes du Tabor No. 2 jusqu'à la limite de la zone internationale, où des postes importants seraient placés sur les routes et chemins.

Cette formation compléterait son service de surveillance à l'aide de patrouilles, rondes, embuscades, &c. L'instructeur en chef du Tabor No. 1 pourrait, par délégation du Mendoub, autoriser les indigènes de la zone de Tanger à se rendre dans la zone espagnole. Ils viseraient les permis de voyage délivrés par les autorités de la zone espagnole à des indigènes de cette zone pour se rendre dans la zone de Tanger. De même, les autorités de la zone espagnole viseraient les permis de voyage délivrés par le Tabor No. 1, au nom du Mendoub, à des indigènes de la zone de Tanger autorisés à se rendre en zone espagnole.

Il demeure entendu que les deux tabors opéreraient pour le compte de l'autorité chérifienne de Tanger, c'est-à-dire que surveillance et arrestations seraient faites au nom du Mendoub et les indigènes arrêtés seraient remis aussitôt à cette autorité avec un rapport circonstancié.

7. Effectif des tabors renforcés.

En ce qui concerne le Tabor No. 2, un effectif de 300 hommes paraît largement suffisant au Capitaine Panabières pour exercer une surveillance efficace dans son nouveau secteur, délimité comme il est dit plus haut. Il aurait le même nombre d'officiers que maintenant, soit un capitaine et trois lieutenants.

Pour le Tabor No. 1, il ne faut pas compter pouvoir assurer le service avec moins de 600 hommes, dont 150 cavaliers. En tout cas, si ces chiffres ne sont pas suffisants, on pourrait les augmenter.

Si on adopte ce point de vue, il faudra désigner pour le Tabor No. 1 :

- 1 lieutenant de cavalerie.
- 2 lieutenants d'infanterie.
- 2 sous-officiers de cavalerie, dont 1 comptable.
- 3 sous-officiers d'infanterie, dont 1 comptable.
- 1 sous-officier d'artillerie, ou bien un sous-officier d'infanterie connaissant la manœuvre du 80 millim. de montagne.

Ainsi complété, le Tabor No. 1 comprendrait :

- 1 capitaine,
- 3 lieutenants et
- 8 sous-officiers.

8. Les deux tabors sont à l'entière disposition du Mendoub, qui les utilisera pour les besoins du service, notamment pour assister, le cas échéant, la police urbaine de Tanger.

9. D'après le Gouvernement espagnol, le désarmement serait immédiat ou progressif, selon les circonstances.

Le Capitaine Panabières nous fait remarquer que de tout temps le Tabor No. 1 a confisqué les armes aux indigènes du Fahs coupables de crimes ou de délits, mais que cette opération envisagée pour l'ensemble des populations de la zone internationale ne

pourra se faire que peu à peu, en profitant de toutes occasions pour désarmer les populations dont la conduite ou l'attitude vis-à-vis des autorités chérifiennes aurait été répréhensible.

Ce désarmement progressif est le seul moyen pour éviter des départs en dissidence, que nous devons empêcher avant tout.

10. Entre 8 heures du soir et 5 heures du matin, les indigènes ne seront pas autorisés à entrer dans ou à sortir de la ville de Tanger.

Par contre, la circulation entre la ville et la zone de Tanger serait complètement libre pour tous les indigènes de la ville et du Fahs de 5 heures à 20 heures du soir.

Il appartiendrait au Mendoub de prendre toutes dispositions utiles à cet égard.

11. Aucun soldat espagnol des troupes indigènes espagnoles ne serait autorisé à pénétrer dans la zone de Tanger avec armes et munitions de guerre, excepté dans les cas prévus par l'article 3 de la Convention de Paris du 18 décembre 1923.

Cette mesure indispensable empêchera le commerce clandestin des cartouches auquel se livrent certains boutiquiers de la ville et de nombreux soldats permissionnaires venant de la zone espagnole.

[W 7178/39/28]

No. 64.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 258. Confidential.)

[By Bag.]

Paris, July 27, 1925.

(Telegraphic.)

I ASKED M. Berthelot this afternoon whether he was satisfied with the arrangements come to with the Spaniards at Madrid. He replied confidentially that the whole position of Spain *vis-à-vis* to France in the matter was purely "opéra bouffe." What the Spaniards had suggested to the French was that they should merely confine themselves to sending a certain number of warships to Alhucemas, there to await the arrival of the French land forces on the other side of Ajdir. When the French had got within bombarding distance of the Riff stronghold, the Spaniards would graciously consent to open fire from the sea without, however, sending a single soldier to attack. M. Berthelot observed somewhat grimly that the French Government fully realised that they were alone in front of Abd-el-Krim, and could not count on any useful co-operation from Spain. He did not, however, by any means take a pessimistic view of the military situation, the great difficulties of which he fully realised, and he considers that it may safely be said, in spite of those difficulties, that the worst is now over.

2. M. Berthelot did not believe in the possibility of peace with Abd-el-Krim until the latter had received a sound beating, and in this connection he spoke to me with some feeling of the so-called Riff peace terms telegraphed from Tangier and reproduced in to-day's "Times." Whilst fully appreciating the sympathetic attitude of Mr. Harris, M. Berthelot observed that these continual declarations of Riff policy made public through him placed the French Government in an awkward position. There were, moreover, calculated to make Abd-el-Krim think that Great Britain sympathised with him. I pointed out how difficult it was to restrain Mr. Harris's activities, and even how difficult it was for the latter to decline to receive any messages which Abd-el-Krim might send him. This M. Berthelot quite understood. I would, however, venture to suggest the advisability of endeavouring to induce Mr. Harris to refrain from publishing any further peace proposals which may be made to him. M. Berthelot said that hitherto no direct proposals had been received by the French Government from Abd-el-Krim.

M. Berthelot declared that he well understood the reluctance of His Majesty's Government to be drawn into the Moroccan imbroglio, and that he had always impressed upon M. Briand how essential it was to avoid giving them the impression that the French Government had any such desire.

[W 7160/39/28]

No. 65.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul-General Clive (Tangier).

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 28, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 100 of 26th July: Peace negotiations at Tangier.

Contingency seems unlikely, but should it arise there is no objection to your being informed of proceedings by Abd-el-Krim provided that it is made clear that Riffs are not receiving British support or advice and that it is done with full knowledge of your French and Spanish colleagues.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 66 (in "R") and Paris, No. 201 (by bag).)

[W 7294/39/28]

No. 66.

*M. de Fleuriau to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 29.)**Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 28 juillet 1925.*

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

PAR sa note en date du 8 juillet dernier, votre Excellence m'avait fait connaître les observations du Gouvernement britannique touchant les mesures de surveillance que mon Gouvernement et le Gouvernement espagnol proposaient de prendre dans la zone internationale de Tanger pendant la durée des présentes hostilités.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement espagnol ont chargé leurs délégués réunis à Madrid de rédiger le texte d'un accord tenant compte des observations du Gouvernement britannique.

Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de communiquer ci-jointe à votre Excellence ce texte et de demander au Gouvernement britannique son assentiment à cet accord.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

A. DE FLEURIAU.

Enclosure in No. 66.

Accord relatif à la Protection de Tanger.

LES Gouvernements espagnol et français, se référant à l'article 7 de l'accord du 8 juillet 1925, et en vue d'assurer la protection de la zone de Tanger, conviennent ce qui suit :

1. Les Gouvernements espagnol et français associeront leurs efforts auprès des autorités locales compétentes de la zone de Tanger pour assurer, par les moyens légaux en leur pouvoir aussi bien que par leur action diplomatique, la stricte observation des dispositions consacrées par le Statut de Tanger de 1923 et les actes internationaux antérieurs.

2. A cet effet et en attendant l'organisation de la gendarmerie prévue à l'article 47 du statut, les deux Gouvernements sont d'accord sur la nécessité de renforcer sans délai les effectifs des tabors de police Nos. 1 et 2.

3. Les instructions spéciales que les autorités compétentes auraient à donner auxdits tabors seront établies avec l'agrément des représentants des Puissances signataires du statut, notamment en ce qui concerne la stricte observation des dispositions ayant pour objet le maintien de la neutralité et de la sécurité de la zone de Tanger ainsi que le respect de l'ordre établi dans les zones voisines.

A cette fin, les deux Gouvernements considèrent que ces instructions spéciales devront porter :

- (a.) Sur l'interdiction de la zone de Tanger aux insoumis des autres zones ;
- (b.) Sur la remise individuelle, à charge de réciprocité, aux autorités desdites zones, sur leur demande formulée pour chaque cas d'espèce et fondée sur une infraction aux stipulations de l'article 10 de la convention du 18 décembre 1923, de tout sujet marocain, leur ressortissant, qui se serait rendu, sans leur autorisation, dans la zone de Tanger ;
- (c.) Sur l'organisation, par le chef du tabor urbain (No. 2), et aux abords immédiate du périmètre municipal de Tanger, d'un service de surveillance qui s'exercera de manière à ne pas entraver le commerce licite et les échanges normaux de Tanger avec l'extérieur et dont il sera rendu compte aux autorités compétentes.

Les deux Gouvernements considèrent, également, que l'armement des indigènes nécessite une surveillance particulière. Ils s'engagent à concourir, avec toute la diligence possible, à la recherche des moyens propres à réduire, au fur et à mesure que les circonstances le permettront, un armement qui constituerait un danger pour la tranquillité publique.

4. Le présent accord sera communiqué au Gouvernement britannique, signataire du Statut de Tanger de 1923, qui sera prié d'y donner son adhésion.

Madrid, le 21 juillet 1925.

[W 7295/39/28]

No. 67.

The Marquis Merry del Val to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 29.)

(Translation.)

Sir,

Spanish Embassy, London, July 28, 1925.

IN your note of the 8th instant your Excellency was good enough to furnish me with certain observations drawn up by the British Government regarding the police measures which the Spanish and French Governments propose to adopt, during the present hostilities, in the international zone of Tangier.

The Spanish and French Governments have instructed their delegates who have met at Madrid to draft the text of an agreement which will take into account the remarks of the British Government.

In compliance with instructions received, I have the honour to communicate the text* to your Excellency and to request the assent of the British Government to the said agreement.

I have, &c.

ALFONSO MERRY DEL VAL.

[W 7294/39/28]

No. 68.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 2576.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1925.

THE French Ambassador handed to me this afternoon the text of the agreement for the protection of Tangier reached at Madrid between the representatives of the French and Spanish Governments.† The Spanish Ambassador handed me a similar document. I promised an early reply, which I said might probably be an expression of our agreement.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 7295/39/28]

No. 69.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Gurney (Madrid).

(No. 426.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1925.

THE Spanish Ambassador handed to me this afternoon the text of the agreement for the protection of Tangier reached at Madrid between the representatives of the Spanish and French Governments. The French Ambassador handed me a similar document. I promised an early reply, which I said might probably be an expression of our agreement.

The Marquis Merry del Val at the same time communicated to me details of the agreement reached between the three consuls-general at Tangier in regard to the tabors and similar matters. I told his Excellency that I had seen a telegraphic report from Consul-General Clive, but I did not think it was quite as full. It was unlikely that I should find anything to object to in what had been agreed by Mr. Clive.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

* For French text of agreement, see No. 66.

† See No. 66.

[W 7375/39/28]

No. 70

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 1712.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report from the naval attaché on the traffic in arms in the Tangier zone.

Paris, July 31, 1925.

Enclosure 1 in No. 70.

Captain Pipon, R.N., to Mr. Phipps.

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Paris, July 31, 1925.

IN accordance with your directions and with instructions received from the Admiralty, I have discussed with the French Ministry of Marine arrangements for British participation with the French and Spanish naval forces in the patrol of territorial waters of the Tangier zone with a view to stopping traffic in arms.

It appears that the French despatch-vessel "Amiens" and Spanish gunboat "Laya" arrived at Tangier yesterday (the 30th July) and have started the "surveillance" (guarding or watching) of the coast. The Ministry of Marine heard of this late last night and informed me of it this morning.

I asked why this "surveillance" had been begun before the arrival of the British contingent, as it was to be a joint operation, and was informed that, the principle of the patrol to stop arms traffic having been admitted, it was considered unnecessary to wait for our contingent before putting it into effect.

The Ministry of Marine have requested that the British division of destroyers to carry out this patrol may be despatched to participate in the operation as soon as possible.

The principle that the duty of patrolling should be borne equally by the three navies, i.e., British, French and Spanish, was entirely agreed to.

It was further agreed that the total line should be divided up into three sections, each nation being responsible for a section, but the sections being periodically interchangeable if considered advisable.

It was considered that once the sections have been agreed upon locally, no superior control will be necessary.

There was no Spanish representative at our meeting, as the Spanish naval attaché is now in Spain and, according to his present arrangements, is not likely to return to Paris for some time. The Ministry of Marine believe, however, that the Spanish naval authorities are quite ready to fall in with any agreement and arrangements that we may make here.

It will be seen from the second paragraph in the appendix to this despatch that the French authorities realise the 3-mile limit and the particular conduct to be followed with regard to the Italian, Portuguese and American vessels.

I have, &c.

JAMES M. PIPON, Naval Attaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 70.

Supervision of Tangier Zone.

(Translation of Résumé of Instructions telegraphed to Admiral Hallier on July 30, 1925.)

THE Ministry of Marine has given to Admiral Hallier the following instructions with regard to the supervision of the Tangier zone:—

Supervision will be carried out within the 3-mile limit from the coast, defaulting vessels being reported to the representative of the Sultan, except Italian, Portuguese and American vessels, which will be reported to their respective consuls.

You are to detach three vessels to carry out this supervision; one vessel is to be at anchor off Tangier, one on patrol duty and the third resting at any base you may select.

Make arrangements with the Spanish admiral to commence this supervision as soon as possible.

Great Britain will take part in the supervision of the Tangier zone with a group of four destroyers under the command of a commander. As a rule, one of these destroyers will be anchored off Tangier, one will be on patrol duty and the two others will be held in reserve at Gibraltar.

Until circumstances permit the officer in command of the British patrol-vessels to get into direct communication with Admiral Guerra and you, the British, Spanish and French officers in command of the vessels detached for patrol work are to arrange on the spot the details of the provisional organisation of supervision.

[W 7294/39/28]

No. 71.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Marquis Merry del Val and M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, August 4, 1925.

IN your note of the 28th ultimo you communicated the text of an agreement for the protection of Tangier drawn up at Madrid between the representatives of the Spanish and French Governments, and you requested the assent of His Majesty's Government.

2 I am happy to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, after consideration of the terms of the agreement, are prepared to give their assent thereto.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 7472/39/28]

No. 72.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 244.)

Sir,

Tangier, August 1, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 326 of the 23rd July requesting my observations in regard to the various incidents mentioned by the Spanish Ambassador in his notes of the 13th, 17th and 20th July.

2 The complaints of the Marquis Merry del Val may be dealt with under three headings:—

- (a.) Alleged incidents in the zone;
- (b.) Hostile agitation of a native agent, Mulai Ali Akhamlish; and
- (c.) The misdoings of a British subject, Mrs. Arnall, who has been instrumental in sending out of Tangier into the Spanish zone a large quantity of telephone wire and motor accessories.

I propose to deal with these in turn.

3.—(a.) The first of the incidents mentioned in the Spanish Ambassador's note of the 13th July is entirely unknown to Captain Panabières and apparently also to Captain Miguel (the resident Spanish military officer under article 3 of the statute). The second incident mentioned in the same note, even if true, is a very paltry affair. As a matter of fact Captain Panabières and also Captain Miguel are quite unaware of what places are meant by "Casa del Frances" and "Punta Blanquilla." There appears, however, to be a man at Handak-az-Zahara who owns a small lighter for the transporting of cattle, &c., to the Tangier zone. But as the port of Tangier is within the sphere of the Spanish tabor, Captain Panabières is unable to give any details as to when and how often this man may come across. In any case the marketing in Tangier of cattle and other produce from the Spanish is in no sense an offence, and it would appear to be rather a matter for the Spanish military authorities to stop the journeys or seize his lighter in case they disapprove. The truth about the incident mentioned in the first half of the penultimate paragraph of the Spanish note of the 17th July is, I am

* The despatch-vessel "Amiens" and the gunboat "Laya" commenced supervision on July 30.

informed, as follows: The Moor named Abd-el-Krim Belheida Val-Hel was the individual in charge of the harka which caused so much trouble in this zone during June, and was responsible for the incident mentioned in my despatch No. 179 of the 11th June. That his house was sacked during his absence by people from a neighbouring village who had suffered by his incursions is a perfectly natural event in any Oriental country. In any case the whole incident, such as it was, occurred in the Tangier zone as between natives of this zone, and there is no question of an incursion from outside.

4.—(b.) The protest about Akhamlish really betrays a certain ingenuousness on the part of the Spanish authorities. I would refer you to the second half of my despatch No. 369 of the 24th November last in regard to this man. Since the date of the Spanish protest last autumn his doings have been carefully watched by this consulate-general, and, far from being involved in any intrigues against this zone or any agitations which may be injurious to the Spaniards, he has remained in Tangier in the rôle of an agent for peace. It is true that he has been an intermediary for correspondence with Abd-el-Krim, but perfectly openly and without disguise. The French have continually availed themselves of his services. Only yesterday he returned from Tetuan, which he had visited with the messenger from Abd-el-Krim at the special request of General Primo de Rivera. I learn that when these two Moors were treated with the greatest courtesy and consideration. They were officially entertained, and had two personal interviews with General Primo de Rivera himself. I referred to their going in the last sentence of my telegram No. 101 of the 28th July.

5.—(c.) As regards Mrs. Arnall and the export of telephone wire, &c., I would refer you to my despatch No. 237 of the 30th July.

6. I have no hesitation in submitting that in my opinion the protests contained in these recent notes from the Spanish Ambassador need hardly be taken seriously. Captain Pauabieres assures me that since the 6th July there have been no incidents in the Tangier zone; in fact, it is a long time since the zone has been so peaceful. The fact that Abd-el-Krim wishes to insist on any negotiations that may take place being held at Tangier goes far to explain the reason why he has been so careful during the last six months to avoid anything which might compromise the political status of this zone. This is unquestionably one reason, if not the chief, for Abd-el-Krim's attitude towards Tangier, the other being that given in the letter to Akhamlish enclosed in the Spanish note of the 17th July, in which he says: "We have decided to close the road to Tangier and forbid our brethren to pass into it because the Spanish are free to murder and imprison men, women and children."

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[W 7585/39/28]

No. 73.

M. de Fleuriau to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 7.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 6 août 1925.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

PAR sa lettre en date du 23 juillet dernier, votre Excellence avait bien voulu me faire connaître les vues du Gouvernement britannique sur la surveillance à exercer sur les côtes des zones française et espagnole du Maroc, en dehors de la zone de Tanger, pendant la durée des présentes hostilités.

D'accord avec le Gouvernement espagnol, mon Gouvernement me charge, en réponse à votre lettre précitée, de déclarer à votre Excellence que la surveillance conjointe exercée sur les côtes du Maroc par les bâtiments de guerre français et espagnols, et qui a fait l'objet de l'avis du 2 juillet, a été organisée de manière à protéger le commerce licite et à ne pas l'entraver dans ses opérations.

Les deux Gouvernements ont donc été amenés à préciser des limites de surveillance pour éviter que leurs bâtiments de guerre n'arrêtent des navires sur les routes commerciales et pour avertir les navigateurs qu'en se tenant en dehors de certaines zones, ils ne seraient en aucun cas soumis à la visite.

Les limites données n'ont pas d'autre portée ni d'autre but; elles ne préjugent rien de la reconnaissance par les autres Gouvernements, soit d'une définition quelconque des eaux territoriales, soit d'une fixation, à quelque distance que ce soit de la côte, du droit d'exercer la surveillance.

En ce qui concerne la prohibition de la navigation sur la côte dissidente du Rif, elle a, d'abord, pour but de mettre le commerce licite à l'abri des vexations des dissidents, et, d'autre part, il est hors de doute qu'un bâtiment ne peut s'exposer au feu des batteries rifaines sans être de connivence avec les rebelles.

En conséquence, un bâtiment rencontré à une distance telle de la côte qu'il n'y puisse naviguer en sécurité sans être soupçonné de complicité avec les dissidents sera, s'il ne peut justifier sa présence dans ces parages, dérouté vers le port le plus proche pour y être visité, mais la prohibition absolue de la navigation, entraînant une sanction pour ce navire, même lorsque le délit de contrebande n'est pas prouvé, s'appliquera seulement aux bâtiments rencontrés à moins de 3 milles de la côte dissidente.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

A. DE FLEURIAU.

[W 9769/18/28]

No. 74.

Acting Consul-General Bond to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 296.)

Sir,

Tangier, October 8, 1925.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 355 of the 6th August and previous correspondence regarding the reorganisation of the tabors in the Tangier zone, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter addressed by the French consul-general to his Excellency the Mendoub, proposing that the new arrangements should be brought into operation on the 15th October next.

2. The Spanish consul-general is addressing a similar letter to his Excellency the Mendoub.

3. Pending the latter's reply to these two communications, the above date must be regarded as approximate.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to his Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, requesting that Captain Chidson may be instructed to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Tangier on or about that date; this with reference to the arrangements outlined in your telegram No. 46 of the 28th July last.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 74.

French Consul-General to his Excellency the Mendoub.

LES Gouvernements espagnol et français avaient, lors de la Conférence de Madrid du mois de juillet 1925, admis le principe qu'en raison des circonstances actuelles dans le Rif, il y avait lieu de maintenir provisoirement les Tabors Nos. 1 et 2 créés par l'Acte d'Algésiras et de renforcer ces unités destinées à assurer la sécurité de Tanger et de sa zone. Le Gouvernement britannique a, par la suite, donné son adhésion au projet ainsi établi par les deux Puissances; il a seulement stipulé que les dépenses occasionnées par le maintien et le renforcement des tabors resteraient à la charge de l'Espagne et de la France et qu'elles ne sauraient en aucun cas grever le budget de la zone de Tanger.

Les unités ont été en conséquence renforcées et se trouvent aujourd'hui portées à l'effectif de 500 hommes pour le Tabor No. 1 (avec maximum à atteindre de 600 hommes) et à l'effectif de 300 hommes pour le Tabor No. 2 (maximum actuellement réalisé).

Votre Excellence voudra bien remarquer que ce maintien provisoire des deux unités en question ne signifie point que l'Espagne et la France aient renoncé à exécuter une des clauses du statut qui prévoyait la constitution d'une gendarmerie: la preuve en est que l'Administration internationale entretient ici le capitaine belge appelé à commander cette troupe et que les lieutenants instructeurs espagnols et français sont versés, en attendant, respectivement dans les Tabors Nos. 1 et 2. Deux sous-officiers belges sont employés, enfin, dans les services publics de l'Administration de Tanger. La création de la gendarmerie paraît donc seulement différée et lorsque les circonstances auront de nouveau permis de réaliser sur ce point le programme de la Convention de Paris, le capitaine belge, les lieutenants, les instructeurs et les sous-officiers seront disponibles et auront pu, entre-temps, se préparer à leur mission définitive.

[13955]

I 2

Il a paru expédient aux Gouvernements espagnol et français de placer les deux tabors maintenus et renforcés sous votre autorité; chaque instructeur en chef sera en rapport avec vous et vous lui donnerez toutes instructions pour assurer la mission de surveillance et de protection qui lui est dévolue. A cet égard, les Gouvernements précités ont envisagé une répartition de ces attributions, que je résume ici brièvement:

Le Tabor No. 1 continue à s'occuper de la police et de la surveillance du Fahs; le Tabor No. 2 abandonne le service de la police de la ville, qui est confié désormais à la police urbaine créée par l'Administration internationale, et il exerce un rôle de surveillance tout le long du littoral de la zone depuis la ville Harris jusqu'au cap Spartel; il détache, de même, des soldats dans les postes de contrôle que le service des douanes a installés ou installera autour de la ville pour reprimer la contrebande. Dans ces deux cas, que ce soit le long de la côte ou que ce soit autour de la ville, les soldats du Tabor No. 2, remplaçant dans certains postes les soldats du Tabor No. 1, seront, comme l'étaient ces derniers, les auxiliaires des agents des douanes chérifiennes, qui ont seuls qualité pour agir.

En terminant, j'ai l'honneur de proposer à votre Excellence qu'elle invite les deux instructeurs en chef à se concerter et à proposer à votre examen un ensemble d'instructions détaillées pour organiser chacun en ce qui concerne leur tabor, le nouveau service qui pourrait commencer à partir du 15 octobre prochain. Mais il reste entendu que, pour toutes les questions concernant l'administration de l'unité, la discipline, l'emploi de la troupe et son instruction, la nomination et la radiation des officiers indigènes, les Tabors Nos. 1 et 2 continueront à se conformer aux prescriptions des règlements de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Tanger, le 5 octobre 1925.

[W 10050/18/28]

No. 75.

Sir H. Rumbold to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 471. Confidential.)

Sir,

Madrid, October 16, 1925.

IN the course of the conversation which I had the honour to report to you in my immediately preceding despatch, General Primo de Rivera made several allusions to the present régime in the Tangier international zone, which he described as unsatisfactory. On my saying that I could not believe that Abd-el-Krim had been able to draw any considerable supplies of any kind from the international zone, General Primo de Rivera admitted that such was the case, but he complained that Abd-el-Krim's partisans had certainly intrigued actively against the Spaniards in that zone. He expressed the view that the arrangements for the administration of the zone were cumbersome and would not work in the long run.

2. The general said that he knew me well enough to talk to me with much greater frankness than he would to most of my colleagues. He foresaw that he might later on wish to raise the question of the Tangier international zone in the sense of proposing that that zone should be administered by Spain alone. As I thought it better not to enter into an argument on this subject with the general, I merely asked him what France would be likely to say to any such suggestion. The general, who is above all an optimist, replied that he did not anticipate any difficulty from the French, who had "changed a great deal in the last six months." The Spaniards would no doubt have to compensate them elsewhere; but he foresaw opposition from England, and I agreed that his conjecture would probably prove correct. He said that such opposition would be inherent in the traditional policy of England. When that country had fixed a definite line of policy with regard to a question, she stuck to it, if necessary, for centuries.

3. General Primo de Rivera more than once stated that his remarks were academic for the moment, but I have thought them worth while repeating to you as showing what is in the mind of a man who, as far as can be seen, is likely to remain at the head of affairs in Spain for a considerable time to come. Recent events have shown that General Primo de Rivera is a man of great energy and determination, who is not likely to allow an idea to drop which has once got fixed in his mind.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

(b.) French Zone.

[W 6433/39/28]

No. 76.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 1503.)

Sir,

Paris, July 6, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1421 of the 24th June, I have the honour to inform you that the subject of the situation in Morocco was raised in the Senate on the 2nd July, when the Government was interpellated on its policy.

2. The interpellation was in point of fact more or less of the nature of a vote of confidence in the Government, and the motion which declared that the Senate, "affirming the pacific intentions of France and its firm intention of defending the territory under French protectorate against the aggression of Abd-el-Krim, approves the declarations of the Government and has confidence that it will not only bring to a termination its military and diplomatic action in a manner which will safeguard the civilising work of France, but will also suppress the agitation being carried on against the army and against the country," was carried unanimously by 290 votes to nil.

3. As regards the actual situation in Morocco, no new facts of special interest were brought out in M. Painlevé's speech. The President of the Council declared that it was a mistake to exaggerate the importance of the operations, and declared that they had more the character of "une vaste opération de police" than of war, and he added that the total French forces at present in Morocco were only 25 per cent. larger than those stationed in that country four years ago. The losses suffered by the French forces, killed and missing, amounted up to date to the number of 400, and the higher estimates which had appeared in many newspapers were vastly exaggerated. The most important part of M. Painlevé's speech was that in which he denounced the agitation against the war which is at present being carried on in France by the Communists, and he declared that, at a time when France was defending her North African possessions, she had a right to the support of the country. He admitted that very serious efforts had been made by the Communists to persuade the troops going to Morocco to refuse to carry out their orders, and he declared that the Government would, in no circumstances, permit such activities to be carried on with impunity.

4. M. Briand, who was invited to give some explanation of the negotiations at present being carried on with the Spanish Government and also with His Majesty's Government with regard to the situation in Morocco, declined to discuss this aspect of the situation beyond stating that, as regards negotiations with Spain, arrangements had been come to for the joint supervision of the Moroccan coast. The most important part of his speech, too, was concerned with the question of the subversive Communist activities. He also declared that the Government would not hesitate to take the necessary steps to check this action.

5. The Parliamentary Commission, the composition of which was reported in my despatch No. 1298 of the 8th June, has returned to France and has made a report to the Army Commission of the Chamber. No account of this report has yet appeared in the press, but it would appear that the commission was of the opinion that it was necessary for the command of the military forces to be entrusted to some officer independent of the Resident-General.

6. In this connection it is reported in to-day's press that it is probable that the Government will take action in this sense, and that the supreme command of the French forces in Morocco will be entrusted to General Guillaumat, at present the officer commanding the French army of the Rhine. I understand that this post was at first offered to a General Targe, who, however, would only accept it on certain conditions, which were unacceptable to Marshal Lyautey. The latter will retain his position as Resident-General, but will now be relieved of the military command, and will be free to devote himself to the political and administrative aspects of the situation.

7. Some prominence was given in the press of the 5th July to the report published in the "Daily Mail" that considerable embarrassment was being caused to the French owing to the fact that certain tribes, which had previously remained loyal, were now going over to the enemy, and in view of the anxiety to which this report gave rise the Government has thought it necessary to issue a statement minimising the importance of the defection of these tribes. A copy of this official communication is communicated herein.* I also have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a declaration

* Not printed.

of M. Painlevé,* published in this morning's "Matin," explaining the reason for the necessity of establishing an independent military command in Morocco, and declaring that, although the French forces may have had to retire to certain parts of the line, yet there is no real danger in the situation.

8. Little definite information regarding the progress of the Franco-Spanish negotiations in Madrid has appeared in the press lately, and an interview with M. Malvy, published in to-day's "Journal," throws little light on the actual details of the negotiations actually in progress. M. Malvy contents himself with saying:—

"Whatever may happen in the future, whether it is a question of negotiation or of the continuance of the campaign, France and Spain, while retaining their complete liberty of action, will collaborate together against the common danger."

It is, however, generally assumed by the press that the conversations now being carried on in Madrid are connected with the terms of peace which might eventually be offered to or accepted from Abd-el-Krim by the two Governments.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

[W 6490/186/28]

No. 77.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 1516.)

Sir,

Paris, July 7, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1503 of the 6th July, I have the honour to inform you that General Naulin has been appointed supreme commander of the French military forces in Morocco. General Naulin, who is 55 years of age, commanded an army corps during the latter part of the war, and afterwards served in North Africa and Syria. A copy of the decree published in to-day's "Journal officiel," defining General Naulin's functions, is enclosed herein.* This appointment was, it is understood, originally offered to General Guillaumat, the commander-in-chief of the French army on the Rhine. He, however, refused it, ostensibly on the grounds that it was essential that he should remain in his present post during the evacuation of the Ruhr, but really, I am told, because he hopes eventually to succeed Marshal Pétain as Vice-President of the Conseil supérieur de la Guerre and therefore commander-in-chief designate in time of war.

2. M. Malvy is expected to return to Paris to-day to give an account to the Government of the negotiations in which he has been engaged with the Spanish Government. In this connection, to-day's "Ère nouvelle" declares that a definite agreement has been reached at Madrid with regard to the peace proposals to be offered to Abd-el-Krim. According to this paper, the Riffians would be granted full administrative and economic liberty with every opportunity for agricultural development under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan. In return, Abd-el-Krim would be required to surrender a certain amount of arms and munitions, but he would be allowed to retain a large portion of his present stock. It is, in addition, stated that the boundary of the French zone would in all probability be fixed along the course of the River Ouergha. The article adds that, beyond deciding the terms of peace to be offered to Abd-el-Krim, the conference has done little to ensure common action between the French and Spanish Governments; in particular, no progress has been made in deciding the question whether French troops may be granted the right to pursue the Riffians across the Spanish border.

3. The attacks upon Marshal Lyautey continue, and to-day's "Homme libre" has an article violently criticising the Resident-General and stating that the best service which he can render to France at the present time is to resign his post. There seems to be a growing opinion here that too great a part is being played in the conduct of the operations in Morocco by the politicians of Paris, and that party feeling is being allowed, in too many cases, to outweigh patriotic sentiment. A particular case which I have heard mentioned in this connection is the fact that the Government refused to appoint General Weygand to the supreme command in Morocco in spite of the fact that his great name and reputation would have been of the highest value. The Government is alleged to have been actuated in this matter by General Weygand's

* Not printed.

political opinions, but I have also heard it stated that the Government did not think it altogether wise to appoint a commander of General Weygand's calibre at a time when no operation of great magnitude appears possible before next spring.

4. To-day's newspapers publish a communiqué stating that, since Abd-el-Krim has taken steps to prevent the Riffians proceeding to Algeria for the harvest, the French Government have decided not to allow any Riffians at present in Algeria to leave that country.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

[W 6684/39/28]

No. 78.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 1563.)

Sir,

Paris, July 13, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1516 of the 7th July, I have the honour to inform you that a vote, granting a credit of 183,000,000 fr. to be devoted to the operations in Morocco, was passed by the Chamber of Deputies on the 9th July by 404 to 29 votes. The entire Socialist party, together with nine Socialist-Radicals and three Socialist-Republicans, abstained from taking part in the division.

2. The debate in the Chamber was awaited with considerable interest, in view of the fact that it was not certain what attitude the Socialist party would adopt towards the Government's demand for a credit. From two leading articles which had recently appeared in the "Quotidien" over the signature of M. Pierre Bertrand, there was reason to think that the Socialist party might have been prepared to give the Government a more active measure of support than they had hitherto extended. In his articles M. Bertrand had argued that the Government should at once make public the conditions of peace which were being drawn up at Madrid for presentation to Abd-el-Krim in order that public opinion might be satisfied that France had no imperialistic aims. Should Abd-el-Krim accept these terms well and good. On the other hand, should he deliberately refuse them and insist on continuing hostilities, then it would be plain to everyone that no blame whatever could be attached to France and the Government would be entitled to take all necessary steps to expel Abd-el-Krim from French territory and to bring him to submission. The Government, according to M. Bertrand, could be assured that in such an event they would have the full support of the Socialist party. It was, however, essential that the conditions of peace which were to be offered to Abd-el-Krim should be published as soon as possible. These views, as expressed in M. Bertrand's articles, were reiterated in the Chamber by M. Renaudel, the Socialist leader. He implored the Government to lose no time in communicating the terms of peace drawn up by the negotiators at Madrid to Abd-el-Krim, and urged most strongly that the conditions should simultaneously be made public. M. Renaudel maintained that in this way much of the ground would be cut from under Abd-el-Krim's feet, and that he would no longer be able to argue that France's aims were purely imperialistic. M. Renaudel assured the Government that, should Abd-el-Krim be so misguided as to refuse these conditions of peace then the Socialist party would be ready to support any measures which might be necessary to bring him to his senses.

3. M. Painlevé, however, declined to comply with the suggestion that the terms of peace should be published at once, nor was he prepared to undertake that they should be communicated officially to Abd-el-Krim. There were sufficient means of communication between the French and Spanish Governments on the one hand and Abd-el-Krim on the other, through unofficial channels, to ensure that the latter would be kept fully informed of the results of the Madrid Conference, and it would not be consonant with the dignity of France officially to communicate the terms of peace to a man who could not be considered as other than a rebel. It would be a mistake to publish the terms of peace at once, since such a procedure might prejudice the chances of their being accepted, and it would be sufficient if they were made known to the world after Abd-el-Krim had either accepted or rejected them. In the latter event, M. Painlevé declared emphatically that France would have no hesitation in employing the most active means to reduce Abd-el-Krim to subjection.

4. The remainder of M. Painlevé's speech dealt with the present situation in Morocco, of which he explained the difficulties, and the appointment of General Maulin as commander-in-chief of the military forces in Morocco. M. Painlevé took the

occasion once more to declare that France had been the victim of an aggression, and that, beyond the desire to defend the regions under her protectorate, she had no ulterior imperialistic aims.

5. M. Painlevé was followed by M. Léon Blum, the leader of the Socialist party, who gave an explanation of the reason why his party felt compelled to abstain from voting in the division. It was not that the Socialists had adopted a policy of deliberate opposition to the Government, even though they had felt constrained to abandon the "politique de soutien," still less did they consider, like the Communists, that Morocco should be evacuated at once, since they felt that the Government was entirely justified in defending the native populations under its protectorate. Nevertheless, the Socialist party had always been opposed to the policy of colonisation, which to them was synonymous with imperialism, and past traditions prevented them from voting with the Government on this occasion. M. Blum incidentally delivered a somewhat pointed attack on Marshal Lyautey, which was greeted with much applause from the Socialist benches.

6. Perhaps the most striking speech made during the debate was that of M. Roux-Freissineng, the Deputy for Oran, who, speaking with intimate local knowledge of the problem, made a great impression upon the Chamber. M. Roux-Freissineng contended that it was a great mistake to consider the Riff as an independent nation struggling for its liberty against foreign oppression. Abd-el-Krim was nothing more nor less than an adventurer, who had attained his present position by the most brutal methods and who was dependent upon continual warfare to maintain his pre-eminence. The Riffian population itself was in no way hostile to France; this was proved by the fact that more Riffians than ever before had migrated to Algeria this year to help with the harvest.

7. On the 12th July the Bill passed by the Chamber with reference to the special Moroccan credit was passed by the Senate by unanimous vote.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

[W 6886/186/28]

No. 79.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 1610.)

Sir,

Paris, July 18, 1925.

AS I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 243 of the 16th July, the French Government have sent Marshal Pétain to Morocco. According to a communiqué issued on the 17th July, a copy of which was forwarded in my despatch No. 1602 of the 17th July, the marshal's task will be to ensure that the reinforcements which are now arriving in Morocco will be properly organised and put to the best use. This statement is borne out by an interview given by Marshal Pétain before leaving Paris, in which he stated that further troops were daily arriving not only by sea at Casablanca, but also overland from Oran, and that it was essential that some scheme of co-ordination should be worked out. It is probable, however, that the marshal will be more occupied in defining the respective spheres of action of the Resident-General and General Naulin, the new Commander-in-chief, who is due to reach Morocco on the 21st. The relation between the various generals and their staffs at present in Morocco is already sufficiently complicated, and without Marshal Pétain's directing influence the advent of General Naulin would probably tend to increase the confusion.

2. The Government has been at pains to make it clear that Marshal Pétain's mission to Morocco has been caused by no anxiety on their part regarding the conduct of the operations. Nevertheless, despite these assertions of the Government, public opinion in general is becoming more and more alarmed over the state of affairs in Morocco. It is specially significant that last night's "Paris Soir," a paper which usually supports the Government, published an article under the headline: "Situation grave." Abd-el-Krim is understood to be making elaborate preparations for a renewed attack upon the French positions, and fears are expressed lest Fez may once more be seriously threatened. The press, with the exception of the Communist and Extreme Left organs, is united in demanding that every effort should be made to meet this expected attack, and the hope is expressed that there will be no delay in sending out whatever reinforcements may be necessary. As reported in my despatch No. 1594 of the 17th July, a division of Moroccan troops from the Rhine army is

already on its way to the scene of operations and another division is to be sent from Tunis. These two divisions will form one army corps, under General Boichut.

3. It remains, however, to be seen whether these additional troops will be employed against the actual forces of Abd-el-Krim; in an interview published in to-day's "Petit Journal," General Naulin states that there are already 125,000 French troops in Morocco, and that these should be sufficient to withstand any attacks from the Riffians. It is more probable that the reinforcements will be required to guard against any further outbreaks of "dissidence" among the natives of the French zone. It is this aspect of the situation which appears to be especially grave, and up to the present, public opinion as expressed in the newspapers would appear hardly to have realised the vital necessity of maintaining a firm hold on these natives. A few days ago, a leading article in the "Journal des Débats" pointed out that although so far the native populations in Algeria and Tunisia had remained calm and apparently unaffected by the situation in the Riff, yet it would be the height of folly to assume that they would remain indifferent to any general outbreak of disaffection among the population of the northern part of the French zone. To avert such a possibility, it was essential that the French authorities should maintain a firm hand over the native tribes, and should not allow their prestige to suffer any abatement.

4. A very interesting article appeared in the "Journal" a few days ago written by a correspondent at Rabat, who seemed to be well-informed as to the actual state of affairs. In this article it is categorically stated that the French had recently offered Abd-el-Krim an armistice, which the Riffian leader had emphatically declined. The moral drawn by the correspondent from this was that it was more than ever essential to crush Abd-el-Krim and bring him to his senses. It is significant that no official *démenti* of this report has yet appeared.

5. The attacks upon Marshal Lyautey still continue, but I hardly think it probable that the French Government will take any steps to remove the marshal from his present post. While Parliament was still sitting, M. Painlevé might have found it necessary, in order to conciliate the Socialists, to sacrifice Marshal Lyautey, but now that this necessity is out of the way, at all events for the time being, it is unlikely that he will take the risks which such a change would involve. Quite apart from the obvious dangers of "swopping horses in mid-stream," Marshal Lyautey enjoys so great prestige among the natives that his removal would be bound to appear to them as a sign of weakness on the part of the French Government and it would tend still further to increase the chances of disaffection among the tribes.

6. It is of interest to note that there was a rumour current last night, reproduced in some of the evening papers, that M. Paul-Boncour had been appointed to replace Marshal Lyautey with the title of "Résident civil." It is to-day, however, officially denied that it was ever the Government's intention to appoint M. Paul-Boncour to such a post. M. Paul-Boncour had been invited to proceed to Morocco on a special mission; but he declined this invitation on the grounds of ill-health.

7. It is stated in the "Petit Journal" in a message from the Rabat correspondent of that paper that the French losses up to the 30th June amounted to 707 killed, 666 missing and 2,775 wounded, a total of 4,148.

8. Little more has been heard of the peace terms, which it was understood, would, as the result of the Madrid Conference, shortly be communicated to Abd-el-Krim by the French and Spanish Governments. It seems generally considered extremely unlikely that the Riffian leader, in his present frame of mind, will be prepared to accept these conditions. Nevertheless, M. Durafour, the Minister of Labour, speaking at a political meeting at St. Etienne on the 16th July, declared that he firmly expected that peace would be made before long.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

[W 6925/186/28]

No. 80.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 1611.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report by the military attaché on the situation in Morocco.

Paris, July 19, 1925.

[13955]

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Enclosure in No. 80.

*Military Attaché to Mr. Phipps.**Paris, July 18, 1925.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the following information was obtained at the French War Office to-day:—

Reinforcements are under orders, and will be concentrated between now and the end of the month at the front. They amount to two divisions, and will form one army corps under the command of General (de Division) Boichut, now commanding the XIXth Army Corps in Algeria.

The 1st division is the Moroccan Division, now on the Rhine, and the 2nd division will be *de marche* and made up of composite units now in Tunis. The latter will in turn be replaced in Tunis by troops from the "Métropole," now under way.

Marshal Pétain has left for Morocco, firstly, to confer with Marshal Lyautey as to the best use to be made of the reinforcements, secondly, to prepare the way for the appointment of General Naulin to the high command of the troops in occupation.

With reference to the first task, it is probable that the moment has arrived to instil the methods and procedure adopted in the Great War, in so far as the employment, for a definite purpose, of forces that have some cohesion and have worked together under one commander is concerned.

There has been, inevitably, a tendency to assemble troops from all sides who are unknown to each other, and place them under a strange commander chosen owing to a high colonial reputation, or from being personally known to Marshal Lyautey.

As regards the high command, the situation will require considerable adjustment. It is of interest to note that General Boichut is almost the senior corps commander in the French army, and senior by appointment to rank of divisional general to Generals Naulin and Daugan.

The first step in the new operations will be to instil confidence and a feeling of stability amongst the tribes on the border-line both on and behind the French front. Till this is done, there can be no question of undertaking even a limited offensive. The arrival of reinforcements will undoubtedly help in this important object. Two Shereefian mehallas have in addition been created by the Sultan's decree. The first, some 1,500 strong, has already given a good account of itself in an action at Fez-el-Bali, and the second, numbering 5,000 rifles, is now being concentrated near Fez.

It is not intended to send out more in the way of aircraft and other arms beyond what forms normally the complement of a division in artillery, engineers, &c.

I have, &c.

(For Major-General, Military Attaché),
D. M. GRAHAM, Lieut.-Colonel.

[W 6937/186/28]

No. 81.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 1624.)

Sir,

Paris, July 20, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1610 of the 18th July, I have the honour to report that a certain degree of optimism is apparent in the present views of the French Government with regard to the situation in Morocco. I understand that hopes are even cherished by M. Painlevé that the more serious operations may be successfully concluded in that country before the opening of the rainy season. In this connection a statement made by M. Painlevé after a Cabinet meeting to-day and published in this evening's "Temps" is of interest. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of this statement.* You will observe that the statement illustrates the present attitude of the French Government, which is, while offering peace on certain terms, to be prepared for an active prosecution of hostilities in the event of these proposals falling on deaf ears. It is also noteworthy that the statement gives a broad hint to Abd-el-Krim that it is open to him to appoint delegates to discuss peace terms.

2. M. Painlevé's attitude, which is that of a large section of public opinion, appears to be based on the assumption that Abd-el-Krim will refuse any terms offered to him

* Not printed.

and will insist on continuing the campaign. The French Government would then have the unanimous support of all parties, except the Communists, for the most drastic measures against the enemy.

3. I understand, however, from information which has reached the military attaché, that it is by no means certain that Abd-el-Krim is in fact unwilling to accept the terms drawn up at Madrid, and that he may be in reality ready to negotiate with the French and Spanish Governments on the basis of the grant of independence to the Riff. It might prove difficult for the French Government, in view of their reiterated declarations regarding their desire for peace, to decline such a solution, though it may be questioned whether they would relish an independent State on the northern border of the French zone of Morocco.

4. It may be of interest to recall the latest casualty list as given in to-day's papers: Killed and missing, 1,473; wounded, 2,775; prisoners in Abd-el-Krim's hands, 30.

I have, &c.

ERIC PHIPPS.

[W 7701/39/28]

No. 82.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 1769.)

Sir,

Paris, August 10, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1744 of the 5th August I have the honour to inform you that the French Government have published a portion of the report rendered by Marshal Pétain on his return from the recent mission to Morocco. The text of this extract is enclosed herein.* You will observe that Marshal Pétain takes an optimistic view of the situation and declares that both Fez and Taza are now free from any danger of being captured by the Riffians.

2. The situation regarding the negotiations for peace still remains obscure and little information tending to enlighten public opinion in this matter has been forthcoming recently. It was understood in some quarters towards the end of last week that the Quai d'Orsay was about to publish the text of the terms as drawn up by the French and Spanish Governments at the Madrid Conference, together with a short *résumé* of the actual state of the negotiations, but so far no official statement on the matter has yet been published. In this connection, I have the honour to transmit herewith an interesting memorandum drawn up by Mr. Hoyer Millar, summarising the present position as understood in Paris.

I have, &c.

ERIC PHIPPS.

Enclosure in No. 82.

Memorandum by Mr. Hoyer Millar.

IT may perhaps be useful, in view of the present uncertainty regarding the actual situation of the peace negotiations between the French and Spanish Governments and Abd-el-Krim, to attempt to summarise the events which have taken place in this connection in the last six weeks.

(a.) *Attempts of the French Government to negotiate prior to the Franco-Spanish Agreement.*

From the start of the campaign in Morocco, Marshal Lyautey seems to have been anxious to open negotiations with Abd-el-Krim. His chief agent in this matter was Mr. Harris, the "Times" correspondent at Tangier. As explained in Tangier despatch No. 180 of the 14th June, Mr. Harris was an ideal intermediary since he was in the confidence both of Marshal Lyautey and of Abd-el-Krim. The marshal's intention to employ Mr. Harris in this way presumably met with the approval of the French Government since Mr. Clive, in his despatch No. 180, stated that Mr. Harris had seen a telegram from M. Briand agreeing to Mr. Harris being used in any way the marshal thought best to help to bring about peace.

* Not printed.

[13955]

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On the 9th June, Mr. Harris arrived at Tangier from Fez with instructions from Marshal Lyautey to open direct negotiations with Abd-el-Krim (Tangier telegram No. 60). The terms apparently suggested by Marshal Lyautey were that—

1. France would withdraw all claims to territory north of the line held by French troops in 1924.
2. A simple formula preserving the Sultan's nominal sovereignty over the Riff would be found.
3. Abd-el-Krim would be granted a large measure of independence.

Mr. Harris saw the emissary of Abd-el-Krim at Tangier on the 16th June (Tangier telegram No. 60) and received a letter from Abd-el-Krim, which was presumably that published in the "Times" of the 19th June. This letter merely stated that the object of the Riffians was to maintain their independence and live in peace with their neighbours.

At the same time, the Riffian emissary informed Mr. Harris that Abd-el-Krim was prepared to negotiate with France, but that the negotiations must not include questions relating to the Spanish zone.

Marshal Lyautey thereupon apparently repented of his previous intention to employ Mr. Harris as an intermediary, and on the 20th June sent a telegram to the French authorities at Fez instructing them to inform Mr. Harris immediately that Abd-el-Krim was in no mood for negotiations, which neither Mr. Harris nor anybody else should undertake (Paris telegram No. 267 of the 4th August).

No reference is made to this message from Marshal Lyautey to Mr. Harris in any of the correspondence from Tangier, nor did it apparently hinder Mr. Harris from continuing his relations with Abd-el-Krim. He must, however, presumably be regarded, as from the 20th June, as acting independently and without the authorisation of Marshal Lyautey or the French Government, and he may perhaps be considered more in the light of a publicity agent for Abd-el-Krim than as an impartial intermediary. Mr. Harris's later actions will be described in another section of this memorandum.

(b.) *Attempts of the Spanish Government to negotiate prior to the Franco-Spanish Agreement.*

We are not really concerned with this matter here, and it is sufficient to note that for a considerable time unofficial negotiations had been carried on between the Spanish Government and Abd-el-Krim through the intermediary of a Señor Echevarietta.

(c.) *Joint Franco-Spanish efforts to negotiate subsequent to the Madrid Conference.*

The Franco-Spanish co-operation in Morocco may be said to date from M. Malvy's first visit to Madrid towards the end of May. Speaking in the Chamber on the 29th May, M. Briand announced that the Spanish Government had been invited to collaborate with the French Government with a view to securing a rapid peace. On the 4th June a preliminary Franco-Spanish agreement was drawn up (see Madrid telegram No. 63), in which it was laid down, among other things, that the French and Spanish representatives should meet as soon as possible to draw up the conditions of peace to be granted to Abd-el-Krim.

The Madrid Conference proper met on the 17th June, but it was not until the 11th July that the terms to be offered to the Riffians were finally agreed upon. During this period, both M. Painlevé and M. Briand repeatedly announced in the Chamber that France was anxious for peace. On the other hand, M. Painlevé declared, on the 23rd June, that up to that time Abd-el-Krim had shown no willingness, either officially or unofficially, to conclude a reasonable peace. Unofficial negotiations had apparently been passing between the French authorities and Abd-el-Krim through a Moorish inhabitant of Oran, who was well known to both parties, but they had led to no definite result.

On the 11th July, the Franco-Spanish terms of peace were finally agreed upon at the Madrid Conference in an agreement of which the terms were as follows:—

1. Neither the French nor the Spanish Governments would enter into peace negotiations independently of each other.
2. The French and Spanish Governments would offer the Riff and Jebala tribes the fullest possible measure of autonomy compatible with treaty stipulations under a ruler of their own choice.

3. The boundaries of the territories concerned would be delimited according to certain conditions to be laid down.
4. The integrity of the territory remaining under the Spanish Government was to be amply respected.
5. The terms offered to Abd-el-Krim were to include arrangements for—
 - (a.) Exchange of prisoners.
 - (b.) Full amnesty.
 - (c.) Establishment of a police force.
 - (d.) Freedom of commerce.
6. Pending receipt of a reply from Abd-el-Krim, the French and Spanish military operations against him would be continued.
7. If Abd-el-Krim should refuse the terms, they were to be published.
8. French and Spanish Governments were to concert as to the publication of the agreement (Madrid telegram No. 86).

The original intention had apparently been to define more precisely that the measure of independence offered to Abd-el-Krim would be based on the maintenance of the suzerainty of the Sultan and submission to the Khalif of the Spanish zone, but in the end it was decided, at the request of the French representatives to omit all reference to the Sultan and merely to refer to the necessity of respecting the existing treaty stipulations. The boundaries of the zone to be allotted to Abd-el-Krim were not to be defined until later (Madrid despatch No. 343.)

Apparently, it was decided that Abd-el-Krim should be first of all informed that the two Governments were prepared to enter into negotiations with him, should he so desire. If Abd-el-Krim accepted this offer then French and Spanish emissaries would be sent to discuss matters with his representatives. Mr. Gurney, in his despatch No. 343, stated that this preliminary intimation would probably be conveyed to Abd-el-Krim through the commandant of the Spanish post in Alhucemas Bay.

It seems, however, that the notification to Abd-el-Krim that the French and Spanish Governments were ready to communicate their terms to him on his making application for them was, in fact, made on the French side by M. Gabrielli, the "contrôleur civil" of Taourirt, on or about the 17th July.

It is important to note that this communication, made by M. Gabrielli, was confined to an intimation that Abd-el-Krim could obtain the Franco-Spanish terms for the asking, but the actual terms were not communicated to him on this occasion. (At least, not officially, though Mr. Harris states that Abd-el-Krim was secretly informed of the terms by M. Gabrielli—see Tangier despatch No. 232.) This is hardly in consonance with the statement made by M. Painlevé in the Chamber of Deputies on the 9th July. On this occasion, the President of the Council, while declining to agree to the Socialist proposal that the terms of peace should be published at once, declared most emphatically that the terms would be communicated, though only through an unofficial channel, to the Riffian leader. No notice has been taken so far of this discrepancy, but, had the Chambers been sitting, the Socialists might perhaps have raised the matter.

Nevertheless, although M. Gabrielli did not apparently communicate the actual terms to Abd-el-Krim, there can be no doubt that the latter very soon became aware of them or of their approximate tenor. In fact, Tangier telegram No. 100 states that Abd-el-Krim was given the details of the terms by an "official secretary" (it is by no means clear what is meant by the "official secretary," but presumably he was some French official). Abd-el-Krim, however, seems to have shown no desire to negotiate through M. Gabrielli, the intermediary chosen by the French, and appears to have preferred to continue to employ Mr. Harris and also Captain Pannebières, the commander of the French tabor at Tangier, through whom he had previously been accustomed to communicate with Marshal Lyautey.

He therefore sent a messenger, understood to be a certain El Christo, on the 22nd July to see Mr. Harris. This messenger stated that, while Abd-el-Krim was anxious for peace, he would probably reject any proposals coming from the French and Spanish Governments, owing to his lack of confidence in either of these two parties (Tangier telegram No. 898). In another message sent both to Mr. Harris and Captain Pannebières, Abd-el-Krim stated that he did not intend formally to apply for the Franco-Spanish peace terms through M. Gabrielli, but that he was ready to send his Minister for Foreign Affairs to Tangier to negotiate there.

According to M. Berthelot (see Paris telegram No. 269), Abd-el-Krim's messenger had also made suggestions to the captain of the Spanish tabor.

Presumably, as a result of this visit from El Christo, Mr. Harris sent a message to the "Times," which was published in that paper on the 27th July, stating that Abd-el-Krim had declared that he was prepared to negotiate with the French and Spanish Governments provided that he received a preliminary assurance that the Riff should enjoy complete independence. Abd-el-Krim had also demanded that negotiations should take place in Tangier. In the course of another long article, also published in the "Times" of the 27th July, Mr. Harris announced that Abd-el-Krim would not accept the terms drawn up at the Madrid Conference, and that he would insist upon any negotiations which might take place being carried on publicly, and not indirectly through the intermediary of some obscure French or Spanish official.

After his above-mentioned interview at Tangier with Mr. Harris and Captain Pannebières, Abd-el-Krim's messenger then left for Tetuan on the 28th July at the invitation of General Primo de Rivera (Tangier telegram No. 101). What passed between the President of the Directory and El Christo is not known, but on the 1st August the "Matin" published a message from Tetuan stating that Abd-el-Krim's representative, who had arrived at Tetuan, had been informed of the Franco-Spanish terms. These terms were stated to be as follows:—

1. Abd-el-Krim was to recognise the religious sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco or of his successor.
2. France and Spain were to recognise the administrative autonomy of the Riff.
3. The Powers would allow the establishment in the Riff of a police force sufficient to ensure tranquillity in that region. The cadres of this organisation would be provided by France.
4. The zones of Ceuta and Melilla would be recognised as belonging to Spain.
5. The boundaries of the autonomous State of the Riff would be as follows: on the west, a line running 20 kilom. to the east of the Tangier-Fez Railway; on the south, the Rivers Ouergha and Loukkos, the frontier between these two rivers being fixed later.
6. The coastal region between the line 20 kilom. to the east of the Tangier-Fez Railway as far south as the River Loukkos was either to be annexed to the Tangier zone or to be divided between the latter zone and the French zone of Morocco.
7. The new arrangements to be controlled by the League of Nations.

This announcement in the "Matin" was immediately denied in an official communiqué from the Quai d'Orsay, which stated that no such communication had been made to Abd-el-Krim by "the delegates appointed by the two Governments to inform him jointly of the possible conditions of peace." This wording does not exclude the possibility that some such communication may have been made to Abd-el-Krim or to his representatives at Tetuan by persons other than "the appointed delegates," and it is probable that General Primo de Rivera did, in fact, make known to El Christo the terms drawn up at Madrid, though these terms are no doubt very different from those detailed in the "Matin."

(d.) It may be well to note that during the last six weeks Abd-el-Krim has on more than one occasion attempted, by means of direct negotiation with the European press, to arouse public sympathy in his favour. He has, of course, had in Mr. Harris a means of making known the Riffian standpoint in the English press, and he has also, through the intermediary of Captain Gordon Canning, conveyed to certain newspapers an announcement declaring the terms upon which he would be ready to make peace. This announcement was published in the "Quotidien" of the 23rd July, and it declared that Abd-el-Krim would be prepared to accept the following terms:—

1. The Riff to be recognised and guaranteed by the League of Nations with a status similar to that of Afghanistan.
2. The Sultan of Morocco to be recognised by the Riff as being its religious suzerain.
3. The southern frontier of the Riff to be the northern bank of the River Ouergha, and the whole of the Jebala region, including Laraiche, Arzilla and Tetuan to be incorporated in the Riff.
4. Spain would retain Ceuta and Melilla.
5. The Riff might maintain a permanent army.
6. Abd-el-Krim's propaganda in French zone would cease.
7. League of Nations would grant the Riff a credit.
8. Spain would be granted certain commercial concessions in the Riff.

It was at once denied by the French Government that any such terms had been transmitted to it by Abd-el-Krim, and it seems clear that the article in the "Quotidien" is purely of a nature of a *ballon d'essai*.

(e.) To sum up, the present situation seems to be as follows:—

Terms of peace have been drawn up and jointly agreed upon by the French and Spanish Governments at Madrid. Abd-el-Krim has been informed by M. Gabrielli that these terms will be communicated to him by the French and Spanish through the same channel if he makes application for them to M. Gabrielli. Abd-el-Krim, having by other means ascertained the nature of the terms in question, does not wish to apply for them through M. Gabrielli, and thus enable the French and Spanish Governments to state that the terms have been duly communicated to him. Presumably, he finds the terms unacceptable, since they do not grant him independence, for which he appears to be still holding out. But, at the same time, he does not wish to assume the onus of refusing these terms, thinking, no doubt, that such a refusal would greatly strengthen the hands of the French Government *vis-à-vis* the Socialists in France.

Abd-el-Krim, however, does not wish to appear to the world as unwilling to make peace, and he has, therefore, sent representatives to Tangier, and has announced, through Mr. Harris, that he is ready to make peace on the basis of the independence of the Riff. This demand is unacceptable to the French and Spanish Governments, but they also do not wish to take the responsibility of definitely refusing them and thus appearing to assume the blame for the continuance of the war. They therefore state that these terms have never reached them, and that they are still awaiting Abd-el-Krim's answer to the message sent to him through M. Gabrielli. Nevertheless, the French Government are fully aware of all the messages that Abd-el-Krim's messenger took to Tangier, since, according to Mr. Clive's telegram No. 102, Marshal Pétain took to Paris copies of all the documents recently communicated by Abd-el-Krim to Captain Pannebières.

Both sides are, therefore, now marking time, the French presumably in the hope that Abd-el-Krim will consent to apply to M. Gabrielli for the peace terms and eventually to negotiate; Abd-el-Krim presumably trusting that, if he can delay matters until the rainy season begins, the campaign will have to continue into next year, and that by that time internal opposition in France against the war will be so strong that the French Government will be forced to grant him greater concessions than they have yet offered.

[W 7798/186/28]

No. 83.

Consul-General Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Clive (Tangier).—(Received in Foreign Office, August 14.)

(No. 118.)

Sir,

Rabat, August 5, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 112 of the 28th July, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Were, No. 84 of the 31st July, dealing with the situation on the front in a more general manner than he has hitherto done.

2. In this able paper Mr. Were reviews the evolution of the situation from the outset, showing clearly the deterioration of the French position up to the beginning of July and their subsequent recovery, which has made the military situation to-day brighter than it has been at any time since April. In paragraph 18 of his despatch he summarises the operations during the second half of July.

3. Broadly speaking, there is now every ground for optimism, but not for unbounded confidence. As Mr. Were points out, the relaxation of enemy pressure on the eastern sector of the front has been followed by an aggravation of the situation in the Ouezzan area. The official communiqué of the 21st July referred to the growing danger of an enemy offensive in that direction. This menace has not materialised on any large scale, but it is still talked of. Meanwhile no little anxiety has been caused by the activities of a fairly strong enemy force, Djebala, I understand, which has established itself in the Djebel Sarsar and affected the security of the country east of the Tangier road between Souk-el-Arba and the boundary post of Arbaoua. The road between the latter place and Ouezzan has been cut more than once, and on the night of the 1st-2nd August the farmhouse of M. Vilmorin, a French settler, not far from Souk-el-Arba on the road to Ouezzan, was sacked.

4. The communiqué of the 4th August announces that on the morning of that day forces under the direction of Colonel Freydenberg had begun the *nettoyage* of the Djebel Sarsar in favourable conditions, and that numerous groups of disaffected tribesmen were recrossing the Loukkos.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Vice-Consul Were to Consul-General Sir A. Ryan.

(No. 84.)
Sir,

Fez, July 31, 1925.

THE general trend of events on this front during the past ten days or so has been such as to justify the assumption that the turning point of the campaign has been reached, and that the initiative is at last passing from the rebels to the French command. A brief survey of the development of the situation since the first outbreak of rebellion may therefore be useful at this stage.

2. The *casus belli*, so far as Abd-el-Krim was concerned, was provided as long ago as July 1914, when the French occupied the fertile zone north of the River Ouergha from which the Riffians had long supplemented their home-grown grain supplies.

3. It was at that time realised that this action might well give rise in the future to Riffian incursions, and to guard against that danger a strong line of posts was established north of the river, with large mobile groups, based on Fez and Taza, in support. At the same time every effort was made, in accordance with accepted policy, to cause dissensions among the Riffian tribes closest to the French frontier.

4. It was confidently expected that this combination of military force and political propaganda would not only secure the newly occupied territory from attack, but would enable a further advance northward to be carried out during 1925.

5. In the event, however, these hopes have been completely falsified. Not only did no split occur amongst the Riffian tribes, but Abd-el-Krim, returning tit for tat, despatched his agents to the pacified tribes of the French zone, where their influence quickly made itself felt.

6. It is here necessary to refer at some length to an attitude of mind prevalent in official circles in the protectorate, and of which Marshal Lyautey is the originator and principal exponent—the fixed belief that Moors of all classes and conditions, once having experienced the amenities of French rule, become perfervid adherents of the cause of France, and are not to be detached therefrom by any influence short of armed force.

7. Constant reiteration of a fallacious statement has its uses in creating the impression in the minds of others that the facts are such as they are declared to be by the speaker, and doubtless this was originally the end in view in the present case. But from unceasing repetition it apparently came to be accepted by all concerned as an axiom that the loyalty of tribes that had once submitted was unshakable, and that despite the example provided by the experience of Spain in her zone of the protectorate. Here, naturally enough, French national pride exerted considerable influence in blinding all concerned to the possibility of France's difficulties and disillusionings being as great as those of Spain; a few weeks sufficed to prove to the disinterested onlooker that they would in fact prove no less; yet it was not until the recent arrival of Marshal Pétain that the old prejudices were finally abandoned, the fickleness of the tribes admitted, and the necessity of despatching reinforcements on a grand scale fully recognised.

8. As early as the beginning of the year the French authorities were in possession of information tending to show that the important tribe of Beni Zeroual were being gradually detached from their allegiance by Riffian propaganda, against which the efforts of their own agent, Shereef Derkawi, were of little avail. They declined, however, to admit the possibility of any wholesale defection, but by the middle of April the tribe had shown its intentions unmistakably by expelling the French agent above named. By the end of the month the whole tribe had seceded and had taken with it the Beni Ouriaguel, and a number of other tribes in the immediate vicinity of the Ouergha, where many of the smaller posts were violently attacked. A mobile column was at once despatched to the disaffected area and succeeded in re-establishing

the situation temporarily. In the meantime, Riffian contingents, as distinct from dissident tribesmen, had made their first active intervention north of Taza.

9. Early in May the French had been so far successful in breaking up the rebel forces that talk of an advance to the frontier was general, and the possibility of pursuing the rebels beyond the Franco-Spanish frontier was being freely discussed. Reinforcements, which at the time seemed important, but which amounted to no more than ten battalions, had arrived or were on their way, and a spirit of complete confidence prevailed. The blame for the momentary flare-up, as it was considered to be, was laid partly on the "carence espagnole," partly on the presence of German agitators in the Riff, and the necessity of occupying the Riff *in toto*, to the exclusion of Spain, was freely urged.

10. From now on, however, it was to be gradually borne in upon the French command that the original defection of the pacified tribes in their zone was due to something more than intimidation by Abd-el-Krim, and that the task of winning them back to their allegiance was not to be so simple an affair as their belief in well-worn formulæ had led them to expect. Resistance crystallised along the whole of the front which they were in process of organising on the Ouergha, and a new focus of disturbance made its appearance in the Ouezzan area, on the west, and it now appeared clearly that the advantage of mobility, which had hitherto enabled the French to wage war successfully in Morocco, was on this occasion on the side of the enemy. The tone of press and other references to Spain underwent a complete change, and the Spanish troops, from ranking *pari passu* with Abd-el-Krim as villains of the piece, were accorded the honour of brotherhood in arms with France's predominantly black defenders. Negotiations tending to discover a basis for mutual co-operation between France and Spain were begun, resulting in the appointment of a joint commission, which has just terminated its labours in Madrid.

11. From early May until early June the operations were indeterminate, and it appeared as though a complete stalemate had been reached, neither side securing any conspicuous success, and such small posts as fell into the hands of the rebels being recaptured within a few days by the French. The only operation of importance during this period was the occupation by the French on the 25th May of a strong enemy position at Jebel-el-Bibane. The rebels were there entrenched in force, and suffered severe loss from artillery fire before they were finally expelled, and it was hoped that this, their first experience of heavy and accurate shell fire, would hasten their submission or retreat.

12. On the 5th June a rebel counter-attack was launched at Bibane, which fell, with a quantity of material, into the enemy's hands. There is no doubt that this was an unexpected blow and a cruel disillusionment to the French, and even now the loss of the position has not yet been officially admitted. Simultaneously violent attacks were delivered at other points in the centre of the front—notably at Taounat, a bridge-head on the north bank of the Ouergha.

13. Meanwhile, in Paris heated controversy was proceeding in the Chamber on the subject of Morocco, the main point at issue being whether French interests in that country justified the grant of comparatively large credits for the prosecution of the war then and in the future. For a long time it appeared probable that the Government would fall over this question, but a visit of M. Painlevé to the front and the declarations based on first-hand knowledge he was able to make on his return influenced public opinion sufficiently to turn the scale in his favour and enabled him to carry his point.

14. Towards the end of June enemy pressure on several of the larger posts just south of the Ouergha (Kalaa des Sless, Ain Aicha, Ain Matouf) had become so severe that it was possible to revictual them only under cover of a strong column, or even in some cases by aeroplane. In the eastern sector a tentative forward move was made by strong rebel forces, with Riffian regulars in support, while in the Ouezzan district dissidence had spread rapidly and had almost attained the outskirts of Fez, all the posts in that region being subjected to more or less continual attacks.

15. At the beginning of July the rebel attacks in the eastern sector, which had been temporarily held up by two mobile columns operating between the Upper Leben and the Msoun, were renewed with such intensity that, in conjunction with the spread of dissidence to the tribes immediately north and west of Taza, they seriously imperilled the communications between Fez, Taza and the Algerian frontier, and as a measure of precaution all European women and children were ordered to leave Taza for Oudjda. In the western (Ouezzan) district also tribes were falling away fast, despite the efforts of a strong mobile column to set a limit to these defections by

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maintaining an unceasing patrol in the disturbed areas; while in the centre the encircled posts continued to hold out against rebel attacks, which do not appear, however, to have been pressed with any great determination.

16. At this juncture it appeared likely that a determined effort by Abd-el-Krim, using his reserves of some 20,000 men, in the Taza region must result in the defection of the large and warlike tribe of Beni Warain, south of Taza, who were already showing signs of unrest, the cutting of communications between Fez and Algeria, and the creation of a situation such that the retention of Fez itself would engage all the attention of the French command. Dissidence was spreading on every side, reinforcements were not forthcoming, and, as a consequence, both the moral and the physical endurance of the troops, maintained in almost constant movement from the first outbreak of hostilities, were strained to breaking point. In official circles the greatest despondency was felt, if not expressed, but, with the courage of despair, every nerve was strained to avert the seemingly inevitable catastrophe.

17. All the forces which could possibly be spared were assembled in the Taza region, split up into small but compact mobile groups, and utilised as police patrols in the disturbed areas, and recourse was had to a pre-occupation device, that of raising "mehallas," or irregular native levies, a scheme open to political objections which in ordinary circumstances would far outweigh any military advantage to be expected therefrom. It says much for the endurance of the black and native Moroccan troops employed that they were able to withstand the additional strain thus put upon them, but withstand it they did, for about a fortnight from the 6th July, by which time the long awaited reinforcements had begun to arrive. It is to be noted that all this time the attacking rebel forces consisted almost entirely of dissident tribesmen of the French zone. An analysis of Moroccan warfare would, I am assured, show that tribal risings have never endured uninterruptedly for a longer period than two months; other interests are remembered, dissensions arise, lassitude sets in, and an interval for rest supervenes, of varying length. And so in this case. Had the tribesmen co-ordinated their attacks, had Abd-el-Krim supported them with the mass of his reserves, the French line must have broken beneath the pressure, and a wave of dissidence would have swept the country. The danger was not averted, it evaporated, but credit is due to those who foresaw and gambled on its dissolution.

18. By the 20th July reinforcements had arrived in sufficient numbers to make their weight felt. The weary troops on the Taza front had been or were being relieved and fresh confidence was inspired by the presence of Marshal Pétain, who realised at once that no mere dribble of reinforcements would serve to bring the operations to a successful issue, and that, if anything of lasting value were to be accomplished, two additional army corps must be despatched. (This, I believe, is the substance of his recommendation to the Government; what response it will meet with is another matter.) Between the 18th and 24th July the posts of Kelaa des Sless, Ain Aicha, Ain Kaatouf, Oula Ali and Bab Morouj were disengaged, in that order, the enemy retreating northwards. At the same time the aviation carried out bombing raids on the villages north of Taounat, and as a result of these successful operations the central sector, south of the Ouergha, was reported to be clear of rebels. In the eastern sector, despite the Bab Morouj operation, the same conditions continued and continue to prevail as heretofore, the efforts of the French are still directed to preventing the spread of dissidence, and in this they are successful, but raids of small parties of the enemy are impossible to deal with effectively. There is, however, little likelihood of any further serious menace to Taza. In the western sector the situation is much less satisfactory. Several posts in close proximity to Ouezzan had to be evacuated and destroyed during the month of July, when the main rebel effort was concentrated in the east, and the latest reports indicate that, with the easing of the situation in the centre, that in the west has become aggravated. It is quite possible that the future holds unpleasant surprises for the French in this sector also, but I feel sure that they are now able to cope with any situation that might arise before it has had time to get out of hand.

19. The first and most serious phase of the situation appears now, at the end of July, to have passed, with the rebels retreating into the mountainous country north of the Ouergha, and sufficient French reinforcements available or close at hand to arrest the development of any grave menace at other points. But some time must elapse before the French are ready to take the next step—a step forward. The ground reconquered must be reorganised, communications improved and strengthened, the danger of infiltrations and consequent tribal defections guarded against; time is short, for the rainy season, during which heavy transport is impracticable except on

metalled roads, is only three months off, and the rebels are by no means a spent force as yet. The spirit of confidence which now prevails is well indicated by the fact that an advance to Sheshawen in the course of this year is warmly advocated, or, failing that, at least an advance to the Franco-Spanish frontier, either independently or in co-operation with the Spanish forces, of which there is but little (I am inclined to say, not the faintest) hope. Even should all the reinforcements demanded by Marshal Pétain, which would bring the French forces in Morocco to a total of over 200,000 men, be despatched, I doubt whether any further serious advance could be made this year; a move forward to the frontier would be possible, but of no great value; and the occupation of Sheshawen, if not impracticable, yet very hazardous. But these bellicose suggestions are probably merely the result of the new spirit of elation following upon a period of profound despondency, and will rapidly be modified. On the whole I incline to the belief that this year will see no more than a consolidation of the line from a point on the Loukkos, north of Ouezzan, to Fez-el-Bali, and thence along the Ouergha to Kiffane, the improvement of communications in the rear of that line, and preparation for a further advance in the spring of 1926.

20. There is, of course, a possibility that Abd-el-Krim may accept the terms of peace offered to him by France and Spain, but it is so faint a possibility as scarcely to merit consideration. In the first place, it must be quite obvious to the Riffian leader, even without the counsels and suggestions of his European advisers, that France and Spain have not arrived at any agreement for joint military action, for each, according to the outline of the conclusions of the Madrid Commission recently published, is to retain liberty of action in her own zone, which, as far as Spain is concerned, merely means inaction, or purely defensive action; and in those circumstances the right of pursuit accorded to France is likely to be of little value, and cannot in any case be exploited this year. The agreement to blockade is a more serious matter, but there again the effects of the blockade are not likely to make themselves felt for some time to come. In the meantime Abd-el-Krim will undoubtedly intensify his propaganda throughout Morocco, and proof of this is provided in the shape of a letter addressed by him as late as the 25th July to the notables of Fez, Meknes and other towns, the gist of which is that his object is to expel the foreign unbeliever, and that he does not ask for material aid, only for moral support, at the present time. This concords with the general tone of his manifestoes ever since his first rise to notoriety in 1921, and does not tend to encourage the belief that the grant even of unconditional independence to the Riff would put a term to disturbance on the northern frontier. My view is that the time is not ripe for negotiation with Abd-el-Krim, that occupation of the Riff, either temporarily or permanently, is beyond the ability, militarily and financially, of either of the Powers concerned, and that, failing some form of internationalisation, the best hope of reaching a satisfactory settlement lies in a strict blockade of the centre of disturbance as a means of educating Abd-el-Krim and his followers to the point of realising the advisability of living in peace with their European neighbours. The Riffian leader is still suffering from "swelled head," contracted in 1921, aggravated in 1924 and 1925, and complicated throughout by religious fanaticism. To remove the diseased organ is a drastic remedy, difficult of application, and which would create a most undesirable impression amongst the Moslem populations of France's North African colonies as well as in the rest of Morocco. To isolate the patient until he shows unmistakable proof of return to normality can offend not even the most patriotic Moor or most religious follower of Islam.

I have, &c.

C. A. W. WERE.

[W 7797/39/28]

No. 84.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 248. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tangier, August 7, 1925.

IN my despatch No. 75 of the 12th March recording a conversation with Marshal Lyautey I remarked that I could not help feeling that the marshal had an obsession on the question of Riffian propaganda and was somewhat inclined to exaggerate the danger. In the light of what is happening to-day, this observation may well appear foolish and to have been falsified by events. I believe, however, that it was in

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substance true. In my despatch No. 136 of the 7th May I stated that in advancing last autumn and occupying one-third of the Beni Zeroual tribe the French authorities were thought by some even of their own people to be treading on dangerous ground however much they might be justified under their treaty rights.

2. Some days ago Mr. Harris told me he had received from Abd-el-Krim certain documents which, if ever published, would be most damaging to the French, and especially to Marshal Lyautey. To-day, in a moment of expansion, he revealed to me what these documents were.

3. It appears that in April last Abd el-Krim obtained possession of letters sent by the French Intelligence Service at Fez warning the tribes in the Wergha valley that in May the French intended to advance right up to the frontier line of 1912, that any resistance on the part of these tribes would be ruthlessly suppressed, and the French would not hesitate, if necessary, to advance to the utmost limits. (Mr. Harris explained that the Arabic expression used for "utmost limits" might certainly be understood to mean the Mediterranean.) In addition, Abd-el-Krim obtained possession of the whole French plan of campaign.

4. Mr. Harris added of course that his loyalty to the French would never allow him to publish these facts, and he asked me to treat this information as secret. He was perfectly satisfied himself that what Abd-el-Krim now wrote to him was true—namely, that he had never had any intention of attacking the French until he learnt that the French had worked out a definite plan for cutting him off from his main sources of supply and, if necessary, attacking him. Abd-el-Krim, in allowing his Riffis to stiffen the tribes north of the Wergha to resist further French encroachments by force, had only done what any competent general would do in similar circumstances—namely, to anticipate an attack by taking the initiative himself.

5. I told Mr. Harris that the truth generally had a habit of coming out in the end, and, if he did not publish it, how could he tell that Abd-el-Krim had not taken other means, such as through Captain Gordon-Canning, to let the facts be known. Mr. Harris admitted this was possible, and said that in any case the French were very nervous that they might be published. I then reminded him of certain telegrams he had sent to the "Times" last November after seeing Marshal Lyautey, in which the latter had spoken of the situation in Morocco as more serious than he had ever known it. I could not help feeling, in the light of what he had told me, that the marshal had determined at that time to paint the picture as black as possible in order to force the Socialist Government of M. Herriot to provide the reinforcements which he would otherwise have been unable to obtain. By holding before the French Government the bogey of Abd-el-Krim as the new apostle of pan-Islamism he had prevailed on them to supply additional troops which need never have been required if General Chambrun, with his approval, had not deliberately provoked Abd-el-Krim to attack him.

6. In these circumstances, it is of interest to compare the various peace proposals which have been published recently by the "Quotidien" and the "Matin" with those elaborated at the Madrid Conference, and to consider to what extent the French and Spaniards have been loyal to one another in their dealings with Abd-el-Krim and his messengers.

7. Reference to the first paragraph of the enclosure to my despatch No. 232 of the 26th July will show that the French contrôleur at Taurirt made known secretly to Abd-el-Krim the Madrid peace terms, although the latter had apparently, when told these peace terms were at his disposal, betrayed no interest in the subject. Marshal Lyautey seems to have taken it very much amiss that he had received no reply to these peace terms, which had been made known to Abd-el-Krim after he had declined to ask for them, and that instead Abd-el-Krim should have communicated his own ideas on the subject of peace to Captain Panabières at Tangier. The French press have, no doubt under instructions, studiously ignored Abd-el-Krim's offer on the ground apparently that no formal communication was made to the French authorities. As a matter of fact I understand the manner of communication was quite in accordance with Moorish custom and in accordance with that which Abd-el-Krim has hitherto employed—i.e., messengers duly provided with a letter of authority providing their *bona fides* made a verbal communication which was taken down and forwarded to Marshal Lyautey, but the latter did not for several days send it on to Paris, and might not have done so at all but for the publication in the "Times." To-day, however, a Paris communiqué of the 5th August, published in the local press, states as follows:—

"D'autre part, depuis le 26 juillet, Abd-el-Krim, qui avait manifesté par l'intermédiaire de ses agents et par la voie de la presse [this refers to Harris's

telegram in the "Times" of the 27th July] le désir de voir cesser les hostilités, a été avisé que les conditions de paix fixées en principe entre la France et l'Espagne lui seraient communiquées dès qu'il manifesterait l'intention d'entamer des pourparlers."

General Primo de Rivera, on the other hand, as I have already had the honour to report, pressed Abd-el-Krim's messengers to visit him at Tetuan, and treated them with far more respect. The latter, after communicating Abd-el-Krim's message that he wished to negotiate peace in Tangier as soon as the independence of the Riff had been conceded in principle, was then informed by General Primo of the Spanish peace terms—without, apparently, any reference to the French. These terms were more or less as follows:—

- (1) Abd-el-Krim to recognise the sovereignty of the Sultan and the authority of the Caliph of the Spanish zone.
- (2) The Spaniards to maintain a permanent post at Ajdir, with the Spanish flag flying.
- (3) Liberation of all Spanish prisoners.
- (4) Complete local autonomy for the Riff, with the assistance of Spanish functionaries.
- (5) The Riffs to be allowed to maintain a small standing army, towards which the Spaniards pay 500,000 pesetas a month.
- (6) All artillery to be restored. Abd-el-Krim might, however, be allowed to retain a certain number of guns for his army.
- (7) Complete evacuation of the Riff after a limited period (Primo mentioned twenty years) if, in the meantime, peace was maintained.

8. The position has now become extremely interesting, and I have the impression that the Spaniards are really in a much happier situation than the French. The latter are hoping to retrieve a bad position by a successful offensive in September, when the heat is a little less tropical, but, should things not develop as they hope, the Spaniards can hardly be expected to wait indefinitely if a basis for peace can be found with Abd-el-Krim. It was the French, and not the Spanish, who suggested combined action, and the Spaniards here place just as little faith in French co-operation as M. Berthelot appears to place in Spanish assistance, as reported in Mr. Phipps's telegram No. 258 of the 27th July.

9. Meanwhile Abd-el-Krim is most unlikely to reply to any peace terms which may be communicated to him or to recede from his demand for negotiations at Tangier. In the interest of this zone and the preservation of its international and neutral status it cannot be denied that Tangier has every interest in retaining the goodwill of Abd-el-Krim. For the past month the Tangier zone has been more free from incidents and disturbances on the frontier than at any time since last November.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[W 8226/39/28]

No. 85.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 267. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tangier, August 20, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 329 and 232 of the 24th and 26th July respectively, I have the honour to report that Captain Panabières, who had been summoned to Rabat to discuss the details of the increase of the French tabor, had an interview on the 17th with Marshal Lyautey, who took the opportunity to communicate through him a long message to Mr. Harris, a résumé of which is contained in the enclosed memorandum, which Mr. Harris has been good enough to give me.

2. The third paragraph explains how it was that for four days, from the 26th to 30th July, the French Government were kept in ignorance of the communication which had been made in Tangier by Abd-el-Krim's messengers. When Mr. Harris's first telegram on the subject appeared in the "Times" of the 27th July, Marshal Lyautey was still hoping to receive a satisfactory reply to the overtures he had been making to Abd-el-Krim through his agent at Taurirt. It was only when Mr. Harris's telegram of

the 30th July made it clear that Abd-el-Krim would send no reply through Taurirt that the conversations in Tangier were tardily admitted.

3. Mr. Harris can only imagine that the "disclosures" referred to in the same paragraph, of which the marshal and the French Government were feeling nervous, were those mentioned in the second paragraph of my despatch No. 248 of the 7th August about the events which gave rise to the present hostilities. In the meantime I learn from Mr. Harris that he hears that an enquiry into the matter is now proceeding, and the results may not be agreeable to General Chambrun, Colonel Huot and other members of the French Intelligence Service in Morocco.

4. Regarding the French plan of campaign, it is realised that the resistance may be slight and that the Riffis may have retired into their own country before the advance begins. At the same time, the proposal, if everything goes according to plan, to make what amounts to a truce with Abd-el-Krim, apparently irrespective of the Spaniards, makes one wonder how the latter may view the idea. It may be that Marshal Pétain is calling in to-day at Algeciras in order to explain to General Primo de Rivera not only the French plan of campaign, but also the idea of a truce, and to reassure him that it does not mean a separate peace. In any case this may help to explain the object of the visit, which is causing considerable speculation locally.

5. Mr. Harris said that, while Marshal Lyautey does not expect Abd-el-Krim to accept the Franco-Spanish terms of "administrative, economic and political autonomy within the limits allowed by existing treaties, subject to the nominal recognition of the suzerainty of the Sultan through his khalifa," the French are confident that they can come to terms with him, but do not believe that the Spaniards can offer any terms which would be acceptable.

6. This, if true, rather disposes of the bogey of Abd-el-Krim as the new apostle of pan-Islamism and the thesis of the French Nationalist press that Abd-el-Krim is bent on turning the French out of Morocco.

7. Finally, it appears, from what Captain Panabières told Mr. Harris, that Marshal Lyautey no longer objects to the details of a final settlement—when it comes—being negotiated with Abd-el-Krim's representatives in Tangier, if he prefers it.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 85.

Memorandum by Mr. Harris.

(Very Confidential.)

MARSHAL LYAUTEY has to-day communicated to me the following information:—

He is in good health, better than he has been for several years. His relations with Marshal Pétain and with General Naulin are excellent. He is very desirous, as is the French Government, to take the first opportunity to make peace with Abd-el-Krim. He is as strongly convinced of the necessity of doing so as he was when he discussed the question with me in Fez early in June. There has been no change in his opinion since. He reminds me that he communicated with me by a cypher telegram addressed to the French consul-general at Tangier on the 20th June that the French Government did not wish to continue at that moment direct peace negotiations with Abd-el-Krim through Tangier. The reason for this telegram was that Rabat was at that moment hoping to get into direct communication with Abd-el-Krim through M. Gabrielli, the French controller at Taurirt, on the Fez-Oudjda Railway, who was thought to be a *persona grata* to the Riffis and a suitable person for the negotiation. No reply came to the overtures made from Taurirt. The marshal thought that, pending these Taurirt endeavours, it was best to "close down" Tangier. Since then, apparently last week, Abd-el-Krim has definitely informed Rabat that he refuses to negotiate or communicate to Taurirt.

The marshal states that my series of telegrams on Abd-el-Krim's overtures for peace, beginning the 27th July, caused some little anxiety in Paris and Rabat. They did not quite know whether "disclosures would not follow," and apparently awaited their publication from day to day with a little alarm. The reason why Rabat had not informed Paris on the 26th July—the day they received the news from Tangier—of the *démarche* of the Riffi emissary was that the marshal expected almost hourly to hear that Gabrielli was in touch with Abd-el-Krim from Taurirt. It was only when

I published the fact, on the 30th July, that Abd-el-Krim had informed me that he would not treat through Taurirt that Marshal Lyautey telegraphed to Paris that Riffi emissaries had made overtures of peace to the French authorities in Tangier. This explanation seems to have satisfied the Socialists, who at first understood from my telegrams that Rabat was purposely avoiding an opportunity for negotiations. The "Times" telegrams, the marshal informs me, were very useful. They clearly proved, to the satisfaction of the Socialists, that there was a genuine desire in Morocco for peace. The Socialists consider that the "Times" is well informed on Moroccan subjects, and they welcomed this proof that its columns would make public any express desire on the part of the Riffis for peace. The incident seems to have given M. Painlevé an occasion to discuss the matter with the Socialists and to point out the French Government's desire for peace. In any case, they seem very much less afraid of Socialist intervention than before.

Marshal Lyautey desires the French authorities in Tangier to keep open with Abd-el-Krim the most courteous communications, and requests them to treat his emissaries with respect.

On the subject of the French programme, Marshal Lyautey states that the French offensive will begin probably in the first week of September, but that there may be some rectification of the French line before that date. Marshal Pétain on his arrival will fix the exact date.

The French intend to drive the Riffians back to the former French lines (1924), and there the advance will cease. *Under no circumstances whatever will the French invade the Riff.* Once back on those lines, they will open local negotiations with the border tribes, both within and without the protectorate territory. They will invite the dissident tribes of the French zone side of the frontier to return and occupy their abandoned lands, and they will open the Ouergha markets to the Jebala and Riffi tribesmen from across the border. Every effort will be made to foster good feeling and to get them to forget the past. There will of course be no separate peace with Abd-el-Krim. It will only be a purely local understanding between the tribes on each side of the frontier—that is to say, the 1924 line. In the Beni Zeroual and elsewhere the French will not advance into any disputed territory and will abandon many of their territorial claims.

The marshal invites me to write to him immediately my views of this policy, of which I entirely approve. It was the policy we talked over in Fez early in June and which Colonel Huot, Directeur des Affaires indigènes at Rabat, has been to Tangier twice since to discuss. The proposed local arrangements, by which the Riffis will recognise an agreed frontier and undertake not again to invade the French protectorate territory, can in no way be considered in the light of "a peace." It is merely a proposed preliminary to the discussion of peace, and can no more affect the Franco-Spanish "combined peace action" than any rectification of the Spanish lines in the Spanish zone. At the same time, its evident advantage to both the French and Abd-el-Krim is very apparent. With the proposed rectification of the Beni Zeroual frontier, none of the country claimed by Abd-el-Krim as being within his jurisdiction will fall inside the French zone, a fact that should greatly facilitate all future relations.

Marshal Lyautey does not seem to expect that Abd-el-Krim will accept Franco-Spanish terms. France will of course keep to her part of the agreement, and will issue the necessary dahir of the Sultan for Riffian autonomy whenever the Spaniards are ready for it and ask for it.

It is quite evident that Marshal Lyautey considers that the Riffian crisis, in so far as France is concerned, will almost cease—anyhow for a time—as soon as the Riffis have been driven out of the French protectorate, and he hints that, after that, it is more Spain's affair than France's. There can be little doubt that the French should have no great difficulty in driving back the Jebala and Riff tribesmen as far as the 1924 line.

[W 10017/186/28]

No. 86.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 2246.)

Sir,

Paris, October 23, 1925.

MY despatch No. 1980 of the 12th September announced the beginning of the French general offensive against the Riffs. I stated in that despatch that this offensive seemed to me the logical application of the more definite policy signalled by the appointment of Marshal Pétain to the command and by the withdrawal of the Franco-Spanish commissioners who had been waiting to get into touch with Abd-el-Krim with a view to taking up peace negotiations.

2. The enclosed despatch, addressed to me by my military attaché, summarises the results of the general offensive, which is now, in view of the autumn rains, coming to an end, but since the date of my despatch No. 1980 three further events, or series of events, have occurred which may conveniently be called to mind here, although the first two have already been separately reported on.

3. In the first place, on the 27th September the resignation of Marshal Lyautey was accepted by the Government, and on the 6th October M. Steeg was nominated to succeed him. M. Steeg left Bordeaux for Casablanca on the 22nd October and Marshal Lyautey returned to Paris at the end of last week. It is not without interest to note that on the latter's arrival at the Gare de Lyon no member or representative of the Government was in attendance to meet him. M. Millerand and a few personal friends only were on the platform to mark by their presence what would seem to have been the final public event of a great proconsulate.

4. The second series of important occurrences in the course of the last month includes M. Painlevé's speeches at Nîmes on the 6th October and at Nice on the 15th October. At Nîmes M. Painlevé announced the terms of peace indirectly offered to Abd-el-Krim prior to the offensive. They included the assurance to the Riff of "all the independence compatible with the international treaties which regulate the status of the Shereefian Empire" and a proposal for the immediate opening of negotiations "with a view to the re-establishment of peace and the erection of the new régime." There was to be a mutual exchange of prisoners, a mutual amnesty, a definition of the régime of administrative autonomy, a determination of the territories to be placed under this régime, a fixation of the police effectives, the recognition of commercial freedom "to the extent compatible with the international treaties and notably with the international stipulations concerning customs matters," the interdiction of the traffic in arms and munitions and the "designation of a section of the coast which would be peacefully occupied by the Spanish after the cessation of hostilities." M. Painlevé added that Abd-el-Krim had refused all negotiations without the prior recognition of the complete independence of the Riff, and that therefore there remained for the French and Spanish Governments no other course than to obtain by force of arms the peace which they considered indispensable. On the 18th October M. Painlevé, after again referring to the peace offer which had preceded the offensive, announced that "to-day we occupy a solid frontier which it is sufficient to equip with roads. We hold the peaks which dominate the heart of the Riff. Communications between Morocco and Algeria are surer than they ever were before and all danger is removed."

5. Thirdly, on the 21st October M. Painlevé was examined by the Finance Committee of the Chamber, and a certain amount of new detail with regard to the situation has accordingly become available. In this examination M. Painlevé stated that the French effectives in Morocco amounted to 158,000 men. He announced the expenditure in Morocco, since the opening of the Riffian offensive, to be 950 million francs, to cover the latter part of which a new Supplementary Credits Bill would shortly be deposited. It will be remembered that a Supplementary Credits Bill covering 183 million francs expenditure was passed through the Chamber on the 9th July and through the Senate on the 12th July (see my despatch No. 1563). He gave the French losses for the period the 25th April to the 1st August as 1,285 killed and 5,306 wounded, and for the period the 1st August to the 15th October as 891 killed and 2,991 wounded. He stated that, according to the French Government's information, Abd-el-Krim still disposed of some 50,000 men, as against the 100,000 with which he had begun the campaign.

6. Further, in reply to a Socialist question as to whether the military operations were not merely interrupted by the rains and would not therefore be resumed in the

spring, M. Painlevé is alleged to have made the following statement: "The positions now occupied by our troops and the submission of numerous tribes causes me to hope for a prompt solution of the conflict. Besides, Abd-el-Krim has lost his prestige with his troops. Two solutions are available for him—peace or flight." M. Painlevé is also said to have stated that, although the Government would in any case spare no effort to secure peace in agreement with the Spanish Government and in accordance with the treaties, it would be inconsistent with its dignity to take the initiative in making peace proposals.

Finally, M. Painlevé took the opportunity of a Socialist question to state definitely that the League of Nations had no title to interfere in Morocco, which could not be considered as an independent State.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

Enclosure in No. 86.

Major-General Clive to the Marquess of Crewe.

(No. 32.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 22, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that, from information obtained from the African section at the French War Office yesterday, it appears certain that the operations undertaken in Morocco under the direction of Marshal Pétain, which began in September, are now definitely closed for this year. As was generally foreseen, the campaign was started too late in the season for there to be any serious hope of a definite decision being obtained before the winter. The rains, once they start, even intermittently, make the question of communications too precarious for operations on any large scale to be continued in a country where roads, as distinguished from tracks, are as yet non-existent. Nevertheless, the main objects, though limited in their scope, which Marshal Pétain had in view have been achieved.

On the west, communication has been established with the Spanish sector on the Loukkos River, and the important post of Ouezzan made secure.

In the centre, the original line north of the Ouergha River, from which the French were driven in the early summer, has been re-established. The position has been widened north of Taounat, and ground gained to improve the Bibane massif. The advance in this direction, moreover, has improved the moral of the important Beni Zeroual tribes, who were the first to waver.

On the eastern side, north of Kifane, the top of the watershed dividing the rivers which flow into the Mediterranean from the Chaouia and Ouizert rivers, which flow south, has been reached and observation to the north established. Junction has also been effected with the Spanish troops holding the Melilla sector along the Oued Kert. It is probable, however, that in the eastern sector, owing to the difficulties of supply, advanced posts north of the line of observation will be given up during the winter months. There will be no particular object in keeping up communication with the Spaniards during that period.

The work during the winter will be mainly political and devolves on the Service de Renseignements and political officers. The allegiance of wavering tribes must be regained, and every effort made to divorce them from the sinister influence of the Beni Ouriaghel, who are Abd-el-Krim's faithful adherents, and constitute the main strength of the Riffian armies.

Unless the military situation should change, or political pressure at home become too strong, it is anticipated that few, if any, of the troops now in Morocco will be repatriated for the winter, owing to the cost of transport and the continued necessity for showing a strong front. It will certainly be more economical to utilise the accommodation available in Morocco and Algeria, and, where necessary, build a certain number of additional hutments, some of which are already under construction.

The troops in Morocco are now said to number 140,000, there having been a slight reduction during the last few weeks owing to the release of the half-class that complete their eighteen months' service in November.

I have, &c.
G. S. CLIVE, Military Attaché.

[13955]

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(c.) Spanish Zone.

[W 6437/39/28]

No. 87.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 321. Confidential.)

Sir,

Madrid, July 2, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 70 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to report that, in the course of a long conversation which I had with General Jordana, the member of the Directorate in charge of Moroccan Affairs and senior Spanish delegate on the Franco-Spanish Commission, and Señor Aguirre, the second Spanish delegate, the general made a vigorous appeal for British sympathy and moral support.

Spain had, he said, for a long time past been carrying on the campaign single-handed against the Moorish rebels, which involved very heavy sacrifices and brought with it no compensating advantages, and unless she received some support the time might come when public opinion, weary of this perpetual sacrifice, might compel the Government to reconsider their position with regard to Morocco. I asked him what precisely he meant by this—did he contemplate complete withdrawal from the country? He answered that it might ultimately come to this, and he pointed out what serious consequences might ensue. It was not to the interest of Spain alone that a country so close to the Straits of Gibraltar and international trade routes should be pacified, and it would seriously affect other countries if the northern portion of Morocco were left to its own devices, with the almost inevitable result, amongst other things, that it would again become a nest of pirates.

He appealed particularly for the support of Great Britain. The rebels were undoubtedly stiffened in their opposition to Spain by the belief, carefully fostered by Abd-el-Krim, that they enjoyed British sympathy and support, and the moral effect would be very great if it could be shown that Great Britain was on the side of France and Spain. This support need not be of a material nature, and if His Majesty's Government did not see their way to send a contingent of 500 men to Tangier as had been suggested, the despatch of a very small detachment (even ten men, he said, would suffice), would have a very great moral effect.

In this connection I may mention that the "Sol" of the 30th ultimo contained a statement, which appears to have been inspired by General Jordana, to the effect that it was essential that France and Spain should not act in this matter without Great Britain, but that it would be sufficient if the latter expressed her approval of the measures which these two Powers proposed to take to preserve the neutrality of Tangier. Corresponding satisfaction is expressed by the "Debate" this morning at the news that His Majesty's Government have agreed to take part in the patrol of the coast of the Tangier zone.

It is of course not the first time that language similar to that of General Jordana has been used by a member of the Spanish Government, but it seems to me worth while placing it on record as evidence of the importance which is undoubtedly attached to the attitude of Great Britain in this, as in other matters, and it is rather emphasised than otherwise by a statement which was made to me yesterday that there was a section of public opinion here which strongly resented the fact that Spain seemed to be able to do nothing without the consent of Great Britain.

It is perhaps also worth reporting in this connection that in the course of a recent conversation the Under-Secretary in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs alluded—speaking in a friendly way and quite unofficially—to an unfortunate impression which he said prevailed here, that His Majesty's Government were opposing the proposed measure for the despatch of forces to Tangier from some ulterior motives, the exact nature of which I could not get him to define. I told him that so far as I was aware His Majesty's Government had not yet taken any decision in the matter, but that I could assure him without hesitation that their intentions were absolutely sincere, and that they had no desire whatever but to maintain the international status of Tangier as laid down in the convention.

The French delegation have also expressed to me a similar hope that His Majesty's Government will co-operate at Tangier. Both the French Ambassador and M. Sorbier, the second delegate, appear to entertain serious apprehensions lest the zone may be attacked by Abd-el-Krim as a result of the pressure which is being brought to bear on him by the French and Spanish forces, and M. Sorbier emphasised the fact that the presence of French and British forces would have the additional advantage of serving

to prevent the Spanish troops from creating further regrettable incidents such as have already been reported by Mr. Olive. The views of Marshal Lyautey had, he said, not yet been ascertained, but he felt no doubt that he would concur in this proposal, full details of which have, I understand, been communicated to you both by M. de Fleuriau and the Marques Merry del Val.

I have, &c.

HUGH GURNEY.

[W 6734/39/28]

No. 88.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 335.)

Sir,

Madrid, July 11, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the following official communiqué on the situation in Morocco appeared in this morning's press:—

2. "For those who follow Moroccan affairs with interest there is perhaps no necessity for an official declaration regarding the present interesting state of the problem; but it is certain that a large part of public opinion expects the Government to say something which will allow it to form as exact a judgment as possible of the events which are taking place.

3. "Towards the middle of May the Riffians started a violent offensive against the French positions of the Upper Wergha and the lines of communication with Fez, giving rise to a difficult situation in the protectorate of our neighbours, who were also obliged to fight in the sector of Uazan. The skill of the High Command and the valour of the troops did all that was possible to remedy the situation, and succeeded in so far as their small forces, in proportion to the extent of the front, allowed them to. But as France keeps on sending reinforcements and abundant munitions of war, it is to be hoped that the situation may be re-established, though not without great difficulty, and that she may be in a position to undertake a punitive campaign against the rebels.

4. "Meanwhile, in our zone, which had been quiet for some months, commissions appeared from the Riffians with letters from Abd-el-Krim, who, by threats and promises, forced a certain number of tribes to make an insurrection supervised by Riffian chieftains, who conceived the plan of cutting our lines of communication with a view, no doubt, to a moral rather than to a material effect.

5. "The good fortune with which the first attempt was combated a month ago in the mountains of Beni Hasan quelled the enemy's initiative, notwithstanding the punishments inflicted by Abd-el-Krim on his chieftains, whom he wishes at all costs to immobilise our forces in one or the other sector of the Spanish zone as well as our flying columns, so that they may not be employed on other objectives nearer to his base.

6. "This approach to our lines necessitated operations to attack and remove the enemy forces, which has been done with good results and without a single casualty more than has been reported in the official lists, while all our communications have been kept open.

7. "The plan of the Government is to pacify the zone entrusted to its protectorate and to maintain the security of its bases and communications, which is the only territory it considers necessary to occupy for the accomplishment of that mission. It may require the establishment of some new base or entail punitive action in some centre not yet occupied; but such an initiative cannot be taken without full guarantees and probably with French agreement and collaboration, if our joint efforts for pacification, which must be sought through other channels with determination and good faith, are not successful.

8. "The Moroccan problem has changed notably in the last fifteen years and especially in the past two years, and has become of world interest—not on account of its geographical, strategical and commercial aspect, but from the political point of view—in the sense that the figure of Abd-el-Krim and his abortive kingdom may be centres of a religious and social movement of a decisive influence in the East. The Principality or Republic of Beni-Urriaguel, aspiring to the Sultanate of Morocco and to the Caliphate of the Mussulman world, would meet with more or less open support if this chimera is not removed at once.

9. "A centre of intrigue in the Riff would be a grave danger to civilisation and peace in the East. Hence the attention which the Directorate gives daily more and more to this question and its anxiety to settle it with effective collaboration, which

[13955]

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must not fail before this new aspect of the problem, since to-day it may be asserted that all those who study the question seriously are agreed as to its gravity.

10. "It is right that the country should know that the necessity to face such an important problem does not find Spain unprepared. There is a fairly complete Maghzen organisation, not only ornamental, as formerly, but in contact with the country and recognised by the authorities, which will shortly be crowned by the solemn proclamation of the Caliph of the zone, who has now been appointed. There is also a civil organisation, suitable and hard working, with Shereefian troops and officers, with an efficient navy and with a flying service, which must be reckoned with for its quality and efficiency, and with an army well provided with modern material and with invincible qualities of discipline and skill. All this, which represents the sacrifices made for the country, the Directorate would prefer not to have to employ if it can secure peace in the Spanish protectorate by other means, which would be stable and not precarious or disquieting for the future."

I have, &c.

HUGH GURNEY.

[W 6948/39/28]

No. 89.

Mr. Gurney to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 344.)

Sir,

Madrid, July 18, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 324 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that the question of Morocco continues to dominate the situation.

2. There has been little fighting in the Spanish zone during the last fortnight, and public attention has been concentrated on the negotiations now proceeding in Madrid and the prospective outcome of these negotiations.

3. I have reported separately in regard to the progress of the negotiations themselves, but I may mention here that, though, owing to the censorship, public opinion can no longer express itself through the press, great disappointment seems to be felt at the belief which is current that His Majesty's Government have been standing in the way of the adoption of measures to prevent the continued use of Tangier as a base of supplies and a harbour of refuge for the rebels now in arms against Spain, and there are some who consequently go so far as to hold His Majesty's Government responsible in some measure for the continuance of the unpopular Moroccan campaign. There are also many who have not abandoned the hope that Tangier may one day be incorporated in the Spanish dominions, and think that the present is a favourable opportunity at any rate to improve Spain's position there. I gather, indeed, from the French delegates that the Spanish representatives on the Franco-Spanish Commission themselves at one time put forward a suggestion for special concessions at Tangier. As was to be expected, however, it met with no encouragement and has not been repeated, and the Spanish delegates have constantly assured me that they have no desire to depart from the provisions of the statute.

4. Unreasonable as may be the attitude above mentioned on the part of the Spanish public, there is no doubt that they attach a great sentimental importance to the question of Tangier, and any indication of a sympathetic consideration for their real or imagined difficulties would be appreciated. The Spanish Government have already reduced their demands, in the main, to a request that the tabors should be reinforced and that the Spanish tabor should be permitted to establish a cordon round the town of Tangier, and the publication of telegrams from London, which seem to show that His Majesty's Government are favourably considering at any rate the first of these proposals, has already caused considerable satisfaction.

5. It would seem that the active policy advocated by General Primo de Rivera on his return from Morocco gained little support in this country, opposed as it was both by the King and certain members of the Directorate. There is, indeed, a strong body of opinion which, as shown by the article from the "Debate" enclosed in my despatch No. 330 of the 8th July, advocates a reversion to the policy of reducing Abd-el-Krim by blockade rather than by a resumption of hostilities. I believe, however, that though the prospect of renewed fighting is not at all popular in the country, the idea of a landing at Alhucemas has not been altogether abandoned and that some such operation may be undertaken if Abd-el-Krim refuses to entertain the terms now offered to him.

6. As regards internal politics, it is of interest to note that a statement appeared in the "Sol" of the 11th instant to the effect that the Directorate proposed, at a comparatively early date, to hold a general election for the Cortes and the Senate. A semi-official communiqué published in the press this morning states, however, that this announcement is premature. It will, it says, no doubt be some day necessary to return to a constitutional régime and to appeal to the electorate on clear and concrete programmes, but this time is still far off, for the Directorate has not yet completed its work of purification and public opinion seems to be practically unanimous in its desire for the Directorate to remain in office. The problem of Morocco, it continues, seems to be entering on a new phase, and, if all goes well in this respect, the moment would seem to have come for the initiation of a political evolution, preparatory to a return to normal conditions, "which would not, however, imply a resuscitation of the old political parties—dissolved and discredited as they are—but the creation of new organisations with efficient programmes of their own."

7. The King and General Primo de Rivera have for some time past been known to contemplate the formation of a civilian Cabinet, with the general at its head, and I hear that some politicians, such as Señor Bugallal, Señor la Cierva and Señor Sanchez de Toca, have already been approached. It is very doubtful, however, whether politicians of standing would agree to serve under General Primo de Rivera and, if they did, whether they would meet with any popular support.

8. As regards the situation in Catalonia, I may mention that the "Heraldo de Madrid" of the 15th announced the formation of a "new political organisation composed for the greater part of members of the Monarchical Autonomist Federation, whose mission it will be to form a *trait d'union* between the Directorate and the Regionalists." The "Heraldo" states that it will be known as the "National Regionalist party," and will act independently of the Unión Patriótica, but in conformity with the principles enunciated to that body by General Primo de Rivera.

9. A communiqué issued on the 15th alludes to rumours which have been current here, though more particularly in the foreign press, in regard to a fresh attempt on the lives of the King and General Primo de Rivera. Without directly denying the truth of the rumour, the communiqué states that the public can rest assured that if such a danger existed it would at once be made known, in order to enlist the support of public opinion for the necessary measures of repression. "Fortunately, however," it adds, "no country in the world enjoys to-day such natural and spiritual tranquillity as Spain, and such tranquillity cannot be disturbed by the machinations of four foolish, disgruntled fellows." I had already heard of the report, but, from the enquiries which I have made, it appears that no actual plot against the life either of the King or of General Primo de Rivera has been discovered. Two persons were, however, arrested recently at Valladolid on suspicion of purchasing arms with a view to an attack on His Majesty, and I hear that some other persons have also been arrested who have been travelling about Spain disguised as members of a religious order and are believed to be really Communists. I am also told that some other persons who were arrested not long ago at Vera, near the French frontier, were believed to have been sent to make a further attempt to produce a rising in Spain on behalf of an organisation established in France, some members of which have been arrested at Biarritz.

10. In my last report I mentioned the bad impression produced by the latest budget. In a recent conversation a member of the Directorate admitted to me that, whilst it was difficult to cut down expenditure, especially so long as the Moroccan campaign constituted a continual drain on Spanish resources, the revenue could and ought to be considerably augmented without increasing the rate of taxation if everyone were compelled to pay the amount properly due from him. At present the taxes were largely evaded, but measures were shortly to be adopted to remedy this state of things, though it would take some time to do so.

11. The education problem is also being taken in hand, and the announcement was made last week that 1,000 new teachers were to be appointed.

I have, &c.

HUGH GURNEY.

[W 10058/39/28]

No. 90.

Sir H. Rumbold to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 490.)

Sir,

Madrid, October 23, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which I have received from Major W. W. T. Torr, military attaché to this Embassy, giving an account of conversations he had with Mr. W. B. Harris, the "Times" correspondent at Tangier, and with Mr. C. Hope Gill, British vice-consul at Tetuan, during the period of his recent attachment to General Primo de Rivera's staff in Morocco.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 90.

Major Torr to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Madrid, October 10, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a résumé of the conversations I had with Mr. W. B. Harris, the "Times" correspondent at Tangier, and with Mr. C. Hope Gill, British vice-consul at Tetuan, during the period of my recent attachment to General Primo de Rivera's staff in Morocco.

I have, &c.

W. W. T. TORR, Major,
Military Attaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 90.

I.—Interview with Mr. W. B. Harris, the "Times" Correspondent at Tangier.

AT the conclusion of my attachment to General Primo de Rivera's staff I returned to Madrid via Tangier. I reported to our consulate-general there, and subsequently had two interviews with Mr. Harris on the general situation in Morocco. I particularly wished to obtain information from him in regard to Abd-el-Krim's forces and the situation at that time in the Riff, as it had been practically impossible to learn anything in this connection from the Spanish military authorities, owing to their lack of intelligence staff and organisation.

I found Harris to be absolutely *au fait* with the situation, and in very close touch with everything and everyone in Tangier. He appears to be a personal friend of Abd-el-Krim and of Marshal Lyautey, and to be in constant communication with both.

Harris gave me the following summary of impressions, which he says are held by Abd-el-Krim:—

1. That he, Abd-el-Krim, attributes his successes against the Spanish army in the past, and in his offensive against the French this year, to be due mainly to three causes:—
 - (a.) The mobility of his army, which, compared with that of the French and Spanish armies, is most marked.
 - (b.) The fact that his men were as well trained, and, if not as well armed as the Europeans opposed to him, were natural fighters, knowing every inch of the country, which they loved, as opposed to the French and Spanish soldiers, who did not know the country and were not inspired with such intensely personal or patriotic feelings.
 - (c.) The nature of the terrain of the Riff, which lent itself so completely to Riffian tactics, both in attack and, even more so, in defence.
2. He considers the French better soldiers than the Spanish, though he admits that the latter are the rougher type, but they are the worse led. His troops are ordered to kill all the French officers possible, as without them their men are of little use, but not to kill Spanish officers, as he considers their men fight better without them.

3. He considers the Spanish air force far superior to that of the French, but the French artillery to be superior to the Spanish artillery.
4. He considers the Spanish Intelligence Service bad, and far inferior to the French native "Bureaux de Renseignement."
5. He likes and admires General Primo de Rivera and considers that Marshal Lyautey, first, and then General Primo de Rivera, know more about the psychology of the Riffs and about Morocco than anyone else.
6. He was confident that he could always retire to the mountains inland without being cut off or surrounded.
7. He considers that he cannot be starved out by a combined sea and land blockade, though he considers this will cause much hardship to the tribes that remain faithful to him this winter.
8. That he will always be able to secure food, if not ammunition supplies, from the Tangier zone, as he is doing at present in spite of the new blockade arrangements.

As I had been very struck, both in Spain and on this visit, by their complete lack of intelligence organisation and staff or information regarding the Riffian forces, I asked Harris the relative value of the French and Spanish intelligence organisations in Morocco. His opinion is that the French organisation is quite effective; but, though Colonel Orgaz, who is at the head of the Spanish "Servicio de Intervenciones militares" in Morocco, is very able, the service as a whole is at present still practically valueless.

He remarked that, of the three combatants, the results of Abd-el-Krim's intelligence service far outclassed those of the French and Spanish together, and that the excellence of his intelligence service was due to the fact that Abd-el-Krim included it as one of his three main military maxims, which, he stated, were—

1. Good intelligence.
2. Mobility.
3. Accuracy of fire and use of ground.

Harris mentioned that in his last conversation with Marshal Lyautey the latter had asked him how many Europeans he thought were fighting for Abd-el-Krim; when Harris replied: "Very few," Marshal Lyautey remarked: "It would be the best thing that could happen for France if a French marshal were in command of Abd-el-Krim's forces"—implying thereby that the most skilled and efficient European soldier could never fight as ably in the Riff as Abd-el-Krim has done, as he would not possess the latter's peculiar knowledge of the characteristics of his tribesmen in the type of warfare now being waged.

When I asked Harris how Abd-el-Krim manned his captured French and Spanish artillery and machine guns, &c., he informed me that for the past three or four years Abd-el-Krim has succeeded in enlisting tribesmen of his army into both the Spanish "tercio" and "regulares," and into the French Foreign Legion—with the object, firstly, of their conveying complete intelligence to him of Spanish and French movements, intentions, &c., and, secondly, with a view to their learning the use of the weapons (viz., rifles, machine guns and artillery) of both nations opposed to him. These men, having served for varying periods with the French or Spanish armies, then returned to Abd-el-Krim and became available to him for employment with the weapons captured from these armies.

I gathered from Harris that the Riff tribesmen are entirely uneducated. None can read or write (the Riffi language cannot be written—Abd-el-Krim writes in Arabic).

He states that there is intense poverty in the Riff, and that the tribesmen have practically no money; the harvest yielded by the land owned by nearly all the tribesmen is insufficient to feed them throughout the year. In order to gain the necessary money to purchase food from Tangier, &c., the tribesmen go to Algiers and other places on the north coast of Africa during the harvest season, returning when they have earned sufficient for their needs in this respect.

Mr. Harris stated that both the French and Spanish authorities have throughout continued to make peace offers and to negotiate with Abd-el-Krim, and that at that time (1st October), General Primo de Rivera was awaiting the reply from Abd-el-Krim to his offer to send Colonel Orgaz (head of "Intervenciones" and Bureau of Native Intelligence), who was then in Tangier, to Abd-el-Krim to negotiate a further offer of peace.

Mr. Harris considers that Abd-el-Krim could be bought by Spain for between £100,000 and £200,000 a year, and that he, Abd-el-Krim, would be of more value to Spain as their subject ruler in the Riff than if he were dead or so stripped of all prestige as to have no power left should they decide to use him for this purpose. He considers that it is essential to have a really strong man in the Riff, and that no other Riffian, still less any European, could disarm the Riff or control its tribes. He considers the only solution to the problem of the future of the Riff is for the French policy (viz., that inspired by Marshal Lyautey, of peaceful occupation of the tribal areas in the French zone of Morocco) to be carried out by the Spanish in their protectorate as well. He considers it almost impossible to defeat or starve Abd-el-Krim altogether, and that, if this were accomplished at what must prove further great loss of life and money, Spain would not have solved the problem then, especially as she does not want to occupy the territory from which she has withdrawn.

Mr. Harris has a high opinion of Abd-el-Krim, whom he considers to be far superior to the late Raisuli in every way. He says that his special gift is more of a political than a military nature owing to his having a wonderful grasp of tribal psychology and political views, and of obtaining and retaining the allegiance of not only his own but the other tribes that serve him. His brother, Mohamed, has the greater military knowledge and is responsible for most of the Riffian military plans and organisations.

He stated that to the best of his knowledge Abd-el-Krim had practically no staff beyond his brother and his Foreign Minister, whom he has recently put to death, and whose son was then in Tangier with messages to Harris from Abd-el-Krim.

If Harris is to be believed, he is in constant touch with Abd-el-Krim, who informs him of everything, and asks advice of him. Harris is also in close touch with the French authorities. His sympathies are undoubtedly primarily pro-Riffian, and it is evident from his conversation, as it is from his articles in the press, that, of the nations opposed to the Riff, he is pro-French and anti-Spanish. I do not think there is the slightest foundation for the accusation which one hears, to the effect that he is in the pay either of France or of Abd-el-Krim—if for no other reason than that Harris is of a proud and independent nature, and is financially presumably quite independent either of the remuneration of his post as "Times" correspondent, or of that from any other source.

He is, of course, a highly educated man, who has been in Tangier for thirty-four years, and is a specialist in the affairs of Northern Morocco and the psychology and language of its tribes. The impression I gained from him was that he is subtle and "puckish," and, having an element of snobbishness in his character, is sensitive of the appreciation of his abilities, recognition of which he has received from France and the Riff, but not from Spain. I refer to the above owing to the very great antipathy to Harris which is felt by Spanish authorities, and especially by His Majesty the King (to which I have referred in my past despatches), owing to Harris's criticism of Spain and of her past and present operations in Morocco, which they feel is unjustly critical and biased.

I think that Harris means to be neutral and unbiassed, but that he is unconsciously antipathetic to Spain owing, not so much to any dislike for that country, but to a long-standing feud with the Marquis Merry del Val. I told Harris of his unpopularity in Spain, and of certain articles in particular he had written which had caused such indignation. He was unable to defend them, and volunteered to write an article to remedy this unfair criticism. This he subsequently did in the leading article of the "Times," dated the 5th October, entitled "The Spanish Victory," which has given great satisfaction to the King and to Spanish authorities here.

Enclosure 3 in No. 90.

II.—Conversation with Mr. C. Hope Gill, British Vice-Consul at Tetuan.

I MET Mr. Hope Gill in the streets of Tetuan on the 27th September, and had a short conversation with him regarding the situation there and in Tangier.

He confirmed, what I had previously gathered from Spanish officials, that the land blockade of the Tangier zone is becoming more effective, but that nothing can ever stop contraband getting out from it. He told me that convoys now only attempt to get food out, and not ammunition, the passage of which has practically ceased except for isolated

cases of single men getting out with small quantities. He stated that the only sale and supply of cartridges in Tangier is from Spanish soldiers, and that the price of these is now 50 centimes instead of 5 centimes each.

He expressed his belief that the sea blockade was now far more effective in the Tangier zone than elsewhere on the coast of Morocco.

[W 10517/39/28]

No. 91.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Gurney (Madrid).

(No. 602.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 11, 1925.

THE Spanish Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, principally, he explained, because it was a long time since he had paid me a visit and not because he had any particular message to deliver at the moment.

He approached the subject of his recent difference with the "Times," and I ventured to commend his discretion in making no reply to their leading article. It was never worth while for one of us Ministers here, and still less for a representative of a foreign country, to enter into a controversy with our press.

On the subject of Morocco, he gave me an account of the success of the recent Spanish operations and of the present situation, and he enquired whether I had any information as to Abd-el-Krim's intentions. Whilst expressing some hesitation about venturing on this topic, I replied that it had more than once been represented to me through various channels that Abd-el-Krim desired to make peace, but felt a great distrust of the Spanish and French Governments and wished to introduce Great Britain into the discussion with the idea that the presence of a British representative would be in some sort a proof of good faith and a protection to him, though he clearly understood that Great Britain would not be prepared to undertake any obligation. My attitude towards any such suggestion was one of great reluctance to intervene in any case in a matter which was not a direct concern of my country and where failure might seem much more probable than success. The only condition upon which I would even consider such a proposal was if both Spain and France thought that Great Britain could be of service. Until, and unless, I was approached by them, Abd-el-Krim could be for me only a rebel against authority on whose behalf it was as unthinkable that I should intervene as it would be that the King of Spain should propose mediation in some Indian frontier dispute.

The Ambassador then observed that some time ago when he had spoken to me about the smuggling of munitions I had said something about their sale to the Riffians or their agents by the Spanish troops; he would be very grateful if I could give him any information upon the subject. I replied that speaking from memory my impression was that I had had no precise details before me, but that I had been told that it was a matter of common notoriety, which anyone at Tangier could verify, that soldiers or their wives bargained cartridges in the market for household produce. If the facts were so, the Spanish authorities could easily verify them, but I was certainly not in a position to lay information against anyone. His Excellency thought that such reports as I had received could only be the revival of very old rumours, and I passed the matter off by observing that I thought that at one time there had been considerable laxity in Spanish administration in Morocco which the President of the Directorate had no doubt corrected since he had taken personal charge of affairs in the Spanish zone.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[13955]

N

CHAPTER II.—TANGIER ZONE.

(a.) The International Administration and its Work. Progress in bringing the Statute into Force.

[W 6279/18/28]

No. 92.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tangier, July 2, 1925.

MY telegram No. 73.

There was some disorder in the town this morning due to two causes: (1) provocative attitude of local Government press; (2) order given Government shops to remain open. Crowd of Spanish roughs supported by Jews paraded the main streets and forced shops and cafés that had remained open to close.

Many carried revolvers.

Windows of big Government store were broken. Two Spaniards were wounded and one member of Government tabor. Spanish tabor carried no arms, and were cheered by crowd. They took no action to protect shops that opened possibly under orders from Spanish captain, who was in sympathy with demonstration. Being great Moslem festival, natives were all busy killing sheep and took no part in demonstration.

[W 6301/18/28]

No. 93.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 76.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tangier, July 2, 1925.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Result has unfortunately been increase of latent hostility between French and Spaniards, and there is a strong current of anti-French feeling shared by natives. French prestige has certainly suffered at the hands of Abd-el-Krim, and Spaniards know it.

To-day's proceedings may be called popular demonstration against statute. Local Spaniards at any rate are imbued with the idea of another conference, when they think that they may improve their position *vis-à-vis* the French.

[W 6307/18/28]

No. 94.

Consul-General Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 205.)

Sir,

Tangier, June 28, 1925.

IF one was to believe the local Spanish press or the man in the street, the failure of the statute would appear to be a foregone conclusion.

2. The fact that 500 signatures, mainly of small Spanish and Jew shopkeepers, have been appended to a petition not to enforce the new taxes provided for in the statute, and that the majority of the local press censures the new Administration and calls for another conference, provides, no doubt, evidence that the statute is not popular.

3. The refrain of the Spanish press continues to be pitched in the same key—"Let us have a new conference and make over Tangier to Spain."

4. The sole English and oldest foreign newspaper in Morocco, the "Moghreb-al-Aksa," has fallen on hard times and a recent change of editors has done little to improve matters. It has unfortunately been impossible to find I will not say a competent editor, but even one with any sense of accuracy or journalistic training. And yet a leading article in last week's number demanding a conference and proposing that Tangier should become an independent republic has been seriously quoted in the foreign press. The daily French paper, the "Dépêche marocaine," publishes windy articles on Tangier, which have little meaning. A little intelligent criticism is badly

needed. Ill-informed abuse of everything becomes wearisome and tends to create false hopes.

5. As a matter of fact, in my opinion and that of my French and Spanish colleagues, the statute has survived the first month of its existence better than we had expected.

6. The Assembly and its various committees have met regularly and got through a good deal of work. The Public Health Department have taken the first steps towards cleaning up the town and, what is very important, the French and Spanish engineers get on very well together and there has been no friction between these two Departments which inevitably tend to overlap. But the biggest achievement is that the question of the lighterage charges, which has raised such an outcry since they were increased last February, has been satisfactorily settled between the port company, the port commission and the Assembly. So long as the statute was not in force, neither the Assembly nor the port commission had any legal existence and no arrangement was possible. The Assembly have at the same time unanimously agreed to the tobacco monopoly increasing their charges for tobacco owing to the fall in the franc, whereby the town will benefit to the tune of about 200,000 fr. a year—a sum which will be nearly sufficient to make up to the port company the loss that will be occasioned by the substitution for the existing tariff of a new and very much lower one.

7. The non-adherence of three Powers is an obvious inconvenience and in one particular has been a source of considerable embarrassment, namely, in regard to registration, transfer and stamp duties. In the case of subjects and citizens of the three Powers who decline to pay these duties, there is no means of enforcing them.

8. The absence of a regular police force is another inconvenience. Two murders have, in fact, been committed since the 1st June, but happily the Italian who whipped out his knife in a café in the Little Socco chose to bury it in the heart of a compatriot. He was secured and handed over to the Italian Agency. While a Spaniard, whose murderous onslaught on another Spaniard would have embarrassed the Mixed Court—still lacking a Spanish judge—saved further trouble by committing suicide.

9. A prospective police commissioner has at length been proposed by M. Alberge, and although the Spanish members of the Assembly walked out in sign of protest—at what it is not quite clear—the remainder of the Assembly voted for him. He is believed to be at present in France, but as soon as he arrives and has had time to go into things, a "règlement de police" will be submitted. The assistant commissioner will in any case be a Spaniard.

10. The stoppage of public gambling is extremely unpopular, and I hear from the hotels that a number of advanced bookings have been cancelled. It is not, I imagine, that many tourists who come here come here with the intention of gambling, but the stoppage of gambling reduces the resources of proprietors of cinemas and other places of amusement, and the attractions provided not only cost more, but suffer in consequence, whilst if they do not gamble themselves it amuses many people to watch others do so. Many petitions to restore gambling have been received by the Committee of Control, but from what I learn from my Spanish colleague it seems to be in the highest degree improbable that the Directorate would consent to its reintroduction in Tangier.

11. At the same time, it is satisfactory to be able to report that the illicit Italian and American gambling establishments have closed down, the former at any rate by order of the Italian agent.

12. The Administrator submitted last week to the Assembly a proposal that Hassani currency should cease to be allowed after the 15th August. The matter has been referred to the Finance Committee. While, under the statute, the action of the Administrator is justified, it is felt that with the falling franc the proposed measure contains the seeds of one very serious danger, namely, that the natives would decline to deal in francs but only accept pesetas in payment for goods or services. This would inevitably have the effect of increasing the cost of living. The Finance Committee will in all probability therefore propose that the suppression of Hassani currency be postponed.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[W 7410/18/28]

No. 95.

*M. van Swinderen to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 4.)**Légation des Pays-Bas, Londres,
le 1^{er} août 1925.*

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

PAR son office du 23 mai 1924, M. le Ministre de Grande-Bretagne à La Haye a bien voulu demander au nom de son Gouvernement l'adhésion du Gouvernement de la Reine à la Convention relative à l'Organisation du Statut de la Zone de Tanger, conclue entre le Président de la République française, Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, et Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne, le 18 décembre 1923.

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine adhère à ladite convention, à l'exception, toutefois, de l'article 9.

Veuillez, &c.

R. DE MAREES VAN SWINDEREN.

[W 8815/18/28]

No. 96.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 284.)

Sir,

Tangier, September 11, 1925.

AS I am shortly going on leave, it may be of interest if, in continuation of my despatch No. 205 of the 28th June, I record briefly the progress that has been made in bringing the statute into force.

2. In the first place, it is well to recognise that three articles are still in abeyance, namely, articles 20, 47 and 52.

3. Article 20, relating to the question of interzonal customs duties, has been fully dealt with in my despatches Nos. 275 and 278 of the 31st August and the 5th September, respectively.

4. Article 47 sets forth the rules for the creation of the new gendarmerie under a Belgian captain. The latter arrived in Tangier on the 20th July with two Belgian *sous-officiers*, but it should be clear to him by now that there is very little, I might almost say no, prospect of the French and Spanish authorities agreeing to the dissolution of the existing tabors so long as a state of war continues on the border of the Tangier zone. For my part I share the view that it is impossible at present to name a date on which the new gendarmerie can be formed and the tabors dissolved, and I have done my best to make Captain Heynderick understand this.

5. Article 52 lays down that games of chance shall be forbidden in the Tangier zone, and can only be allowed by an unanimous vote of the Committee of Control. So long as certain Powers do not adhere to the statute this article is bound to remain a dead letter.

6. The two most satisfactory features of the new régime since my last report are—

(a.) The fact that the Mixed Tribunal, in spite of various shortcomings such as the non-appointment of a Spanish judge, the somewhat excessive court expenses, the unsatisfactory system of *juges adjoints*, &c., is gradually being recognised by the population as a permanent and established institution that works and with time will work better.

(b.) The creation of a municipal police force. While possibly suffering from an *excès de zèle* in the first few weeks, it is safe to say that the new force has made a good impression under its chief, M. Palazat, formerly French assistant police commissioner in Casablanca. There is still considerable room for improvement, but the start is encouraging.

7. On the financial side budget expectations are being fully realised, and it is universally recognised that we are extremely fortunate in having two capable British officials of long experience and training as Director of Finance and Chief Accountant of the zone.

8. An especially satisfactory feature is that the *taxe urbaine*, which was some 2 to 3 million francs in arrear under that inert body the late Commission d'Hygiène,

is now being regularly collected, and some half-million francs of arrears have been got in.

9. The early dissatisfaction with the new consumption duties and other taxes has given way to a feeling of resignation to the inevitable, except in the case of the stamp and registration taxes, which by reason of their partial application are still a cause of not unreasonable discontent; while the demonstration of the 2nd July has proved to have been nothing more serious than a temporary ebullition of feeling worked up by certain Jewish and Spanish elements, and incited by the tactlessness of the local French press. At the same time, I do not wish to give an impression of undue optimism. Between the French and Spanish colonies there exists a scarcely veiled antipathy, and there will, I fear, always be causes of friction.

10. Without waxing enthusiastic over the work of the Assembly, no one can deny that they take themselves seriously and the attendance has been extremely regular until the middle of August, when the absence from Tangier of several members for their annual holidays rendered a quorum impossible. Certain of the Spanish delegates, I regret to say, display a tendency to obstruction combined with extreme verbosity whenever the weight of argument is against them, and as it was unfortunately impossible to reach any agreement as to the length of speeches or the number of times a delegate might speak on the same motion a good deal of time is wasted. There will be plenty for the Assembly to do when it meets again in October under the vice-presidency of Colonel Ellis, and it will be interesting to see how the Latin elements react to the Anglo-Saxon idea of the conduct of debate.

11. The Committee of Control have held twenty-nine meetings to date since January, and I am happy to say their work has been carried on in an atmosphere of perfect good feeling and without friction.

12. Finally it is hardly necessary to repeat that, so long as three Powers do not adhere the full application of the statute is not possible. On the one hand we have a Jewish banker, of questioned Portuguese nationality, declining to comply with the stamp tax regulations, to the extreme annoyance of all the other banks. On the other hand, Italians are free to snap their fingers at the gambling prohibition, while the Italian representative, as president of the Conseil sanitaire, will not hand over the funds that now belong to the Administration. Land transfer dues, as between citizens of non-adhering Powers, can be ignored with impunity.

13. At present, it is difficult to point to any way in which these foreigners suffer by the non-adherence of their Governments, and I cannot help feeling that as time passes it will be more than ever difficult to persuade those Governments of the necessity of adhering without making some concession if only to their *amour-propre*.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[W 10547/18/28]

No. 97.

Acting Consul-General Bond to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 321.)

Sir,

Tangier, November 9, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Tangier budget for 1926 was presented by the Administrator to the Legislative Assembly on the 3rd instant, and I enclose a copy of an introductory memorandum drawn up by the Director of Finance.

2. The projected budget reflects a very satisfactory financial position, showing as it does that it will be possible at the end of the current year to carry forward a credit balance of 2,000,000 fr. into 1926.

3. Mr. Dicken points out that the forecast of receipts is much higher than might have been anticipated. This, he explains, is due to the fact, firstly, that extreme prudence has been exercised in framing the budget for the seven months of 1925, and, secondly, that the effect of new taxation and the collection of arrears will not have its full effect until next year.

4. The total receipts are estimated at 18,660,000 fr., against an estimated expenditure of 18,460,000, but out of this sum no less than 5,000,000 fr. are set apart for new public works and roads. The laying out of the town is to absorb 3½ millions out of this 5 millions, and work is to be commenced immediately by drawing plans from aerial surveys.

5. Mr. Dicken adds a word of warning as to the expenses the zone will have to support when the port and the Tangier-Fez Railway are completed, amounting to some 3 or 4 millions.

I have, &c.
W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 97.

Administration internationale de la Zone de Tanger.

NOTE SUR LE PROJET DE BUDGET POUR 1926.

LE projet de budget qui vient d'être établi pour l'exercice 1926 se présente avec 18,660,000 fr. de recettes et 18,460,000 fr. de dépenses en chiffres ronds.

Sans entrer dans les détails qui seront examinés plus tard par l'Assemblée, ces chiffres appellent quelques observations :

I.—*Recettes.*

Il peut paraître surprenant qu'alors que le budget de 1925 avait été dressé avec une prévision de recettes de 8,775,000 fr. seulement pour une période de sept mois, celui de 1926, pour cinq mois de plus, s'élève à 18,660,000 fr. sans qu'aucun impôt nouveau ait été institué.

Cette différence provient :

1. De l'extrême prudence avec laquelle avaient été évaluées les recettes probables de 1925, en raison des incertitudes de la période de début ;
2. De l'inscription, parmi les recettes de 1926, d'une prévision de 2 millions de francs correspondant à l'excédent probable de recettes que fera apparaître le règlement de l'exercice 1925, en raison des plus-values constatées dans le produit des impôts au cours de ces derniers mois ;
3. De la prévision d'une rentrée de 1 million de francs au cours de 1926, sur l'arriéré de la taxe urbaine, qui sera probablement encaissé en presque totalité, avant la fin de 1927.

L'exercice 1926 se trouve donc bénéficier de 3 millions de recettes exceptionnelles. Mais il convient de remarquer que la disparition de ces ressources extraordinaires sera compensée au cours des exercices ultérieurs par l'accroissement des recettes ordinaires et la création de nouvelles sources de revenus.

Le Monopole des Tabacs rapportera, à partir de 1927, au moins 500,000 fr. de plus. D'autre part, la reprise des relations normales avec la zone voisine, l'amélioration des conditions d'exploitation du port et l'ouverture au trafic du chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez, assureront un mouvement d'affaires d'où résulteront de fortes plus-values sur l'ensemble des impôts.

Il ne faut pas oublier non plus que la zone pourra tirer des jeux une ressource importante dès que la réglementation indispensable sera intervenue.

II.—*Dépenses.*

On pourrait également s'étonner qu'alors que le budget de dépenses de 1925, comprenant outre les sommes nécessaires au fonctionnement des services publics pendant sept mois une large part des frais de premier établissement, s'élevait seulement à 8,650,000 fr., le projet établi pour 1926 atteigne 18,460,000 fr., sans aucune création de service nouveau.

Ce résultat serait très inquiétant s'il s'agissait de dépenses normales et permanentes. Aussi importe-t-il de signaler immédiatement que dans cette somme de 18,460,000 fr. les dépenses normales et permanentes n'entrent que pour 13 millions environ, et que plus de 5 millions de francs sont destinés à entamer l'exécution de travaux de voirie et d'édilité.

Sur ces 5 millions de francs, 3 millions et demi sont destinés à commencer l'exécution du plan d'aménagement de la ville. Ce plan ne pourra malheureusement pas être définitivement arrêté avant que le plan photographique à grande échelle, déjà commandé à une société de levés par avion, ait pu être livré. L'Assemblée aura à statuer sur son adoption et à arrêter l'ordre de priorité des travaux dont l'exécution fera de Tanger une ville digne de la beauté de son cadre.

Des affectations aussi importantes pourront-elles être faites en faveur des travaux publics au cours des exercices ultérieurs ? Il y a lieu de l'espérer, car les premières dépenses faites produiront de nouvelles augmentations de recettes. Mais il ne faut pas oublier que la zone aura à supporter, du fait de la construction du port et du chemin de fer, un accroissement de charges de 3 à 4 millions. Il convient donc d'observer la plus stricte économie dans la gestion des services publics et d'éviter toutes les dépenses improductives qui ne seraient pas indispensables.

Aussi bien, même si les circonstances ne l'imposaient pas, cette politique serait nécessaire pour asseoir le crédit de la nouvelle zone.

Répartition des Crédits prévus au Budget.

<i>Dette publique.</i>				Pour Cent.
Anciens emprunts	...	...	...	3½
Emprunt de la Société du Port	...	...	...	6½
				— 10
<i>Dépenses de personnel :</i>				
(a.) Justice et administration générale	...	...	...	2½
(b.) Services financiers	...	...	...	4
(c.) Services d'hygiène et assistance	...	...	...	2
(d.) Services de sécurité (police et gendarmerie)	...	...	...	16
(e.) Travaux publics	...	...	...	2½
(f.) Douanes...	...	...	...	6
				— 33
Dépenses de matériel et l'ensemble des services	...	...	...	6
<i>Travaux publics.</i>				
Dépenses d'entretien de la voirie, nettoyage de la ville, éclairage et eau	...	...	...	21
Travaux neufs	...	...	...	25
				— 46
Prévision pour imprévus	...	...	...	5
				— 100

(b.) *The Tangier Gendarmerie.*

[W 7192/18/28]

No. 98.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 225.)

Sir,

Tangier, July 23, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose an article from the "Dépêche marocaine" of this morning,* giving the names of the Belgian captain of gendarmerie and the two Belgian non-commissioned officers, who arrived in Tangier on the 20th July.

2. On receipt of your telegram No. 42 of the 16th July, I addressed a note to the president of the Committee of Control pointing out that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the existing situation did not permit of the formation of the new gendarmerie, and that it would be better for the Belgian captain to wait meanwhile and familiarise himself with the local conditions. My Spanish colleague received instructions in a similar sense, but as the French, Belgian and Dutch consuls-general had not received instructions it was not possible for a letter in the name of the Committee of Control to be sent to the Belgian captain, although my Belgian colleague quite appreciates the situation, and has privately informed Captain de Ghelcke of the position.

* Not printed.

3. Captain de Ghelcke is married to a French lady and has three children. He informed me that one of his non-commissioned officers had been for eight years in the French Foreign Legion, where he had an excellent record without disciplinary punishment.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[W 7799/18/28]

No. 99.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 250.)

Sir,

Tangier, August 7, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 225 of the 23rd July, I have the honour to enclose extracts from the *procès-verbaux* of the twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth meetings of the Committee of Control of the 21st and 31st July in regard to the Belgian captain of gendarmerie.*

2. As neither my colleagues nor I have heard anything further on the subject of the note enclosed in my despatch No. 223 of the 21st July, I presume that the Belgian and Dutch Governments are being asked to agree to a temporary suspension of article 47 of the convention before the new arrangements proposed are put in force. I may add that my Spanish colleague remarked at the Committee of Control—though it is not recorded in the minutes—that it might be best that Captain Hynderick should, after a short visit, return to Belgium. He would then be in a position to say whether, when the time came, he wished to return. It may be assumed that M. Buigas, at any rate, does not believe that the "Règlement de Gendarmerie" as approved in Paris will go into effect at least for some time to come.

3. Meanwhile, Captain Cazes and the former Spanish officers of No. 2 tabor have been relieved of their functions and replaced by Captain Miguel, as commandant, and Lieutenants Llorea and Parladé. I understand that recruiting is quietly proceeding for both tabors, but no steps have yet been taken in regard to the extended sphere of tabor No. 2.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

(c.) Italy and the Tangier Convention.

[W 10968/18/28]

No. 100.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 4060.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 9, 1925.

I HAVE taken advantage of the recent presence in this country of His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier to review the question of the Tangier Statute and the general situation of the zone. Despite the disturbance and losses caused by the Riff war, the machinery of the new régime has been successfully put in motion, and six months' experience has shown that the statute is a workable instrument. The Mixed Tribunal has been established, the administrative services organised and taxes levied from a population which has never paid them before. The budget for the first year shows a comfortable surplus, and has enabled 5 million francs to be set aside for improvements to the town. In short, the statute has worked better than was expected by many, and it has been amply justified by the events of the past summer. It was mainly, if not wholly, owing thereto that His Majesty's Government were able to resist the Spanish proposal to send troops to Tangier and so to avoid the serious consequences which must have ensued.

2. There is now good reason to believe that autonomy will result in a well-governed and prosperous Tangier, if the new régime be given a fair chance. So far this has not been the case owing to the failure of the Italian, United States and Portuguese Governments to accede to the statute. The immediate accession of the United States and Portugal is not of paramount importance. There are no United

* Not printed.

States citizens and but little United States trade or shipping at Tangier, and the Portuguese Government have declared themselves in principle ready to accede and have only failed to do so owing to the ineffective working of their parliamentary system. It is quite otherwise with the Italian Government. Mr. Clive is firmly convinced that unless the latter accede, and that fairly soon, the statute will be wrecked, and the whole question will fall once more into the melting-pot.

3. The responsibility for inducing the Italian Government to accede lies primarily with the French Government. Throughout the negotiations in Paris which resulted in the signature of the Tangier Convention the French representative repeatedly declared that in virtue of the Franco-Libyan Treaty of 1912 the Italian Government had no choice but to accede. When the British delegates pointed out that the Italian Government would probably ignore the treaty their warning fell on deaf ears. Unfortunately events have proved the correctness of the British view. During the last two years His Majesty's Government have more than once urged the French Government to demand that the relevant clause of the 1912 treaty should be referred to arbitration, but they have refused to entertain the suggestion. At present there seems no prospect that they will take the initiative in bringing pressure to bear on the Italian Government.

4. The attitude of the Spanish Government is not dissimilar, but for different reasons. General Primo de Rivera, in conversations with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid and with Mr. Harris, and the King of Spain in conversation with the British military attaché, have laid great stress on the justice and expediency of incorporating Tangier into the Spanish zone. Spain would view with positive satisfaction the opportunity of reopening the Tangier question which the collapse of the statute would be likely to afford.

5. It seems, therefore, that the only hope of bringing the Italian Government into line lies in an initiative on the part of His Majesty's Government. Viewed from the Italian standpoint there are two different sides to the question. On the one hand, it is actually to the advantage of Italian residents at Tangier that Italy should not accede. At present they do not have to pay taxes, they can own gambling establishments, and they may with impunity ignore all local laws and regulations. On the other hand, it would scarcely suit the Italian Government to see either the French or the Spaniards firmly installed at Tangier, and they are probably shrewd enough to see that if the statute breaks down one or other of these alternatives is likely to happen. Mr. Clive, from his conversations with the Italian representative at Tangier, feels almost certain that if some way can be devised to satisfy Italian *amour-propre* and save the face of the Italian Government the latter will accede.

6. With this object in view Mr. Clive has put forward an ingenious proposal. Experience has shown defects in the statute, which requires amendment on certain points—I emphasise "certain" for reasons which will be explained later. A new conference is unnecessary for this purpose, and the amendments required could most conveniently be discussed, in the first instance, by the Committee of Control, i.e., the representatives at Tangier of the acceding Powers. In order that all local talent and experience should be made available for this purpose it is desirable that the Italian, Portuguese and American representatives at Tangier should be associated with their colleagues in this discussion.

7. If the Italian Government were approached in this sense by the British, French and Spanish Governments, and if they agreed, the result of the labours of the committee, i.e., a revised statute, would be submitted to the Italian as well as to all the other Governments. M. Mussolini would thus be able to declare that he had scored a success, and that without Italian participation and Italian consent it had been impossible to arrange a satisfactory régime for Tangier.

8. The obvious danger is that the Spanish Government might seize the opportunity of attacking once more the principle on which the statute is based, i.e., the control of the natives of Tangier by the French protectorate authorities. It would be altogether out of the question to allow this, and therefore the revision of the statute must be strictly limited to certain articles such as those relating to the gendarmerie, international customs and gambling, all of which in my view require amendment. Before the committee gets to work the actual articles to be revised should form the subject of a definite written understanding first between the British, French and Spanish Governments and then between the other Powers represented on the committee.

9. On my authority Mr. Clive, on his way back to Tangier last month, sounded the French and Spanish Governments in regard to his proposal. MM. Berthelot and

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Laroche were too busy to examine the question carefully, and after inveighing against Italian bad faith handed over Mr. Clive to M. Ponsot, who deals with Tangier business at the Quai d'Orsay. M. Ponsot seemed benevolently inclined, but did not dare to take the responsibility of expressing a definite opinion. M. Aguirre, head of the Moroccan Department of the Ministry of State in Madrid, was even more guarded, and said he could pronounce no opinion at all until the dictator had been consulted. On the whole I am inclined to believe that if the Italian Government were agreeable in principle both the French and the Spanish Governments would make little or no difficulty.

10. The question is one of some urgency, and I am ready to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome to sound the Italian Government confidentially as soon as possible and endeavour to ascertain how they would receive a request for the participation of the Italian representative at Tangier in a discussion of amendments to the statute. Before doing so I think it is worth while to make one more attempt to persuade the French Government either to take the initiative themselves or to join His Majesty's Government in approaching the Italian Government. I request accordingly that your Lordship will represent the considerations set forth in this despatch to M. Berthelot and urge him to join in placing Mr. Clive's proposals before M. Mussolini. If he has any alternative to suggest I shall be glad to consider it, but I trust that he will put aside for the time being his anti-Italian bias and treat the question on its merits. To reinforce your argument your Lordship should say that, in view of Italy's position as a guarantor of the Treaty of Locarno, I hold it to be of the highest consequence for France, and not without interest for Great Britain, that everything possible should be done to remove a cause of friction between France and Italy.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 11678/18/28]

No. 101.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 2721.)

Sir,

Paris, December 18, 1925.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph 10 of your despatch No. 4060, I spoke to M. Briand to-day on the subject of possible modifications of the Tangier Statute, giving him a complete account of the contents of the despatch, and leaving with him an *aide-mémoire* marked "Very Confidential," repeating verbatim all the paragraphs which can be regarded as addressed to the French Government.

2. Having completed my exposition of the despatch, I said that in all probability the Minister for Foreign Affairs would wish to study the paper and to consider the question in all its bearings before making a definite reply. M. Briand assented, but said that he would like to make one general observation at once.

3. It was quite true, he remarked, that, in the view of the French Government, Italy, by not acceding, had simply broken the engagement made with France in 1912. Such had been their practice in relation to some other questions. But he begged us to remember that the French Government had been made the spokesman of the refusal by the British and French Governments to admit Italy into Tangier on equal terms. In fact, Italy's claim had been met by France with a categorical "No," the British Government, on its part, having insisted that it would be dangerous to admit Italian participation in any form. Therefore, if a partial reversal of this policy is to be undertaken, it would place him in an uncomfortable position if it were believed that French objections had been withdrawn at the instigation of another of the Powers interested in Tangier. I was to understand that in principle he was by no means unfavourable to some such modifications of the statute as I had mentioned, but if anything is going to be done he would probably ask that the initiative should principally with him, as the Italians probably hold France mainly responsible for their original exclusion.

4. Of course, I made no comment on this forecast of the attitude which M. Briand will probably take in his reply, but I venture to hope that if he agrees to the general line of action foreshadowed in the despatch it will be found possible to let him make the first move. Even from the purely British standpoint, it seems to me more important

that an admission of Italy's interest in this business should appear to be made by France in the first instance than that we should acquire some further credit at Rome at the expense of the Quai d'Orsay.

I have, &c.

CREWE.

[W 11786/18/28]

No. 102.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 2761.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the Tangier statute.

Paris, December 23, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 102.

Aide-mémoire.

L'AIDE-MÉMOIRE relatif à la question de Tanger qui a été remis le 18 décembre par son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique à M. Briand a retenu toute l'attention du Gouvernement de la République.

Ce document, partant de l'idée qu'il y a un intérêt majeur à trouver le moyen d'obtenir l'adhésion de l'Italie au statut de Tanger, propose, à cet effet, l'adoption d'une procédure suggérée par Mr. Clive, consul général britannique à Tanger, consistant à saisir le prétexte d'améliorations à apporter au statut pour réunir une conférence à laquelle les États qui n'ont pas accepté cet acte international seraient conviés à participer. Mr. Clive pense qu'on fournirait ainsi une satisfaction d'amour-propre au Gouvernement italien qui pourrait faire valoir aux yeux de son opinion que c'est sa participation qui a permis d'obtenir un statut viable.

Cette proposition appelle tout d'abord les observations suivantes :

La constatation faite par le Gouvernement britannique que le statut, après six mois de pratique, s'est révélé viable et a même dépassé les espérances qu'on fondait sur lui, enlève beaucoup de sa valeur à l'argumentation suivant laquelle, d'après Mr. Clive, le statut ne pourrait subsister si l'adhésion de l'Italie continuait de faire défaut.

D'autre part, se fondant sur cette considération, Mr. Clive estime que l'échec du statut aurait pour conséquence de rouvrir la question de Tanger. Cette observation n'est pas injustifiée, mais il reste à savoir si le moyen suggéré n'aboutirait pas directement et plus vite encore au même résultat.

De l'aveu même du Gouvernement britannique, on peut concevoir à cet égard les plus vives appréhensions. L'aide-mémoire note que le Gouvernement espagnol serait précisément désireux de voir se rouvrir la question de Tanger. Si tel est l'état d'esprit du Gouvernement de Madrid, la révision envisagée lui fournirait une occasion d'autant plus propice qu'il pourrait être tenté de s'entendre avec l'Italie pour obtenir son appui.

Il est vrai que le Foreign Office, pour parer à ces conséquences, propose, au lieu de recourir à une "conférence," de confier le soin d'examiner les modifications projetées à une "commission," composée des représentants à Tangier des Puissances adhérents et non adhérents.

D'autre part, le Foreign Office propose de limiter d'avance le programme de cette réunion à certains articles (gendarmerie, douanes, jeux) et, en outre, de faire des modifications envisagées, l'objet d'un arrangement écrit préalable entre les Gouvernements français, espagnol et anglais, puis entre les autres Puissances représentées à la commission qui se réunirait à Tanger.

Si les modifications en question doivent être arrêtées préalablement entre les trois Puissances qui ont rédigé le statut, cela revient à faire décider par elles seules les modifications projetées, les conversations avec les autres Puissances, puis la réunion de la commission plénière n'étant que de pure forme. On ne voit pas en quoi l'Italie pourrait être par là satisfaite. Au reste, les modifications envisagées par Mr. Clive ne paraissent pas, en tant qu'elles sont connues, avoir un intérêt suffisant pour l'amener à

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modifier son point de vue. Par contre, il paraît bien difficile, quand seront réunis les représentants des Puissances à Tanger, de les empêcher de déborder le programme, et il est à présumer que leurs discussions ne seraient pas moins dangereuses à ce point de vue qu'une "conférence" proprement dite.

Le Gouvernement italien a mis d'ailleurs jusqu'ici à son adhésion des conditions différentes de celles envisagées par Mr. Clive, par exemple, la demande d'obtenir un poste de juge au tribunal mixte en échange de la renonciation au régime capitulaire (demande qui avait rencontré l'opposition britannique).

Le Gouvernement français est prêt à réexaminer cette question, dont il désire garder l'initiative, et à en entretenir les Gouvernements anglais et espagnol, car il est le premier intéressé à ne rien négliger pour resserrer ses rapports amicaux avec l'Italie et en éliminer toute cause de friction.

Toutefois, le Gouvernement français ne saurait oublier l'existence des accords (intervenues en 1900 et 1902 et complétés par l'accord de 1912) entre la France et l'Italie, grâce auxquels la France, moyennant des engagements pour la Tripolitaine qu'elle a intégralement tenus, a obtenu le désintéressement complet de l'Italie au Maroc.

Paris, le 23 décembre 1925.

[W 11678/18/28]

No. 103.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 4248.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 29, 1925.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 2721 of the 13th instant, in which you record a conversation with M. Briand on the subject of Mr. Clive's proposals for inducing the Italian Government to accede to the Tangier Convention.

2. It appears from M. Briand's language that he wholly misunderstands the attitude of His Majesty's Government. They have no desire whatever to gain credit in Rome at the expense of the Quai d'Orsay, and it was for this reason that I instructed you, in my despatch No. 4060, to urge the French Government to join in placing Mr. Clive's proposal before M. Mussolini. If the French Government prefer to take the initiative alone and make a genuine effort to secure the accession of Italy, His Majesty's Government will be only too glad to stand aside. If, on the other hand, the French Government intend to continue to ignore the Italian Government, as they have done for the last few months, His Majesty's Government cannot acquiesce in a policy which they believe will wreck the Tangier Statute, and they will find themselves reluctantly compelled to approach the Italian Government, alone if need be.

3. I request that your Lordship will take an early opportunity of communicating the substance of this despatch to M. Briand, emphasising the fact that His Majesty's Government would positively prefer that the French Government should take the initiative in sounding M. Mussolini, and that they will only act themselves if the French Government refuse to do so.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

(d.) Effect of the Tangier Convention on the System of Protection.

[W 7372/7372/28]

No. 104.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 230.)

Sir,

Tangier, July 24, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a memorandum on the grant of protection to agents of firms having ex-protégés at Tangier justiciable by the Mixed Tribunal and to request a ruling on the two points raised therein.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 104.

Memorandum.

UNDER the Tangier Convention the protection of Tangier natives is abolished. Natives who have hitherto enjoyed protection, however, although they become ex-protégés in Tangier justiciable by the Mixed Tribunals, are still full protégés when they travel in the rest of Morocco. There they come under our consular authorities (although the French authorities still contest this).

2. A British firm, therefore, which had a semsar in Tangier on the 31st May ceased to have him on the 1st June. Can the firm, in virtue of this, claim the right, accorded by the treaty, to hold two semsars in the Shereefian Empire in order to replace the lost semsar by another elsewhere in Morocco? Presumably not, for although technically the firm loses the semsar *quâ* protégé in Tangier, it retains him for the rest of Morocco. If, however, its Tangier ex-semsar be struck off the Tangier ex-protégé list, it would seem permissible to replace him by another semsar outside (but not in) the Tangier zone.

3. Suppose, however, that a firm has no use for its ex-semsar outside Tangier, would it be possible to renounce the right to protect him throughout the Shereefian Empire, although retaining him on the Tangier ex-protégé list, in order to allow of the appointment of a more useful semsar elsewhere in Morocco, who should enjoy protection only in the French and Spanish zones, if necessary, in order to compensate for the privileged, if unprotected, status of the Tangier ex-semsar?

4. Such a step would increase neither the total number of protégés in Morocco nor the maximum number of semsars allowed to any one firm, the Tangier native being no longer a protégé. The argument is specious. It is, however, open to the objections that it runs somewhat counter to His Majesty's Government's admission of the oneness and indivisibility of the Shereefian Empire and also that it can hardly be established as a working principle without French and Spanish concurrence. This last seems at least problematical.

5. A concrete case has raised the above two questions, on which a ruling seems desirable.

No. 105.

[Nil.]

[W 7372/7372/28]

No. 106.

Foreign Office to Mr. Clive (Tangier).

(No. 356.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 8, 1925.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 230 of the 24th ultimo, requesting a ruling on the grant of protection to agents of firms having ex-semsars at Tangier.

2. I agree with the conclusions reached in the memorandum enclosed in your despatch. Protection is valid throughout the Shereefian Empire, and His Majesty's Government hold that a Tangier ex-protégé who is justiciable at Tangier before the Mixed Tribunal is protected in the French and Spanish zones. It follows logically therefore:—

1. That a British firm cannot claim another semsar in the French zone in place of an ex-semsar whose name remains on the Tangier *ex-protégé* list, but that if the ex-semsar's name be struck off the Tangier list he may be replaced by another semsar outside but not within the Tangier zone; and
2. That protection of a Tangier ex-semsar cannot be renounced in the French and Spanish zones while retaining his name on the Tangier list, since owing to the fact that his name is on the list the ex-semsar is automatically protected in the French and Spanish zones.

I am, &c.

G. H. VILLIERS.

[W 8063/2647/28]

No. 107.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 259.)

Sir,

Tangier, August 15, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to refer to recent correspondence on the subject of the interzonal status of protected natives in Morocco, and to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have at length received from the Residence-General at Rabat in reply to mine of the 20th April last.

2. Marshal Lyautey maintains that ex-protégés in Tangier, being no longer justiciable by the consular court in Tangier, are likewise no longer justiciable by those courts in the French zone. This is tantamount to saying that, by renouncing the Capitulations in Tangier, we have also in part renounced them in the French zone. The blow, however, is softened by the "important concession" admitting the Tangier ex-protégés to the French courts in the French zone instead of returning them to the jurisdiction of the native courts.

3. The phrase "à titre exceptionnel" which the marshal emphasises in the fourth paragraph of his note was only introduced in April last after an exchange of correspondence in which it was sought to define the status of the Menebhi family. Its use then was purely unilateral, and we have always contested the principle it involves.

4. The marshal states, in concluding, that the question of the status of Tangier ex-protégés in the French zone is one of academic rather than of practical interest. This is a dangerous argument, calculated to defer any definite agreement on the question at issue, and to leave the French, as the controlling power on the spot, at a distinct advantage. On the contrary, the status of these ex-protégés may become one of immediate practical importance should they visit the French zone. Frenchmen with claims against them might await this opportunity to arraign them before French tribunals in the hope of getting a cheaper and more sympathetic hearing than in the Mixed Court of Tangier. They might themselves abscond from Tangier to the damage of the British firms which employ them and in the hope of evading their obligations by a prolonged stay in the French zone. I referred to this aspect of the case in the fifth paragraph of my despatch No. 77 of the 12th March last. The matter assumes added practical importance when it is realised that one-third of our Tangier ex-semsar list represents the full complement of protected agents which can be held in Morocco by six British firms. It is certain that at some time these firms will require to use their agents in the rest of Morocco where they have no semsars. Moreover, the firm of I. and D. Cohen, for example, has important interests all over Morocco. It consists of two partners, the senior a Tangier ex-protégé, the junior a Tetuan protégé, both of whom are protected by virtue of their trade with an important Manchester firm. If the French contention be accepted, this firm's interests in the French zone, and with them those of its British principals, will be virtually unprotected, or at least only protected to the extent of the junior partner's holding.

5. It is therefore difficult to find any basis of agreement with the marshal's point of view which will not be derogatory to our treaty rights and our commercial interests. I should be glad therefore to receive your instructions whether His Majesty's Government hold to the views expressed in paragraph 2 of your despatch No. 171 of the 3rd April, or whether they are prepared to give way on the point at issue.

6. In conclusion, I would remark on the marshal's somewhat tardy reference to the views of the Quai d'Orsay in the last paragraph of his note. I am not aware, however, of their having yet been expressed in answer to your memorandum of the 25th September last.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Marshal Lyautey to Mr. Clive.

M. le Consul général,

Rabat, le 5 août 1925.

PAR une lettre du 20 avril dernier, vous avez bien voulu me faire connaître que vous aviez consulté votre Gouvernement sur la question du statut, en zones française et espagnole du Maroc, des ex-protégés britanniques de la zone de Tangier. Après examen de la question, votre Gouvernement a estimé qu'un indigène marocain détenteur

d'une carte de protection anglaise devait être considéré comme protégé, non pas seulement dans la zone où la carte a été délivrée, mais encore dans la totalité de l'Empire marocain. En conséquence, les ex-protégés britanniques de Tangier, dans l'opinion du Foreign Office, doivent rester justiciables des tribunaux consulaires britanniques dans les deux autres zones du Maroc aussi longtemps que le Gouvernement britannique n'aura pas abandonné ses droits extra-territoriaux dans lesdites zones.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir qu'après un nouvel examen de la question, il ne me paraît pas possible, à mon grand regret, de me ranger à cette manière de voir. Ainsi qu'il vous l'a été précédemment exposé, l'avis de ma Résidence générale est que les ex-protégés britanniques de la zone de Tangier doivent être, en zone française, justiciables, non pas des tribunaux consulaires britanniques, mais des tribunaux français.

Les ex-protégés britanniques de Tangier ont cessé, en effet, depuis la mise en vigueur du statut, d'être justiciables, dans cette ville, du tribunal consulaire britannique. On ne voit pas, dès lors, pourquoi ils auraient, dans la zone française du Maroc, plus de droits que dans la zone dont ils sont originaires. Je comprendrais les objections du Gouvernement britannique si l'opinion du protectorat était que les ex-protégés britanniques de Tangier doivent être considérés, en zone française, comme justiciables des tribunaux indigènes. Mais tel n'est pas le cas, puisque nous reconnaissons très volontiers que les intéressés, dans notre zone, sont justiciables des tribunaux français. C'est là, de notre part, une importante concession que nous leur faisons et qui les garantit contre tout arbitraire.

Il est vrai que ma Résidence générale a bien voulu accepter qu'à titre exceptionnel les membres de la famille Menebhi fussent considérés, en zone française, comme des protégés et non comme des ex-protégés britanniques et ressortissent, en cette qualité, aux tribunaux consulaires britanniques, au lieu d'être justiciables des tribunaux français. Mais je me permets d'appeler votre attention sur l'expression "à titre exceptionnel" qui a accompagné cette concession. Elle indique que, dans l'esprit de ma Résidence générale, cette faveur était réservée aux seuls membres de la famille Menebhi et ne pouvait être étendue à d'autres ex-protégés britanniques de la zone de Tangier.

Le protectorat a tenu très largement vis-à-vis de Menebhi et de ses fils les promesses que les plénipotentiaires français avaient faites, à la Conférence de Paris, en faveur de cette famille. Il est même allé au delà de ces promesses, puisque celles-ci ne visaient que Tangier, alors qu'il a reconnu, aux membres de cette famille, la qualité de protégés et non d'ex-protégés en zone française.

Je veux espérer que, dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement britannique n'insistera pas dans ses prétentions en ce qui concerne le statut, en zone française, des autres ex-protégés britanniques de la zone de Tangier. Il ne vous échappera pas; d'ailleurs, que la question de savoir à quelle juridiction ressortissent, en zone française, ces ex-protégés est d'ordre plus théorique que pratique. Il semble que ce soit là une raison de plus pour le Gouvernement britannique de se ranger à la manière de voir de ma Résidence générale—qui est aussi celle du Gouvernement français—surtout après la manière très libérale dont elle a accepté de régler le cas de Menebhi et de sa famille.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

LYAUTEY.

[W 8396/7372/28]

No. 108.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 271.)

Sir,

Tangier, August 24, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 356 of the 8th instant, in which you repeat the view of His Majesty's Government that protection is valid throughout the Shereefian Empire, and that a Tangier ex-protégé who is justiciable at Tangier before the Mixed Tribunal is protected in the French and Spanish zones.

2. While this gives the answer to the enquiry in paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 259 of the 15th instant, I think it advisable to await a specific reply to that despatch in view of the fact the question at issue is one which has already been treated with the French Government, and that you may prefer to continue to treat it in Paris rather than that I should with Rabat.

3. While on the subject of the interzonal status of protégés, I would venture to remind you that no method has yet been established of notifying to the Tangier Administration the names of our protégés in the French and Spanish zones. Some arrangement with the French and Spanish Governments seems to be called for if we are to ensure that the Mixed Tribunal, and not the Mendoub, is to deal with these protégés when they visit Tangier.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[W 8063/2647/28]

No. 109.

Foreign Office to Mr. Clive (Tangier), No. 403, and to Consul-General Sir A. Ryan (Rabat), No. 67, mutatis mutandis.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 4, 1925.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 259 of the 15th ultimo on the subject of the status of British-protected natives in the various zones of Morocco.

2. His Majesty's Government adhere to the view that protection is valid throughout the Shereefian Empire and that a protégé resident at Tangier, who since the entry into force of the Tangier Convention is justiciable before the Mixed Tribunal, retains the rights of a protected person in the French and Spanish zones. No reply has yet been received from the French Government to the memorandum on the subject enclosed in Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's despatch to Lord Crewe No. 3030 of the 25th September last, but it appears from Marshal Lyautey's note that the Quai d'Orsay endorse the view of the French protectorate authorities. The legal aspect of the question is discussed in the enclosed memorandum,* and the conclusion is reached that His Majesty's Government are fully justified in maintaining their attitude.

3. Before raising the question once more with the French Government, it will be well to consider it purely from the point of view of expediency. In doing so regard must be paid to the interests of British trade as a whole rather than of individual semsars, however deserving of sympathy they may be.

4. It follows from the British thesis that a British firm is not entitled to replace a semsar now resident at Tangier by a semsar resident in the French or Spanish zones, for the reason that the former is held still to enjoy protection in the French and Spanish zones. Conversely, if the French thesis were admitted a British firm would be entitled to do so, and it appears from Mr. Irwin's letter of the 18th August, of which an extract is enclosed,* that the French authorities are ready to admit this. In the circumstances, it is open to question whether it would not be advantageous to agree to the French thesis. There appears to be some truth in the French contention that British interests will not materially gain if British ex-protégés at Tangier are maintained under the jurisdiction of the British consular court in the French zone. The only occasions on which they would be so justiciable are those in which they are (1) defendants, or (2) plaintiffs in a suit against a British subject or a British protégé. Neither of these eventualities is likely to arise frequently, and when they do arise British trade will probably not be affected. On the other hand, it might well be to the advantage of British firms if they could replace their semsars at Tangier by semsars in the French zone. The semsars at Tangier are definitely on the list of persons justiciable before the Mixed Court, and they no longer have the same inducement to advance the trade of the British firm whose agent they are. It is possible that British firms in the French zone might be able to open new agencies by being in a position to offer British protection, and they would presumably welcome an arrangement whereby they could add considerably to the list of semsars outside the Tangier zone, whilst retaining the services at Tangier of persons bound to them by ties of sentiment and force of habit.

5. Before deciding whether these considerations would justify a surrender to the French Government, the Secretary of State will be glad to have your observations. Before submitting them you will doubtless obtain the views of local British traders.

I am, &c.
G. H. VILLIERS.

* Not printed.

[W 8396/7372/28]

No. 110.

Foreign Office to Acting Consul-General Bond (Tangier).

(No. 423.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 24, 1925.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Clive's despatch No. 271 of the 24th ultimo, in which he pointed out the desirability of notifying to the Tangier Administration the names of British protégés in the French and Spanish zones, and of taking steps to ensure that these persons shall be justiciable at Tangier by the Mixed Tribunal.

2. In coming to a decision on the subject, the Secretary of State is somewhat hampered by his ignorance of the views and intentions of the other Governments concerned. So far as is known, the French Government adhere to their original view, namely, that, as the Shereefian Government are not a party to the grant of protection in the Spanish zone, protégés resident in that zone are not justiciable in Tangier before the Mixed Tribunal. They are, however, ready to agree that persons justiciable before the Mixed Tribunal at Tangier may be justiciable in the French zone before the French courts, and *vice versa*. In practice, this will mean that a French ex-protégé from the Tangier zone will be justiciable in the French zone before the French courts, whereas a French ex-protégé from the Spanish zone will be justiciable before the native courts. It seems difficult to believe that the French Government have considered this point and that they really contemplate putting into force so illogical an arrangement.

3. His Majesty's Government have not yet raised the question with the Spanish Government, and it is possible that the problem has not yet been brought to their notice. So long as the French Government refuse to recognise protection granted in the Spanish zone, the Spanish Government are unlikely to agree to recognise protection granted in the French zone. On the other hand, if they follow the lead of the French Government, they will have to commit themselves also to supporting an indefensible and illogical system. The Netherlands Government are believed to have made a special agreement with the French Government under which a list will be drawn up of Netherlands protégés in the Spanish zone, who will be justiciable before the Mixed Tribunal at Tangier. The details of the agreement have not been communicated to His Majesty's Government, nor is it known whether it has yet been put into force. The Belgian Government have apparently not considered the question, or, if they have, they have given no indication of their views.

4. The Secretary of State will be glad if you will obtain such information as you can locally to clear the obscurity enshrouding the attitude of the various Governments. Subject, however, to any observations which you may offer, he believes that the best course will probably be to notify to the Tangier Administration the names of the British protégés in the French and Spanish zones, and to assume that both categories will be regarded as justiciable before the Mixed Tribunal. Should the French Government demur, the case will have to be fought and, if necessary, taken to arbitration under article 54 of the Tangier Convention.

I am, &c.
G. H. VILLIERS.

[W 9732/2647/28]

No. 111.

Consul-General Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 64.)

Sir,

Rabat, October 2, 1925.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 67 of the 4th September, I have the honour to report as follows on the question of the status in the French zone of persons who have hitherto enjoyed British protection at Tangier in virtue of semsarship:—

2. I discussed the question with the committee of the British Chamber of Commerce for the French zone on the 24th September. In order to prepare the ground, I had previously sent to the committee a confidential memorandum explaining the problem and stating the grounds on which His Majesty's Government, though confident of the soundness of their legal position, might possibly find it expedient to accept the French view. At the meeting, I completed this memorandum by reading paragraph 4 of Mr. Clive's despatch to you, No. 259 of the

[13955]

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15th August, which sums up certain arguments in favour of maintaining on practical grounds the contention that the Tangier ex-semsars involved continue to be entitled to protection in the French and Spanish zones.

3. The committee had at first some difficulty in apprehending the question in all its aspects. After we had cleared up various points, however, they expressed the provisional opinion that the balance of advantage lay in favour of continuing the protection of Tangier ex-semsars in this zone. They thought that a British firm which had worked up its connection in Morocco generally through semsars at Tangier would lose more by seeing those semsars deprived of protection in the French zone than they would gain by exchanging this position for freedom to appoint fresh semsars in the zone. At the same time, the committee felt that the question was one which concerned people in England and Tangier more closely than it concerned members of their own chamber, and they were unwilling to express a final view without consulting merchants at home and exchanging views with the sister chamber of commerce at Tangier. I said that there could be no objection to this, provided that due discretion were observed and that they formulated their final opinion within a reasonable period.

4. My personal view is that, so far as British interests in the French zone are concerned, the question is of little real importance either way. Trade with this zone is, in the main, conducted independently of Tangier. On a balance of advantages, however, I share the view provisionally expressed by the committee of the chamber of commerce at Casablanca. In so far as any firms in England have hitherto relied on semsars at Tangier in connection with business in this zone, I consider that it is more to their advantage that those semsars should retain protection in French Morocco than that the firms should be able to appoint local semsars in their place. I am strengthened in this view by the consideration that, if the Capitulations are doomed to disappear in the French zone in the course of a short term of years, it would hardly be worth the firm's while to work up new semsar connections. Further, if His Majesty's Government successfully assert their legal position, the Tangier semsar is a bird in the hand, while the new semsar is a bird in the bush. The French may be willing to admit in principle that a firm may have its full complement of two semsars in the French zone (or, rather, in the French and Spanish zones together), regardless of its ex-semsars in Tangier, but in practice the appointment of each new semsar has to be submitted for the approval of the authorities here. I cannot say that those authorities behave otherwise than correctly in the matter, but they scrutinise all new applications closely, and, while His Majesty's Government claim in principle the right to override objections, except such as are founded on the last paragraph of article 5 of the Madrid Convention, it is contrary to their policy to enforce this right.

5. I also share the view of the committee that this question concerns British merchants established in the French zone very little, and that it falls to be decided rather in the light of interests at home and in Tangier. There is not a single instance of a British firm in the French zone having a semsar at Tangier, so that no British merchant here is directly affected. The fundamental question appears to me to be whether in fact merchants at home or in Tangier do to any extent use their Tangier semsars in connection with business in the French zone. Only one such case is within my personal knowledge, viz., that of the semsar firm of I. and D. Cohen, mentioned in Mr. Clive's despatch No. 259 of the 15th August. This firm does, I understand, an important business in various places in the French zone, including Casablanca, Oudjda, and probably Fez. As it deals in cotton goods, the protection enjoyed by it is presumably of value not only to the partners themselves, but to their principals in England.

6. An analysis of the Tangier list of semsars tends, in my opinion, to confirm the above views both as to the relative unimportance of the question so far as interests in the French zone are concerned, and as to the balance of advantage in favour of maintaining the legal position. There are on the Tangier list thirty-four persons deriving their status from twenty-eight British firms. Of those twenty-eight firms, eleven are established in Tangier, seventeen in England. Of the eleven Tangier firms, two have each hitherto had their total allowance of two semsars in the Tangier zone itself; eight have had one semsar each in the Tangier zone and none elsewhere; one has had one semsar at Tangier and one in the French zone. (I may mention in parenthesis that no British firm in Tangier has two semsars in the French zone except for the peculiar case of Messrs. Harrison and Crosfield (Limited), who have two semsars in the French zone in respect of their Tangier house, while they have had

two in Tangier in respect of their house in England.) Of the seventeen firms in England, four have had two semsars each in the Tangier zone; nine have had one semsar each in the Tangier zone and none elsewhere; one has had one semsar in the Tangier zone and one in the Spanish zone; three have had one semsar each in the Tangier and French zones.

7. From this analysis it appears that, of the twenty-eight British firms, six have had their full allowance of semsars in the Tangier zone; no less than seventeen have been content to have only one semsar each at Tangier, and have not apparently thought it worth while to exercise their right of appointing another either there or elsewhere in Morocco; and only four have distributed their semsars between the Tangier and French zones. The conclusion would appear to be (a) that four firms established in Tangier or doing business with Tangier are sufficiently interested in business in the French zone to need semsars here, and (b) that the majority either do no business with the French zone or they do it through Tangier semsars, or they do it without the assistance of semsars.

8. On one point I am not very clear. I gather that, notwithstanding the words "leur vie durant" in article 13 of the Tangier Convention, the lists of persons justiciable in the Mixed Court as being ex-protégés will not be final, and that a firm at home which no longer wishes to maintain its connection with an ex-semsar can have him struck off these lists. If this be so, it seems to be a further argument against accepting the French view on the ground indicated in your despatch under reference, for individual firms which saw a strong advantage in having in future a semsar or semsars in the French zone might at any time ask to have one of two persons struck off the Tangier lists. They would, of course, risk estranging the ex-semsar, but in any quarrel with him they could still sue him in the Mixed Court.

9. It is difficult to discuss this question without overlaying the main issue with a mass of details. I trust, however, that my general conclusions emerge sufficiently from what I have written. So far as I attach importance to the question at all, those general conclusions support rather the view expressed by Mr. Clive in his despatch No. 259 of the 15th August than the view suggested in your despatch under reference. His Majesty's consul at Casablanca and His Majesty's vice-consul at Fez, whom I have consulted, both incline in the same direction.

10. I must, however, qualify my conclusions to some extent by adding five considerations with which I will conclude. They are these:—

- (a.) I venture to think that, unless Tangier ex-semsars are very mobile and the Mixed Court somewhat impotent, the danger of the former being attacked in the French zone or absconding to the French zone is not so great that it should weigh greatly in the balance.
- (b.) The Tangier ex-semsar who has a claim against a native in the French zone would presumably gain one advantage if the French view were accepted, namely, that he could seek redress in the French courts, and not in the native courts. This is, of course, a particular application of one of the very few non-political reasons in favour of agreeing to the suppression of the Capitulations.
- (c.) It seems very improbable that the Rabat authorities will depart from the attitude taken up in Marshal Lyautey's note to Mr. Clive, unless His Majesty's Government can induce the French Government to overrule them. There is therefore a strong likelihood of the question dragging on indefinitely until it merges in the general question of the Capitulations, and in the meanwhile the French authorities will have the upper hand wherever a particular case gives rise to dispute in the French zone.
- (d.) Arising out of (c), it occurs to me that there may be a different argument of expediency in favour of yielding to the French view at a suitable moment. There is another controversy under article 13 of the statute regarding the justiciability in the Mixed Court of the families of persons affected by that article. It is just possible that, if the two questions were combined, the French might be ready to yield to us on the question of families in return for a counter-concession regarding the right of Tangier semsars to protection in the French zone.
- (e.) As I have stated already, His Majesty's vice-consul at Fez is opposed to the suggested acceptance of the French view. In discussing, however, the particular case of I. and D. Cohen, which may prove to be much the most important individual case, he suggests that this firm would not necessarily suffer greatly from a discontinuance of the protection hitherto

enjoyed by the Tangier partner. They could to some extent safeguard themselves by vesting their property in the French zone in the Tetuan partner, who will, in any case, continue to enjoy protection. Colonel Mackereth further thinks that the Cohen firm are powerful enough and sufficiently well acquainted with the means of obtaining what they want in this country to make them more or less independent of foreign protection.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the acting consul-general at Tangier.
I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[W 10389/7372/28]

No. 112.

Acting Consul-General Bond to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 314.)

Sir,

Tangier, October 27, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 423 of the 24th ultimo, in which you instructed me to obtain local information regarding the attitude adopted by the various Governments towards the question of notifying to the Tangier Administration the names of their protégés and ex-protégés in the rest of Morocco.

2. From enquiries which I have caused to be made it appears that none of the Governments concerned has yet taken any definite steps in the matter. When the French and Spanish Governments abandoned capitulations in each other's zones, lists of "ex-protégés" purporting to be definitive were drawn up, but I understand that complete agreement has not yet been reached. Neither of these lists has yet been communicated by the Government concerned to the Tangier Administration. The present attitude of the local French consulate-general is that such communication is unnecessary. The Spanish consulate-general, on the other hand, considers that it is necessary to transmit to the Mendoub, for communication to the Mixed Tribunal, the list of Spanish ex-protégés in the French zone, on which I believe almost complete agreement exists.

3. In so far as the points raised in paragraph 2 of your despatch under reply is concerned, I can find no suggestion locally that as the Shereefian Government are not a party to the grant of protection in the Spanish zone, protégés (and ex-protégés) resident in that zone are not justiciable in Tangier before the Mixed Tribunal. I would not, however, go so far as to suggest that the French Government will accept, for the purposes of establishing this justiciability, a unilateral list of such persons. They may rather argue that their own Spanish zone list is not unilateral in that it has the approval of the Shereefian Government (seeking to ignore the fact that it lacks the approval of the Khalifian Government), and in insisting on the drawing up of all such Spanish zone lists in agreement with the Rabat authorities they may quote their arrangement with the Netherlands Government as a precedent.

4. This arrangement, which was the price of Dutch adhesion to the Statute, provided for the establishment of an agreed list of Dutch protégés in the Spanish zone, these protégés to be justiciable in Tangier before the Mixed Tribunal. Their names were examined by M. Rageot, of the French Protectorate Administration, in conjunction with the Dutch consulate-general, and were approved with one exception, to whose exclusion the Dutch agreed. The list was then communicated by the residency-general at Rabat to the Mendoub, but has not been transmitted by the latter to the Mixed Tribunal.

5. The Belgian Government have so far not gone further than to obtain from the French Protectorate Administration the assurance that Belgian Tangier ex-protégés are justiciable in the French zone before the French tribunals. Their consulate-general here supposes that the opposite will also apply, and is considering the communication of their French and Spanish zone ex-protégés lists to the Mendoub for transmission to the Mixed Tribunal. I am informed this procedure will be submitted to the Belgian Government for approval.

6. I entirely concur with your suggestion that the best course for us to pursue will be to notify to the Tangier Administration—and I would submit that the Mendoub is the proper authority—the names of British protégés in the French and Spanish

zones. I would suggest that this be done forthwith; with the request that the names be communicated to the Mixed Tribunal, and the intimation that it is proposed to transmit these lists at the beginning of each year, alterations occurring during the course of the year being similarly notified as they occur. The Mendoub's "contrôleur" has expressed himself as satisfied with this procedure, but in discussing it with him no mention was made of the acceptance or otherwise of our lists as they stand. The names on our French zone list will presumably already have been approved at Rabat, unless semsar certificates have been issued in the face of invalid objections by the Makhzen. Little difficulty is to be anticipated, therefore, in the acceptance of that list. It is likely, however, that the Shereefian authorities will wish to examine our Spanish zone list, which will presumably be that of all persons to whom we have issued protection certificates, whether with the approval of the Khalifian Makhzen or not. It is most unlikely, however, that they will consult the Spanish zone authorities on the subject.

7. In view of the fact that the foregoing observations appear to be in harmony with the views of His Majesty's Government, I presume that you will wish me to proceed on the lines indicated in paragraph 4 of your despatch under reply.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[W 10389/7372/28]

No. 113.

Foreign Office to Acting Consul-General Bond (Tangier).

(No. 469.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 11, 1925.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 314 of the 27th ultimo regarding the notification to the Tangier Administration by the various Governments concerned of the names of their protégés and ex-protégés in the other zones of Morocco.

2. The Secretary of State concurs in your proposal to notify to the Mendoub the names of British protégés in the French and Spanish zones, and to intimate at the same time that arrangements will be made to forward these lists at the beginning of each year, and to notify, as they occur, any alterations which may be made during the year.

I am, &c.

G. H. VILLIERS.

[W 11596/2647/28]

No. 114.

Mr. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 340.)

Sir,

Tangier, December 11, 1925.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 403 of the 4th September last on the subject of the future status in the other zones of Morocco of natives who enjoyed British protection in the Tangier zone prior to the introduction of the statute, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter containing the views of the local British Chamber of Commerce.

2. You will observe that, although the possible expediency of accepting the French view had been carefully explained to them, the Chamber are unanimously of opinion that the natives in question should remain within the jurisdiction of the British consular courts in the other zones. They therefore consider that His Majesty's Government should maintain their attitude and insist on the rights which, in view of the conclusion reached in the legal memorandum contained in your despatch under reference, seem properly to be theirs.

3. I gather from Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 64 of the 2nd October, of which he was good enough to send me a copy, that, although the British Chamber of Commerce for the French zone had not yet expressed a definite opinion on the subject, they were inclined to share this view. It would therefore appear that the opinion of the British commercial community in Morocco is unequivocal.

4. I also have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in the form of a memorandum by Mr. Hope-Gill, the results of a further examination into the French and British points of view. If the reasoning employed is sound, the two theses will be

seen in their practical results to be more closely allied than might have been supposed, although they differ radically in principle. From the point of view of expediency in the interests of British trade as a whole, I am inclined to think that we should maintain our attitude and endeavour to secure French agreement. I would not, however, support this view against the contrary opinion of such a body as the British Merchants' Morocco Association, whose members hold twenty-one out of the thirty-three semsars now remaining on the Tangier list.

5. It has occurred to me that it might be possible to reach an agreement with the French on the basis of the British thesis by means of personal conversation with M. Rageot, and I would propose, if you agree, that Mr. Hope-Gill should be authorised to pay a visit to Rabat for this purpose some time in the near future. Considerable misapprehension may exist in Rabat on the scope of the British contention, which an explanation on the lines of the enclosed memorandum might correct. When they realise that few, if any, British firms will be in a position to obtain new semsars or retain those they now hold, and that such natives as are still protected in a year's time will probably figure on the Tetuan list, the French protectorate authorities may be ready to modify their attitude.

6. Even should they maintain it, I see no reason why we should not maintain ours and allow our thesis to work itself out to its logical results. We may conceivably then be in a stronger position to enforce our views, and shall have had the advantage of upholding all the rights which British commerce can legally claim under the treaties as modified by the Tangier Statute. In the meanwhile, the occasions on which the French will be able to exercise jurisdiction over any of the natives concerned are likely to be few. In this connection it is of interest to note that on two recent occasions, in response to a request from this consulate-general "de bien vouloir délivrer au porteur, un tel, ex-protégé britannique sous l'article 13 du statut, le document requis pour faciliter son voyage en zone française," my French colleague has issued French Republic passports valid for one year, and inscribed: "Protégé britannique—le présent passeport a été délivré sur la demande du consul général de Grande-Bretagne—bon pour le Maroc." The request followed on the refusal of the Mendoub to issue a Moroccan passport, but I am unable to say whether my French colleague's action is due to definite authorisation from Rabat or to ignorance of the points at issue.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 114.

British Chamber of Commerce for Morocco to Mr. Clive.

Sir,

Tangier, October 21, 1925.

REGARDING your letter of the 15th September last, referring to the status of semsars in the Tangier zone, I am directed to state that, after giving this matter their careful consideration, the committee have unanimously expressed themselves to be of the following opinion:—

"That though a British semsar automatically becomes justiciable before the Mixed Tribunal of the International Zone he should not *ipso facto* lose his status as a British protected subject, and should therefore remain amenable to the British consular courts both in the French and Spanish zones.

"Further, that any surrendering of our extra-territorial rights, more especially at the present moment, is to be deprecated, even if such surrendering of rights is more a matter of principle than of reality."

I have, &c.
R. W. B. BECKETT, Secretary.

Memorandum by Mr. Hope-Gill.

Article 13 of the Tangier Convention reads:—

"As a result of the establishment at Tangier of the Mixed Court, as provided in article 48, the Capitulations shall be abrogated in the zone. This abrogation shall entail the suppression of the system of protection.

"Moroccan subjects whose rights to protection shall have been previously recognised shall be personally, and during their lifetime, justiciable before the Mixed Court of Tangier.

"The existing lists of protected persons shall be revised, within a period not exceeding six months from the date of the entry into force of the present convention, by agreement between a representative of the Shereefian Government and the consulate concerned."

His Majesty's Government hold that these persons are still to be considered as full protégés except in Tangier. The French view is that their protection has entirely disappeared.

2. Two main interpretations may be placed upon the text:—

- (a.) No native domiciled in Tangier may in future enjoy protection anywhere in Morocco.
- (b.) While in Tangier no native may in future enjoy protection.

3. The first interpretation depends in part on the view that, although protection, when granted, is valid throughout the Shereefian Empire, it may nevertheless be considered as local in its origin. The effect of this interpretation so far as the point at issue is concerned would clearly be that all protégés, natives of Tangier, would lose their protection and would be within the jurisdiction of the native courts in the other zones. The second interpretation rests on the conception of protection as springing from the Sultan and as being in origin entirely independent of place. Its effect would be to leave unaffected the whole question of the grant, renewal and exercise of protection in Morocco, although no rights or privileges would be conferred on the protégé so long as he was in Tangier.

4. The French Government appear to have adopted the former interpretation. In any case they support that part of it which is essential to the discussion of the point at issue, namely, that no natives of Tangier shall hold protection. Nevertheless, as a special concession they agree that Tangier ex-protégés may be within the jurisdiction of the French courts in the French zone and not within that of the native courts. His Majesty's Government seem on the whole to hold the second view. The memorandum on the legal aspect of the case contained in Foreign Office despatch to Tangier No. 403 of the 4th September appears, however, to suggest that the effect of the suppression of the system of protection is still less than the second interpretation would entail and that it consists solely in the substitution in Tangier of the Mixed Court for the consular court as the judicial authority competent to deal with protégés. This presumably would allow them to enjoy the other privileges of protection even in Tangier itself. Furthermore, it might be deduced from Foreign Office despatch to Tangier No. 356 of the 8th August last that His Majesty's Government claim full and semi-permanent protection in the other zones for those natives whose names are included in the lists of Tangier protégés. At the same time, they would appear to hold that names may be removed from this list at will.

5. It seems incontestable, however, that (1) for all purposes within Tangier these natives have the lifelong privileged status of justiciability before the Mixed Court of which they cannot be deprived, but that (2) for all purposes of protection elsewhere in Morocco they must conform to the existing rules governing its annual renewal. The Tangier Statute contains nothing to suggest that these rules have been changed outside the Tangier zone.

6. Furthermore, it must logically follow from the British thesis that there is no obstacle against the appointment of new protégés among the natives of Tangier, although they would not, of course, enjoy the privileges of protection in Tangier. The lists of protégés in Morocco are subject to annual revision and communication to the Makhzen, and it is understood that the protection of any native who would not be qualified to receive an original grant of protection should not be renewed. Unless it be held, therefore, that new appointments of protégés may be made among natives of Tangier, it would be impossible to claim a right to continue the protection of existing protégés after the end of the first year.

7. With regard to the existing treaty requirements for the grant or renewal of protection, it does not seem possible to argue in face of article 13 that figures of trade done in Tangier should be taken into account or of trade done through the Tangier customs, unless there is satisfactory proof that the goods passed into one of the other zones. This is a point of considerable importance.

"m'sail" et la version espagnole le mot "asunto," qui correspondent tous deux au sens de "question" et non à celui "d'affaires commerciales ou industrielles."

En réalité, la difficulté vient de ce que l'article 26 ne donne pas seulement au Comité de Contrôle la faculté, mais lui impose aussi l'obligation d'annuler toutes délibérations irrégulières, sans distinction, tandis que la loi municipale française du 5 avril 1884, à laquelle paraît avoir été emprunté cet article, distinguait dans ses articles 63 et 64 :

1. Les délibérations prises en violation de la loi et celles portant sur un objet étranger aux attributions du conseil municipal, qui étaient déclarées nulles de plein droit ;
2. Les délibérations auxquelles auraient pris part des membres du conseil municipal intéressés personnellement ou comme mandataires à l'affaire qui en fait l'objet. Ces dernières délibérations étaient simplement annulables après examen des circonstances de fait (importance des intérêts en cause— influence probable de l'intervention du membre intéressé sur l'issue de la délibération).

Enclosure 2 in No. 115.

*Extract from Minutes of Thirty-Second Meeting of the Committee of Control,
October 17, 1925.*

M. ALBERGE, administrateur de la zone, spécialement convoqué par le comité, expose, à la demande du président, sa manière de voir en ce qui concerne les cas d'annulation de délibérations de l'Assemblée législative en vertu des articles 23 et 26 du Dahir organique.

Après l'exposé de M. Alberge, le Comité de Contrôle constate qu'en annulant la délibération de l'Assemblée relative au règlement des poursuites, il a appliqué strictement les dispositions insérées dans le statut.

Mais, considérant les difficultés qu'entraînerait l'annulation systématique d'un grand nombre de délibérations de l'Assemblée— de celles notamment concernant tout règlement fiscal—le comité décide de demander aux Gouvernements intéressés une atténuation des termes de l'article 26 du Dahir organique et la faculté pour le Comité de Contrôle d'apprécier les cas de nullité des délibérations de l'Assemblée. Les membres du Comité de Contrôle se proposent de communiquer en même temps à leurs Gouvernements les observations contenues dans une note de M. Alberge ci-annexée.

Enclosure 3 in No. 115.

Loi municipale française du 5 Avril 1884.

63. SONT nulles de plein droit :

- (1.) Les délibérations d'un conseil municipal portant sur un objet étranger à ses attributions ou prises hors de sa réunion légale ;
- (2.) Les délibérations prises en violation d'une loi ou d'un règlement d'administration publique.

64. Sont annulables les délibérations auxquelles auraient pris part des membres du conseil intéressés, soit en leur nom personnel, soit comme mandataires, à l'affaire qui en a fait l'objet.

[W 11090/18/28]

No. 116.

Foreign Office to Mr. Clive (Tangier).

(No. 497.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 7, 1925.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Bond's despatch No. 319 of the 3rd ultimo on the subject of the difference which has arisen in regard to the interpretation of articles 23 and 26 of the Shereefian dahir embodied in the Tangier Convention.

2. The Secretary of State concurs in the interpretation given by Sir Basil Scott to the passage in dispute. It was foreseen by the signatories of the convention that the Assembly would be composed largely of men with considerable commercial and financial interests in Tangier, and it was their intention to ensure that no member of the Assembly should discuss or vote on a business question in which he was personally interested, such, for example, as the allocation of a public contract. M. Saurin's interpretation is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole statute, and obviously cannot be admitted.

3. As regards the proposal that the Committee of Control should be given discretion in the exercise of the right of veto, Sir A. Chamberlain is not persuaded that any modification of the statute in this respect is desirable. It is important to ensure that members of the Assembly shall not use their position to further their private interests. The knowledge that a violation of the rule inevitably involves the annulment of the proceedings should act as a valuable deterrent, and it seems preferable to adhere to the existing rigid arrangement rather than to adopt one which might lead to irregularities and even lay the Committee of Control open to charges of unfair discrimination. The Committee of Control already have discretion to decide whether or not the last paragraph of article 23 has been infringed, and this should be sufficient to enable them to steer clear of the difficulties to which M. Alberge draws attention.

4. His Majesty's representatives at Paris, Madrid, Brussels and The Hague are being instructed to communicate the substance of this despatch to the Governments to which they are accredited.

I am, &c.

C. W. ORDE.

[W 11090/18/28]

No. 117.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris), and to Mr Gurney (Madrid), No. 636; Sir G. Grahame (Brussels), No. 1566, and Sir C. Marling (The Hague), No. 564.

(No. 4037.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 7, 1925.

I TRANSMIT herewith a copy of correspondence with the acting British consul-general at Tangier on the subject of a difference which has arisen in regard to the interpretation of articles 23 and 26 of the Shereefian dahir embodied in the Tangier Convention.

2. I request that you will communicate to the French (Spanish/Belgian/Netherlands) Government, for their information, the substance of the instructions given to Mr. Clive.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

(f.) Miscellaneous.

[W 7050/18/28]

No. 118.

Mr. Clive to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 220.)

Sir,

Tangier, July 17, 1925.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 91, H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth," which arrived here on the 14th July, left for Gibraltar last night after a most successful visit.

2. The opinion seems to be generally held here, both among the foreign colonies and among the Moors, that the visit was arranged for some political purpose. In the light of the recently published views of His Majesty's Government with regard to the present situation here, it is thought that this purpose can only have been to make a gesture indicative of the interest taken by His Majesty's Government in Tangier, and of their determination to uphold the existing order of things, and, above all, not to accede to any change of policy which might embroil the zone in war with the Riff.

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The fact that this opinion is widely held among the natives has just been confirmed to me by the French consul-general.

3. It might be difficult to find concrete evidence on which the opinion could be based, but it is true that in the various ceremonies held in connection with the visit the changes brought about by the convention were in some way emphasised. On the 14th July I gave an official dinner party for the commander-in-chief. To this dinner were invited Rear-Admiral Stapleton-Cotton and a number of officers from the ship, the leading British officials and residents, including Sid-el-Menebbhi, G.C.M.G., and beyond them the Mendoub and the members of the Committee of Control. Apart from reasons of space, which would have necessitated my reducing the number of officers if I had invited all the foreign representatives, there is always on such occasions the difficulty of official precedence, and I saw no reason why the chief places should be given to the diplomatic agents of Portugal, Italy and the United States of America. The latter were, however, invited to a reception in this consulate-general on the 15th July, and to a reception given yesterday on the "Queen Elizabeth." To a luncheon given on board by the commander-in-chief, apart from British subjects, only the Mendoub was invited. His Excellency, who accepted the invitation, was treated with the fullest ceremony. The commander-in-chief's private barge, flying the Shereefian flag in the bows, awaited him at the jetty. A guard of honour was drawn up for him on his boarding and leaving the ship. On his departure he was given a salute of seventeen guns, a number fixed by a precedent already established here. His Excellency was much impressed and delighted by the ceremony and entertainment provided for him, and it is possible that the special attention paid to him may have been the subject of remark. But whatever the grounds for the impression that the visit was prompted by political motives, I am of the opinion that it can only have a salutary effect. Moreover, quite apart from these special political considerations, it is unquestionable that from the point of view of general propaganda the visit of H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth" was an unqualified success. A warship of her size had never before lain in Tangier Bay, and she was the object of general admiration, while the smartness of her officers and men naturally made the most favourable impression. The cordiality of the welcome extended to all those who attended the reception on board and the cheerfulness shown by the officers in the monotonous work of conducting parties over the ship and politely answering foolish questions were much appreciated. Finally, the success of the visit was in no small measure due to the personal charm and courtesy of Sir Roger Keyes himself and of Lady Keyes, who assisted the commander-in-chief in receiving the guests on board.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[W 1:354/18/28]

No. 119.

Mr. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 332.)

Sir,

Tangier, December 2, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that, after four months' service on patrol duty in Tangier waters, the four destroyers detailed from the Mediterranean Fleet are returning to Malta, and will be replaced as from the 7th instant by two other destroyers. Commander Abbay, of H.M.S. "Worcester," who is the senior officer of the four destroyers to be relieved, asked me whether I could give him a memorandum, for the information of the commander-in-chief, of the present position in Tangier and the prospects of a settlement of the Riff war.

2. I have the honour to enclose copy of the memorandum which I have given to Commander Abbay for the confidential information of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes.

3. The second part of the memorandum relating to the Riff war is merely an extract from a private letter to me from Mr. Harris, recording in detail his recent interview with the President of the Spanish Directory, a copy of which I forwarded to Mr. Villiers in a private letter written from Madrid on the 17th November.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Memorandum.

THE present position in Morocco must be considered from two points of view: the Riff war and the Tangier statute. The two questions are to a certain extent interdependent, as it is too much to hope for a completely settled and stable Tangier so long as a state of war exists on the frontier of the Tangier zone. Moreover, at least one very important article of the convention, namely, that relating to the international gendarmerie, must remain in abeyance so long as the war continues. His Majesty's Government are entirely in agreement with the French and Spanish Governments that for the present it is impossible to dissolve the French and Spanish tabors and start a new gendarmerie under a Belgian captain.

Tangier.

The convention, which was brought into force on the 1st June, has, on the whole, been working much better than most people anticipated. The Mixed Court functions, a municipal police force has been formed, the streets are cleaner, and, though there is endless criticism, there is no very manifest discontent. At the same time, the non-adherence of three Powers—Italy, the United States and Portugal—makes further progress very difficult. These three Powers still retain their extra-territorial rights, their nationals are not subject to the Mixed Court, and in certain cases they can act with impunity in defiance of the law, as, for example, in running gambling establishments. Moreover, the Italian Agency, with a colony of some 500 or 600 Italians, is a rallying-point for all the disaffected elements. Again, certain taxes and dues cannot be enforced against the nationals of the three non-adhering Powers. An Italian ship, for instance, while paying the increased lighterage charges which were accepted by all the signatories of the Act of Algeciras early this year, declines to pay the increased anchorage dues which, though perfectly reasonable, result from the new convention, to which they have not adhered, while the stamp tax remains a dead letter as far as the non-adhering Powers are concerned except in a few cases where, in the interests of their business, it is to their advantage to pay. It is easy to see, therefore, that a sense of grievance exists among those who have to pay these taxes, who claim, with justice, that economic equality, which is the essential feature of the convention, does not in reality exist. The only remedy for this state of affairs is to bring about the adherence to the statute of Italy and the other two Powers. His Majesty's consul-general, when recently in England, went so far as to say that he feared that if something was not done in the next few months to bring in the Italians it was not impossible that the convention, which had made a satisfactory start, might in the end fail. He was authorised, therefore, unofficially to discuss this in Paris and Madrid on his way back to Tangier with a view to finding some means by which the Italians could be brought in.

The French have always maintained, and still maintain, the view that the action of Italy is a direct breach of faith. The French had given the Italians a completely free hand in Tripoli in return for a completely free hand in Morocco; Tripoli was now an Italian colony, whereas the French had only a protectorate over a part of Morocco, having sub-leased to the Spaniards what is known as the "Spanish zone," while they had agreed to an international régime in Tangier. The Italians had, therefore, no right whatever to any special concession, and if they had acted up to their engagement they would never have made any difficulty about the Tangier statute. Mr. Clive, while admitting the question of right, pointed out that we were up against a question of fact; Italy had not come into the statute, was not suffering by her abstention, and, unless something was done to meet her, it was quite clear now that she would not come in. It was suggested, therefore, that certain articles of the convention, which experience had shown might with advantage be revised, should form the subject of examination by the consuls-general sitting as a committee in Tangier, to which the representatives of the non-adhering Powers should be invited. If the three signatory Powers could agree on the articles to be revised, and the three non-adhering Powers accepted the invitation to take part in the revision, a way might be found to satisfy Italian *amour-propre*, so that the Italians would be able to say that the convention in its final form had received their assent. The discussion in Paris was, it must be remembered, unofficial, but the head of the North Africa Department considered that the French Government would not object in principle to such a solution.

The attitude of the Spanish authorities was somewhat different. Spain has all along considered that it was a mistake not to have agreed to Italian participation in drawing up the convention, and she had been prepared to make considerable concessions to induce her adhesion. At the same time, it must be remembered that Spain still hankers after a Spanish Tangier, and both the King and the President of the Spanish Directory have recently again given voice to this sentiment. There are certain articles of the convention which Spain particularly dislikes, and it is fully realised that it may be very difficult to induce the Directory to agree to the revision of a limited number of less contentious articles. The President of the Directory was absent from Madrid at the time of Mr. Clive's visit, and the head of the Morocco Department, while ready to discuss the proposal, said he could express no opinion until the matter had been submitted to the President. There the matter rests for the present. If Spain refuses to allow any revision of the statute with Italian participation as a means of obtaining Italian adherence, some other way will have to be found, and this only appears possible by means of certain definite concessions to Italian demands, which the French have hitherto refused to entertain. One must always bear in mind that, if the Spaniards are determined to prevent the statute becoming a success, they can probably do so. In order, therefore, to prevent the Tangier question again becoming a source of international trouble, it seems worth while to go as far as possible to meet the Italians.

The only alternative to the statute appears to be Spanish control of Tangier, subject to all necessary safeguards in respect of its permanent neutrality and the maintenance of economic equality. It is possible that, from the point of view of British interests, Spanish control under these conditions might suit us as well as the present international régime, but there are certain very obvious and serious difficulties in the way of any change in the status of Tangier. If the Tangier Convention has done nothing else, it has at least been successful in keeping the Tangier zone outside the war area, and that is a very considerable achievement, which the inhabitants of Tangier do not sufficiently realise. Abd-el-Krim understands and appreciates the present neutral status of Tangier, and would probably be the first to resent any change in that status. Any idea, therefore, of Spanish control of Tangier is inconceivable so long as a state of war exists in the Spanish zone, and it must be remembered that an intermittent state of war has been going on ever since the Spanish protectorate has been established. One cannot, therefore, safely argue that if the present state of war should be brought to an end it would be safe to hand over Tangier to the Spaniards, because no one would be rash enough to predict that any peace that might now be made will necessarily have a permanent character. The more the problem is studied the more difficult it becomes to contemplate any other solution to the Tangier problem than the international régime agreed upon in Paris two years ago. The Spanish desire for Tangier will die hard, but the only policy appears to be to try and induce them to realise the impossibility of any other solution to the problem than the one which has been arrived at.

The Riff War.

The following extract from a letter sent to Mr. Clive by Mr. Harris, the "Times" correspondent in Tangier, on the 14th November, recording an interview with the President of the Spanish Directory, shows clearly how unsatisfactory the present state of affairs really is. While the French and Spaniards each claim publicly to have achieved their objectives, peace has not yet been made, and there is nothing to show that Abd-el-Krim is any more ready to make peace now than he was last summer, except on his own conditions. Numerous unofficial agents are said to be in touch with Abd-el-Krim, and it can only be hoped in the general interest that he may be induced to come to terms before the spring, although the outlook for an acceptable peace is not encouraging.

Extract from Mr. Harris's Letter.

We then talked of the Jebala and the Riff with perfect frankness on both sides. Primo evidently realises the great difficulties of the situation. Neither the Riff nor the Jebala have any confidence in Spain, owing, he said, to former disastrous policy with regard to Raisuli. He agreed that incalculable damage had been done to Spanish prestige by the action of the Spanish Government turning Raisuli loose to kill and to rob after Spain had definitely promised to grant adequate and effective protection to the tribes. "We failed," Primo said, "and dishonourably, to keep

our word." He was very bitter about it, nor was he much milder on the subject of his predecessor, General Berenguer's policy. He spoke of "his barbarous methods" of warfare. I felt inclined to ask what methods of warfare Berenguer had used which were not being employed by the Spanish army at the present moment—but refrained. Our conversation then turned on Abd-el-Krim, and from him to the possibility of winning over the Jebala. I said I thought the Jebala were tired of war, but they had no confidence whatever in Spain's capacity to protect them from Abd-el-Krim's Riffis. I recommended him to continue active political work amongst the tribes, but to avoid inviting premature submissions which might lead to reactions or reprisals—either Spain must be able fully to protect the tribes, or must render Abd-el-Krim incapable of furnishing Riff contingents to punish them for their leanings towards peace with Spain. He thinks the latter is quite possible, and even doubts to-day whether Abd-el-Krim could find the necessary forces to form a punitive expedition against these northern Jebala tribes should they decide to abandon the rebellion. Primo seems quite certain that the campaign in the Alhucemas district will continue all the winter. He is distinctly optimistic, sees possibilities of a Spanish offensive shortly, and of a definite victory. He told me that they have about 18,000 men at Alhucemas, of whom 4,000 are sufficient to hold the lines there, leaving 14,000 available for an advance into the Riff, should it be considered advisable. He is decided that the present lines in the western part of the zone—Tetuan to Laraiche—must not be advanced, nor any, except the smallest local, action taken in those regions. Any campaign must be conducted against Abd-el-Krim personally, and against his Riffs, and not in outlying districts. His eventual policy is to hold the Atlantic strip of the zone, thence to Tetuan, including Anjera, and in the Riff only the Penon de la Gomera, Alhucemas Island and the shore of the bay, and the Melilla district—the rest to be treated as an unoccupied sphere of influence under kaid relations with the Spanish authorities on the coast, and acknowledging the Makh-Makhzen of the Sultan and the Khalifa. Publicly he is against all attempts to negotiate with Abd-el-Krim at present, but desires to send Colonel Orgaz, who is head of the Bureau of Native Affairs—"Intervención Indígena"—to talk to him. Abd-el-Krim has a copy of the text of the Franco-Spanish terms of peace, Primo told me, and he also confirmed my telegrams to the "Times" that he had received the Riff delegates and made known to them what the French and Spanish Governments were prepared to offer and accept. He also told me, which I think was never made public, that he himself sent a signed letter to Abd-el-Krim containing the terms. He was very anxious that I should assist him in obtaining an invitation from Abd-el-Krim for Colonel Orgaz to go to Ajdir to see the Riff leader. But all this talk about the Riff is of minor importance and can wait till we meet. What is more important is Primo's opinion of the Franco-Spanish (Madrid) Agreement. He began by asking me what I thought of this agreement. I told him that I quite frankly did not consider it could be really beneficial to either party—and that I had told Lyautey this, and that he had quite agreed. Lyautey had decided to go no further than "simultaneous" action, which I had recommended in the "Times." I gave him all my reasons, which Primo acknowledged were good—mentality of the two people, divergence of methods, jealousy, treatment of tribes, &c. Primo spoke very seriously of the very difficult position this arrangement with France had placed Spain in. The Spanish Directorate had taken the immense risk—he called it a gamble—of landing at Alhucemas, as the price of French co-operation from the south of the Riff. The disembarkation had been successful, but already, it seemed, the French were hesitating to fulfil their part of the bargain. They had retired their troops from the very spot where it was vital for Spain that they should have remained, and Primo feared an entire repudiation in effect, if not in words, of the Madrid Agreement. He told me that France and Spain had respectively reserved the right of treating locally with the tribes, but were pledged to make no separate peace with Abd-el-Krim. The Spaniards had understood this to mean that they could engage in negotiations with the tribes round Tetuan and Tangier, for instance, and the French with the rebel tribes of the French zone, for instance, those of the Wergha Valley. But Primo said he had evidence that the French put quite a different interpretation upon this reservation clause, and were treating with the limitrophe tribes of the French and Spanish zones, including the tribes situated *inside* the Spanish zone. The result he foresaw was this—the French, owing to the difficulties of their situation, both in Morocco and in France, would some day suddenly announce that they had settled the question of their participation in the campaign

by an arrangement with the tribes under this special clause of the Madrid Agreement, while protesting that they would refrain from making peace with Abd-el-Krim until Spain was prepared to do so. Primo did not seem to be aware that the French are already in active relations—so far unsuccessfully—with Abd-el-Krim with the object of arriving at peace. In my opinion, both France and Spain, while protesting their acceptance of combined action and united political and military front, are, in reality, full of suspicion of each other's intentions, a suspicion that seems to me fully warranted on both sides, and I am convinced that if peace were possible for either it would be accepted without hesitation.

I told Primo the French point of view—that they have carried their campaign into the Riff, where they have no interests, purely and solely to facilitate Spain's action at Alhucemas—at least, they say so—and that, if they had been alone, their part of the war would have been concluded long ago. I added that the advice I had to give Primo was exactly the same that I had given to Lyautey, that no matter what agreements they had signed at Madrid, the French and Spanish armies never ought to be allowed to come within 15 kilom. of each other. Primo laughed—and, I think, agreed. It is, of course, possible that "combined action" may be resurrected in the spring, but it is pretty dead on both sides at the moment. It was never anything but impracticable and foolish. Each country, I told Primo—and I had said the same to Lyautey—must count on its own forces and on its own forces alone, in this war against Abd-el-Krim. Should combined action be possible—simultaneous action should be quite feasible—so much the better, but neither France nor Spain ought to count on each other's support.

We discussed the question of what would be the effect in the Riff if Abd-el-Krim accepted the Painlevé-Primo terms, and I did not disguise the fact that, in my opinion, the result would be anarchy. The Riffis are quite incapable of self-government, which those terms grant. Primo said the proposals came from the French, and the Directory accepted them, not quite realising that all that was to be given to Abd-el-Krim would be at the expense of Spain—as the Riff is in her zone—and that all the French had to do was to find a formula and get the Sultan to sign a dahir which would be only operative in the Spanish zone. Primo seemed to regret the action taken in Madrid, when a combined front, military and political, was decided upon. He made no secret of the fact that he considered Spain had been told off to pick the chestnuts out of the fire for France to eat. As to the future of the Riff, beyond a desire that it should be a sort of Spanish sphere of influence, entailing no great expense or loss of life to Spain, Primo really seems to have no fixed ideas. He confesses, and rightly, that it is a hopelessly complicated situation.

CHAPTER III.—FRENCH ZONE.

[W 8538/627/28]

No. 120.

Consul-General Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 8.)
(No. 45.)

Sir,

Rabat, August 28, 1925.

THE budget of the French protectorate for the year the 1st January to the 31st December, 1925, was published in the local "Bulletin officiel" of the 11th August. This is the earliest date on which the budget has been produced since 1920. The delay in recent years gave rise to complaint, and the comparatively early appearance of the final estimates this year marks an improvement in the administrative arrangements.

2. As I did not report on this subject last year, I may perhaps be permitted to refer to my contribution to the annual report on Morocco for 1924, in which I attempted to review the finance of the protectorate since the armistice. I take the opportunity of correcting two mistakes in the first table (Table (A)) in the report. The figure for "Other receipts credited to Ordinary Budget" for 1924 should be 99,444,800 fr. The figures for "Specially affected Resources" ("taxe spéciale") and "Specially affected Resources, Reserve Fund," for 1922 should be interchanged. I may also mention that there is always a certain margin of possible error in particular figures, owing to the fact that minor modifications are sometimes introduced into the budget by decrees subsequent to those sanctioning what purport to be final estimates.

3. The following table gives a partial analysis of the new budget on the same plan as that adopted in the annual report for 1924:—

Estimated Expenditure for 1925.		Estimated Receipts for 1925.	
	Fr.		Fr.
<i>Ordinary Budget—</i>		<i>Ordinary Budget—</i>	
Debt charges	61,448,257	Agricultural tax ("tertib") ..	76,800,000
Expenditure other than debt charges		Customs	89,600,000
in the ordinary budget.. ..	280,650,829	Consumption duties on sugar and	
		alcohol	59,305,000
		Posts and telegraphs	16,215,500
		Other receipts credited to ordinary	
		budget	100,264,160
Total of ordinary budget ..	342,099,086	Total of ordinary budget ..	342,184,960
<i>Special Budgets—</i>		<i>Special Budgets—</i>	
Expenditure chargeable to proceeds		Proceeds of loans and connected	
of loans	50,682,725	operations	50,682,725
Expenditure chargeable to reserve		Specially affected resources ("taxe	
fund and other specially affected		spéciale")	18,000,000
resources	38,514,000	Specially affected resources, "re-	
		serve fund"	11,329,000
		Specially affected resources, miscel-	
		aneous	9,185,000
Grand total of expenditure ..	431,295,811	Grand total of receipts ..	431,381,685

4. The general plan of the 1925 estimates is the same as in previous years, i.e., they are divided into three parts, viz., the ordinary budget and two special budgets, which balance automatically, showing expenditure chargeable to proceeds of loans and connected operations and expenditure chargeable to reserve fund and specially affected resources, including the protectorate's share of the "taxe spéciale" levied under the Act of Algeciras. I will deal first with the two special budgets.

5. The most interesting feature of the loan budget, which contemplates new expenditure of a little over 50 million fr., is that the equivalent amount on the receipts side is described as "avances de trésorerie pour dotation provisoire du programme de l'emprunt autorisé par la loi du 19 août 1920." This would appear to indicate that the proceeds of the two issues already made in respect of the large loan sanctioned in 1920 have been exhausted and that it has become necessary to anticipate the proceeds of a further issue. The principal items of new expenditure contemplated are 21,800,000 fr. for ports, against which is set off 10 million fr. to be provided by the Phosphates Administration, and 17 million fr. for agricultural and industrial water supply.

6. The third section of the budget presents no unusual features, except that it is credited with 4 million fr. to be provided by the newly established royalty payable by

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the State Bank on its note issue. Following the precedent of last year, a portion of the Moroccan contribution to military expenditure, amounting to 6,350,000 fr., is charged to reserve fund.

7. The ordinary budget, by which, in my opinion, the financial position of the protectorate must in the main be judged, shows the same progressive increase on both sides which has characterised recent years. It is made to balance almost exactly at a figure of about 342 million fr. as compared with 312 million fr. in 1924 and 300 million fr. in 1923.

8. It is interesting to note that in the preliminary estimates produced here early in the year it was proposed to balance the ordinary budget at a figure of about 331,500,000 fr. I do not know whether the increase in the final estimates was made on second thoughts here or when the budget went to Paris for approval, as it has to do before final adoption. Anyhow, it is curious that the increase on the receipts side results from more optimistic estimates for three taxes which might be expected to react most immediately to the general state of the country, viz., the agricultural tax, customs duties and the tax on sugar. These are now estimated to yield in 1925 in round figures 77, 89½ and 52 million fr. respectively as compared with 66, 83½ and 43 million fr. in 1924. Practically the whole of the increased receipts shown in the final as compared with the preliminary estimates is attributed on the other side to unforeseen expenditure.

9. In my contribution to the annual report for 1924 I expressed the view that the financial policy of the protectorate appeared to be in the main sound. I was looking primarily to the actual figures and results obtained up to date. Doubts are entertained in many quarters as to whether the necessary economic basis exists for a rapidly expanding budget and comparatively heavy capitalisation. My personal impression is that, unless the French administration has some serious set-back, the policy will justify itself in this respect also, but weight must be given to the considerations summarised in the despatch No. 67 O.T. of the 24th December, 1924, addressed by His Majesty's consul at Casablanca to the Department of Overseas Trade, a despatch in which Mr. Selous drew particular attention both to capital expenditure and to the numerous contingent liabilities incurred by the protectorate. The present year should test the policy pretty severely. It must, for instance, have required some courage to budget confidently on a considerable increase in the yield of the agricultural tax in a year of only fairly good harvests and at a time when the protectorate is going through a critical political and military phase. Such optimism is the more striking when it is remembered that, whereas in 1919-21 actual receipts exceeded estimates, the actual receipts in 1922 and 1923 fell short of them (see Table (B), p. 20, of the annual report for 1924).

10. It must, of course, be remembered, that the bulk of the military expenditure in Morocco falls on France. The Moroccan contribution thereto is small. It works out for 1925 at about 45 million fr. as compared with an estimate in the French military budget of about 341 million fr., to which will have to be added the very heavy additional expenditure entailed by the present war. The total expenditure of France on the occupation of Morocco from 1907 to 1924 inclusive is officially put at a little over 4,173 million fr., of which 64 per cent. is described as "dépenses de garnison, non spéciales au Maroc" and 36 per cent. as "dépenses de pacification, spéciales au Maroc." When the total military expenditure on this year's operations is added the figure will be very largely increased, though attempts will doubtless be made for political reasons to disguise many items.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier and His Majesty's consul at Casablanca.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[W 9934/4011/28]

No. 121.

Consul-General Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 67.)

Sir,

Rabat, October 13, 1925.

MARSHAL LYAUTEY, having resigned the office of Resident-General, left Morocco on the 10th October. His departure may prove to be a turning-point in the history of this country, and is, in any case, an event so considerable that it is worth

while to attempt a general appreciation of the marshal's achievement during the thirteen years of his tenure of the Residency-General. For this purpose it is convenient to consider him as a soldier, as a European administrator of an essentially, though not geographically, Oriental country, and as an exponent of French colonial expansion.

2. From a purely military point of view, Marshal Lyautey could hardly claim to be a great soldier. He had, however, before 1912 a distinguished military record, sufficiently distinguished, and in its later stages closely enough connected with Morocco, to make it natural that he should be selected for the post of first Resident-General, when the crisis which followed the conclusion of the Protectorate Treaty on the 30th March, 1912, showed the necessity for a strong hand. He combined the qualities of a soldier fitted for high command in an occupied country with those of an administrator whose task must be to pacify not merely by force, but by policy, and to evolve order out of chaos by superimposing a European system on decayed and incoherent native institutions. He brought to his task a definite and high conception of the soldier's rôle in the life of the French body politic, and the conviction that it was essential to that rôle that it should consist in practical action rather than in political or speculative theorising.

3. The fundamental principles of Marshal Lyautey's work as a Moroccan administrator were that, as far as possible, French influence should be extended by political and peaceful penetration rather than by arms, and that, again as far as possible, the natives should not be disturbed in the machinery of their daily lives. The means of material prosperity were to be given to the latter, and it was perhaps one of the marshal's illusions that this would not only reconcile them to European administration, but would endear to them the administrators. Direct French control was to be brought to bear on the native system over a gradually increasing area, but scrupulous respect was to be shown towards native susceptibilities in matters affecting religion and social organisation. In the more remote and difficult regions French influence was to be exercised less directly, much latitude being allowed to local kaid in matters of administration so long as they recognised the overlordship of the Sultan and his French protectors.

4. In the realisation of this programme Marshal Lyautey was the inspiring genius. As time went on an organised departmental system had naturally to be evolved, but the belief which is sometimes entertained that in later years he dropped into the rôle of a venerable and picturesque figurehead is erroneous. Up to the end the work bore the impress of his personality. The material development of the country proceeded apace. Complaints have been made with partial justice that there was too much façade and too little well-furnished interior to the edifice. Towns and ports were developed out of proportion to the rural districts, but the settled parts of the country as a whole were provided with an excellent system of communications and increasing, if possibly insufficient, attention was given to agriculture. The marshal's favourite theory of non-interference with the natives in matters of intimate concern to them was in some ways applied over-faithfully. Too little was done to reform native justice, which contains in itself small possibilities either of progress on European lines or of a return to the purity of Islam. No general encouragement was given to the natives to seek education on modern lines, with the result that, if Morocco should be destined for an evolution at all similar to that of Egypt, it will long suffer from the lack of any considerable number of educated natives. The latitude allowed to the local kaid, especially to the grand kaid of the south, tended too much to the perpetuation, or even aggravation, of abuses under the ægis of the protecting Power. Perhaps the least satisfactory feature of French administration is that minor French officials are not above suspicion of corruption, and that the toleration of unsatisfactory conditions often presents the appearance of collusion.

5. Even when allowance is made for all these defects, and some of them may be justified by political necessity, the work done under the direction of Marshal Lyautey has been a great one; the best tribute that can be rendered to it as an experiment in the management of an Oriental country is that it has stood the strain of the present war. The Moors do not love the French occupation. They dislike organised taxation and the shackles of foreign administrative interference even when reduced to a minimum. The personal affection with which they are sometimes represented as regarding Marshal Lyautey himself is more or less of a fiction. But, even when the north of Morocco was subjected last spring to the strain of revolt and invasion, it is remarkable how little the life of the rest of the country was affected. The grand kaid may have wavered momentarily, but they remained loyal. The people in the

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settled regions carried on. Marshal Lyautey might well claim that the pacification of Morocco, so far as it had gone, had been a success.

6. Morocco seemed in 1912 to be a promising field for French enterprise. It was clearly a part of the programme that it should be not merely a bulwark of the French Empire in North Africa, but should be in itself an important market for French wares and the home of a thriving French community. The Great War delayed matters, but one of Marshal Lyautey's titles to distinction is that he did not loose his hold or allow the French Government to do so in the midst of their preoccupations elsewhere. It is still too soon to say whether colonisation will be a permanent success. The towns are only now recovering from the boom which followed the armistice. The French settlers in the country districts complain that little has been done for them. There is much French criticism, if not of Marshal Lyautey himself, of the administration which he brought into being. There is doubtless ground for many of the complaints, but their authors are too ready to forget how short the time has been, and in two respects the complaints correspond to an attitude on the part of Marshal Lyautey, for which he deserves credit rather than blame. He has discountenanced an excessively "colonial policy," under which the interests of natives would be subordinated entirely to those of Frenchmen, and Frenchmen favoured not only to the disadvantage of natives, but to the exclusion of all other foreigners. He was not invariably successful in securing respect for those principles on the part of his subordinates. He did so, however, to a large extent, and one of the possible dangers of the withdrawal of his influence is that an extravagantly "colonial" policy may prevail, perhaps to the detriment of the highest political interests of France herself, certainly to that of British and other non-French foreign interests in Morocco. Fortunately, however, the present war and its aftermath will probably act as a deterrent to the adoption of sudden and drastic changes of policy.

7. I have tried to make this cursory review dispassionate, but I think the fact emerges that, if Marshal Lyautey was not so infallible as his out-and-out admirers would have him to be, he discharged a great task in a great and worthy manner. His personality imposed itself the more because of his boundless energy, and his combination of military bluntness with a certain chivalric aspect which made even his fables picturesque. His detractors accuse him of having grown to think himself a demi-god, of having deprived fellow-soldiers of the credit which was their due, and of having allowed himself to be swayed too much by an entourage of creatures of his own. Many who are not necessarily his detractors say that he would have done better to leave Morocco two years ago, when his reputation was at its zenith. As it is, he has certainly left amid a storm of recrimination, at a time when military reverses, only partly retrieved, have shown the defects of the military organisation on the northern frontier and the illusoriness of his belief in the hold established by his political service on the frontier tribes. It is not to the present purpose to discuss the controversies to which the war has given rise, but it is my personal belief that Marshal Lyautey cannot be fairly accused of having gratuitously provoked the war, of having failed more than was in human nature to forestall the danger, or of having done less than was possible with the means which were at his disposal while he was still in supreme command to meet the storm when it broke. He might have been happier in his fate if he had anticipated what was coming and resigned his post in 1923. I think that he chose the nobler part in remaining, even if he did so only to be driven out by circumstances and adverse criticism in 1925.

8. General Lyautey was sent to Casablanca in a French cruiser in 1912. The marshal left as a passenger on board a packet steamer. Underlying the magnificence of his send off there was a feeling that he was departing under a cloud, a victim of ingratitude in the eyes of his friends, a failure in the final test according to his enemies. When the last farewells had been said and the ship moved across Casablanca Harbour, he stood looking towards the shore, a tired and somewhat lonely figure. He doubtless felt the sorrow of an old man ending his life work, and perhaps some disillusionment. Yet no man of his time could have a better right to say: "Si monumentum requiris, circumspice." Casablanca is not the prettiest part of the monument, but it is a French *tour de force*, and beyond Casablanca lies a country in which much has already been achieved for France, not a little for the Moors. Those who look not merely to the theatre of the war, but to French Morocco as a whole, with all its defects, but with all its possibilities of future progress, must recognise in Marshal Lyautey a very remarkable, perhaps a very great, Frenchman.

9. Marshal Lyautey has sometimes been regarded as anti-British. He was so absorbed in a French task that it is, to my mind, somewhat futile to attempt to define

him with reference to his sentiments towards Great Britain. I think it is true that he shared the tendency of many Frenchmen, especially those who, like him, have marked monarchical and Catholic sympathies, to mistrust British policy. Outspoken, temperamental, and in his later years a little spoilt, he was sometimes apt to ventilate this mistrust just when another man might have concealed it, *i.e.*, in speaking to Englishmen, who on such occasions found him disconcerting. On the other hand, he was, as I have already said, opposed to a policy in the protectorate of hostility to non-French interests, a policy for which British interests would have offered a special mark, had he chosen to encourage it. He welcomed British visitors, and British subjects established in this country held him in high regard. I have pleasure in recording that on the 7th October, when he was making his farewells in Casablanca, a deputation of British subjects presented him with a silver tray as a permanent memento of their admiration. This spontaneous demonstration on the part of a small and mainly commercial community speaks for itself.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the acting British consul-general at Tangier.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[W 10132/186/28]

No. 122.

Consul Selous to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.---(Received October 28.)

(No. 45.)

Sir,

Casablanca, October 14, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a very interesting memorandum which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul in Marrakesh, wherein he deals with the political situation in South Morocco. Mr. Were's remarks dealing with the possibilities of development consequent upon the appointment of a civilian resident-general and centering round the Glaoui and Merebbi Rebbo are of particular interest.

I have, &c.

G. H. SELOUS.

Enclosure in No. 122.

Memorandum.

THE events of the past few months on the front north of Fez seem to have aroused but little interest amongst the greater number of the inhabitants of Marrakesh and its surrounding districts. It is altogether the exception for the subject to be introduced in conversation, and when mentioned it is in a tone of complete indifference and with a total absence of curiosity as to developments, or, indeed, of any apparent knowledge of the situation.

2. It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this attitude of detachment from the vicissitudes of the military operations that the population is out of sympathy with, or at least indifferent to, the theoretical consideration underlying the Riffian upheaval—the right of Moslem peoples to govern their countries without the interference of European Powers; for in this respect the sympathy of both classes and masses is entirely with Abd-el-Krim, and the efforts of the French to discredit him, by representing him as a pretender to the Sultanate and otherwise, have failed badly of their purpose, and confirmed many Moors in their growing distrust of the honesty of purpose of their protectors.

3. It is instructive to compare the published utterances of the Glaoui on the subject of his attachment to France, with the following opinion, expressed privately to a personal friend (not a Frenchman). Asked whether he did not think Abd-el-Krim had foolishly and disastrously over-estimated his strength in challenging so powerful a military nation as France, he expressed entire dissent. "If a man," he said, "is worried by the presence of a snake in a hole close to his house, he does not stop to consider whether it is a large or a small snake before trying to entice it from its hole in the hope of killing it before it has time to strike." The analogy is not very clear, but the implication that France is, in the opinion of her most trusted ally, an unwanted intruder in

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Morocco, is insultingly and surprisingly evident, in contrast with his avowed affection for her. But the Glaoui, like most Berbers, is an accomplished cynic, and loses no opportunity of turning the colossal vanity of the French to his own advantage.

4. Another of the Grand Kaid, El Ayadi, is at times more outspoken in his dislike of and contempt for the protecting Power. At the same time, he has very little regard for Great Britain, who, he says, betrayed Morocco by failing to carry out a virtual promise to take over the government of the country, and is therefore responsible for all Morocco's present ills. His bogey is that Morocco is destined to become another Algeria, and he sums up his grievances in the cry: "Have these people no country of their own that they must come to ours and take our land from us to farm, and our water to irrigate their farms?" El Ayadi, it should be said, an Arab of the plains, whose property is more accessible and more suitable for European exploitation than that of his compeers, has most to fear from the extension of the system of "lots de colonisation" granted to European (predominantly French) settlers, a system which gives rise to much dissatisfaction amongst the natives of both north and south Morocco, and which is a constantly recurring theme in Abd-el-Krim's propaganda.

5. Of the remaining Grand Kaid, Goundafi, who was relieved of his official duties in May 1924, has long been suspect, and was reported to have gone to Fez at the time of the Aid-el-Kebeer this year in order to be present when Abd-el-Krim should enter the town in triumph. Whatever the reason underlying his visit, he was promptly sent back to Marrakesh, virtually under arrest. M'Tougui, the doyen of the company, is, I think, far too experienced and too circumspect to give expression to any feelings of either satisfaction or the reverse at the existing state of affairs.

6. That discussion of the Riffian war is not more general amongst the mass of the population may be due, as some hold, to the fact that the French rigorously repress all mention of it; but a more cogent factor is, I think, the circumstance that the harvest, particularly the rich almond crop, has turned out exceptionally well within a radius of 50 miles of Marrakesh, and that the natives are far too fully occupied with the collection and safe disposal of their gains to devote any time to consideration of a war which touches them not at all. In the regions lying further afield the harvest has been bad, and I gather that the French have been and still are nervous as to the possibility of disturbance, and have again resorted to the policy, exploited during the European War, of ensuring quiet by the distribution of largess, in the shape, in present circumstances, of high rates of pay for "partisans" (who are not, however, required to leave their own districts) and for pack animals requisitioned for military purposes, and by providing plenty of remunerative work on roads and *pistes*.

7. Unfortunately, these and other signs of anxiety on the part of the French have not been lost on the native population, and there has sprung up amongst them in the course of the past few months a new spirit of insolence towards Europeans which, unmistakable in Marrakesh itself, is so pronounced in the country districts that the local Chamber of Commerce, at the instance of French *colons* in the region who fear for their personal safety, has drawn thereto the attention of the protectorate authorities. This state of affairs is due in large part to the effect of certain instructions issued last May to all the authorities of the region enjoining them, in view of the situation in the north, to use especial leniency and discretion in their dealings with Moslems and in deciding disputes between Moslems and Europeans or Jews. There can, I think, be no doubt that a gross psychological error was committed in ordaining a change of treatment of the native at such a time; but the official tactics are, after all, merely a reproduction of the attitude of the average Frenchman in Morocco towards the Moor, whom he will at one moment permit to treat him with the utmost familiarity, and the next dismiss with a contemptuous "sale Arabe!"

8. But despite the change that has supervened in this respect it cannot be said that the mass of the population of this region is anything but satisfied with the results of the French occupation and of the stricter control exercised by the French "Renseignements" Service over the Kaid, great and small. It is no longer the latter who alone permit themselves the luxuries brought by civilisation in its train; on the contrary, the Kaid, whose expenditure is to some extent subject to the control of the political officer of their district, have been obliged to draw in their horns, while their "ressortissants," who have hitherto sedulously avoided all display which might expose them to the exactions of their superiors, are now no longer afraid to

lay out a portion of their accumulated wealth in goods of other than prime necessity. To that extent the native recognises the benefits of the protectorate, without, however, realising that it is the protectorate alone which makes possible so satisfactory a state of affairs.

9. The problem confronting France in South Morocco has hitherto been to bring the country under her effective control by a process of gradual penetration, while avoiding direct conflict with the Grand Kaid, and on the whole they have so far succeeded admirably in their purpose. It is true that the Goundafi's opposition had finally to be overcome by other than diplomatic means, but his disappearance called forth little comment and no reprobation whatever from his adherents. Rehamna and Sraghna, owing allegiance to El Ayadi, and M'Touga are quiet, well-governed and prosperous under French control, and the same can be said of the less remote portions of the Glaoui's hereditary fiefs. But in the greater part of the Grand Atlas is still only the writ of the Glaoui that runs, and few of the inhabitants believe that the French could maintain themselves in Morocco at all without the support of their chieftain.

10. More than ever, therefore, the ultimate success of French policy in Southern Morocco centres round the Glaoui, who alone of his countrymen has retained his prestige and power practically intact. A week ago one could scarcely have hesitated to conclude that the policy of gradual substitution of French influence for that of the Glaoui would be pressed to its logical end, without haste but with none the less certainty, and that in due course the Glaoui would retire, full of honours and of more substantial marks of France's gratitude. But Marshal Lyautey's resignation, and more particularly the probable advent of a civilian Resident in his place, evokes the spectre of a complete reversal of policy, such as accompanied the disastrous Spanish experiment of a civilian High Commissioner at Tetuan, and of a hasty attempt to introduce more regular methods of government into the Atlas. Even should that danger fail to materialise, there remains the possibility of the Glaoui's premature death. At 45 or thereabouts he enjoys but poor health, and his manner of living is not conducive to longevity. Should he disappear from the scene, by death or otherwise, before the hold of the French over the Atlas tribes had been firmly established, they might well be led astray by any agitator, sincere or the reverse. At the moment no serious focus of dissidence exists nearer than Tafilelt, where Merebbi Rebbo maintains the country in a state of more or less continuous effervescence. Hitherto he has restricted his activities to his own desert region, but the threat of French penetration might, probably would, bring about an attack by him on the Marrakesh district similar to that which the Ouergha operations of 1924 caused Abd-el-Krim to launch this year against Fez, Taza and Ouezzan.

C. A. W. WERE.

Marrakesh, October 5, 1925.

[W 11476/186/28].

No. 123.

Acting Consul-General Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 100.)

Sir,

Rabat, December 2, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a despatch No. 133 of the 28th ultimo addressed to me by His Majesty's vice-consul at Fez, in which Colonel Mackereth reports on the state of native feeling and opinion in Fez.

2. Of particular interest is Colonel Mackereth's statement that the instruments of modern warfare do not inspire either combatant or non-combatant natives with terror, and that, on the contrary, they are learning to look upon them with contempt.

3. A copy of this despatch and its enclosure has been sent to His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 123.

Vice-Consul Mackereth to Acting Consul-General Stonehewer-Bird.

(No. 133.)

Sir,

Fez, November 28, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on the state of native feeling and opinion in Fez:—

2. I find that in native circles sympathy with Abd-el-Krim has increased since May last to a considerable extent. This is due in large part to the inability of the French and Spaniards to crush the Riff leader, and to a lesser degree the cruelty allowed to enter into acts of reprisal against reconquered tribes; enough to irritate but not enough to intimidate, has brought about further hatred of the French and a correspondingly increased sympathy for the Riffis. The Riff tribesmen, notwithstanding the blockade, still manage to come to the Fez markets and they bring with them tales of Homeric fights and victories against great odds. This is inclined to make the man that sits in his cosy house in Fez think that it is easy to beat the European and that he could, should the occasion arrive, do likewise. The tanks used by the French seem to have been unsuccessful in producing panic among the unsophisticated natives. The time has passed when elephants presented by Queen Victoria to the Sultan of Morocco produced terror in the ranks of the Sultan's enemies. The natives think it is easy to put these weapons of war out of action, their favourite method is to dig pits and cover them with a layer of brushwood and mud. Into these traps fall the unsuspecting tanks, whereupon the natives hiding near the pits rush in and kill the unfortunate men in them. Shells have little effect, so the tribesmen maintain (familiarity, as in the Great War, breeds a certain contempt). Aeroplane bombs are not feared, but they seem to be the only instruments of modern warfare that have any real or lasting effect in this hilly country, not from the bombing of villages or people, but from the bombing of herds of cattle and flocks of sheep. In general, it may be said with safety that the native has grown to look with contempt upon modern armament, whether the particular native has participated in this year's fighting or merely heard of it from those that have.

3. This contempt is a very real danger to France; perhaps also to us, for the tales of the Riffis will surely spread beyond the boundaries of Morocco. The native, who has never loved the Frenchman in Morocco, with possibly a few exceptions, is now losing his fear for him. To-day politics, and "politics" usually means in these countries rank sedition, are talked aloud in the sooks of Fez, a state of affairs that certainly did not exist a year ago, when everyone was afraid of being overheard; to-day nobody seems to mind. Many old European inhabitants of Fez maintain that there is an increase of spitting on the ground by natives on the approach of Christians, an action which has the double advantage of expressing dislike and warding off the evil eye. Personally, I do not notice much change in this respect.

4. The fall in the franc has sent up the cost of living by leaps and bounds and many people are on the verge of starvation. The army, in a penny wise pound foolish fashion, has been requisitioning in large numbers natives who should be busy ploughing. To make matters worse, it has paid this forced labour at the rate of 3 fr. a day, whereas the normal price of navvy labour is 7 fr. 20 c. a day. This is, indeed, callous treatment and has caused a vast amount of discontent. The discontent is all the greater because the natives working for French colonists have been, without exception I believe, exempt from this forced labour on military roads.

5. The shelling of Damascus has caused some comment among the few people who know that city. It is, however, a matter so far beyond the appreciation of the man in the sook that little notice has been taken of it. It is merely a tool in the hand of the agitators. The fact, however, that serious trouble exists in Syria is welcomed, for it is said openly that the strength of France is thus slowly being sapped, and that eventually she will have to relax her grip on Morocco. There is but little of pan-Islamism in this, it is the hatred of a people for their enemies.

6. It does not appear to have caused surprise that the kaid south and east of Marrakesh did not rise against the French whilst the latter were being pressed by insurgent tribesmen in the north. It is said that they were waiting until communication had been opened up between them and Abd-el-Krim through the tribes of Branes, Tsoul and the Beni Curain, an event that would have occurred had General Cambay been allowed to retire from Taza when he asked authority to do so in July last. It is

thought in Fez that a rising of some importance will take place next year in the Sous, when, say the bolder spirits, Marrakesh will be taken.

7. M. Steeg's visit has created very little impression, but the impression that has been created by it is bad, and was brought about by a small and perhaps insignificant episode, which was due to failure to keep to the time-table and to thoughtlessness. M. Steeg paid the traditional visit to the Najjarine, there to be entertained to tea by the guilds of Fez. Whilst there, three of the elders of the brotherhood of Mouley Idriss invited the new Resident-General to enter their shrine (the Zawia of Mouley Idriss). M. Steeg declined the invitation, as had Marshal Lyautey on a similar occasion. Then, in a matter-of-fact manner, he handed to the elders three 500-fr. notes, saying that that sum was an offering from his Government to the famous brotherhood. The Moors have few scruples about the way money should be given, so long as it is given, but in this matter tradition decrees that offerings to Mouley Idriss shall be made personally through the hole in the wall of the shrine by the giver, otherwise it indicates a lack of respect for the saint. M. Steeg was pressed for time and omitted this essential, in the eyes of the Moors, act of respect. With all the faults imputed to the now disgraced Lyautey, the late Resident-General would never have been guilty of slighting old customs. I am told by French officials that the reason for not carrying out this visit of immemorial usage was that M. Steeg had an appointment with the French Chamber of Commerce in the new town and he himself did not attach much importance to the hypocrisy of a Christian paying his respects to a Moslem saint. The Moors, however, look upon this visit as more important than the card-leaving ceremonies that are so respected among some Europeans. Failure to perform it gives the impression that the new Resident-General is not disposed to be friendly with the Moslems, that is to say, the natives of the country, and confirms the reputation that M. Steeg appears to have had among the natives of Algeria.

8. The personality of M. Steeg is in reality a matter of little or no importance, but the fact that during the last six months French prestige has been lowered to an alarming extent is very disturbing. The country is still far from ripe for a general revolt, but, unless control by the French is made less visible, that revolt has certainly been brought nearer by many years as a result of the outbreak of this summer, but perhaps more notably on account of the inaptitude of the French in dealing with it.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

CHAPTER IV.—SPANISH ZONE.

[W 10689/39/28]

No. 124.

Acting Consul-General Bond to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 18.)
(No. 324.)

Sir,

Tangier, November 13, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch received from His Majesty's consul at Tetuan reporting on the induction of the new Khalifa of the Spanish zone. Contrary to all expectations, the ceremony passed off without any untoward incident, which is all the more surprising as an attempt, which failed, was made to buy off enemy activity in order to prevent any interference from the Riffian guns.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 124.

Consul Hope Gill to Acting Consul-General Bond.

(No. 179.)

Sir,

Tetuan, November 11, 1925.

THE three days of ceremonial surrounding the installation of the new Khalifa of the Spanish zone have passed without any untoward incident other than the bad weather. For some reason there was no interference from the Riffian guns on Bou Zeitoun. The gathering in Tetuan of some 300 leading natives of the Larache and Melilla areas and the concentration of the populace in the main Plaza of the town offered an occasion for hostile artillery demonstration which it was generally thought the rebels would not fail to seize. Whether they were paid not to fire into the town, which seems unlikely, or whether General Primo de Rivera simply gambled and won once again, it is not yet possible to determine. Certainly during the 8th and 9th the bad weather befriended him; heavy clouds obscured the gun position and only six shells were fired, at a post well below the town. The last day was clear however, but the guns were silent and a review of some 4,000 troops was carried through in front of the Residency with complete success. To-day shelling has been renewed outside the town.

His Imperial Highness Mulai-el-Hassan-ben-el-Mehdi, the new Khalifa, is a boy of 16. He is the second son of the late Khalifa, who was first cousin to the reigning Sultan, and died in 1923. The Shereefian Dahir naming Mulai-el-Hassan Khalifa of the Spanish zone was read in the chief mosque on the 8th instant.

The young Khalifa, like his father, will no doubt remain a mere figurehead. Such power as has been left in the hands of the native Makhzen will be wielded by his Grand Vizier Ben Azuz, an astute politico of the old Fez school. The real work of government lies with the new High Commissioner, General Sanjurjo, and it remains to be seen whether as a subordinate bound hand and foot to the directorate in Madrid he can carry through the task which the President himself, with the plenary powers which he has enjoyed during his year's High Commissionership in Morocco, has been unable to do more than begin. General Sanjurjo's record is one of military competency; he should be capable of keeping his lines intact. But whether he, or indeed anyone, can effectively pacify the zone with the material at his command is at least doubtful.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE-GILL.